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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to contribute to a litera-
ture which as yet barely exists in political science. 
it is a study of the transformation of a working-class 
political party, more specifically of the declining 
involvement. in the New Zealand Labour Party of the 
organizations out of which the party grew, the trade 
unions. 
In the opening chapter, four indicators of the 
'level' of trade union involvement in the party are 
examined. Changes in the proportion of all trade 
unionists and all trade unions affiliated to the party; 
in the proportion of trade unionists among all the 
delegates at, and in the proportion of union-origin-
ated remits considered by, the party's annual confer-
ences; in the frequency of meetings of the Joint Council 
of Labour; and in the proportion of trade unionists 
among the members of the PLP all reveal that the Labour 
Party is much less the party of the organized working 
class today that it was in the years before World War 
II. 
In the subsequent chapters, the causes of the 
trade unions' gradual abandonment of the party are 
identified and discussed: the success with which they 
have been able to pursue their primary objectives under 
viii 
conditions of full employment in the post-war period; 
the institutionalization of the FOL, which has become 
an increasingly independent and effective interest 
group; the changing composition of the trade union 
movement; and the growing domination of the PLP by 
its middle-class. elements. The conclusion states that, 
as a mass party, the Labour Party is moribund, but that, 
as the party of the working class, organized or other-
wise, it is already dead. 
lX 
INTRODUCTION 
Recognizing that political action is 
necessary and inevitable in the working-class 
movement, we agree to the formation of a polit-
ical party for the enacting of legislation to 
better the condition of the working-class and 
ultimately'to achieve its economic emancipa-
tion. 1 
This resolution was adopted amidst "much applause" 2 
from delegates at a Unity Conference of New Zealand 
trade unjons in January 1913. An historic step had 
been taken. The chain of events that the delegates 
had just set in motion was to culminate, three years 
later, in the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party, 
in which the political unity of the country's organjzed 
working class was at last achieved. 
Initially, the Labour Party's membership was 
wholly 'indirect•. 3 It$ constitution in 1916 made no 
provision for the recruitment of an individual member-
ship. ~lthough it had inherited existing branches of 
the Social Democratic Party, out of which it had been 
born. The report of the foundation conference of July 
7 and 8, 1916 stated that the basic organizational unit 
1. Quoted in PH Hickey, 'Red Fed. Memoirs (Wellington: 
New Zealand Worker, 1925), p. 63. 
2. Ibid. 
3. 'Indirect' members are those who belong to parties 
by virtue of their membership of organizations which, 
as entities, are affiliated to the parties. 'Direct• 
members are those who join the parties individually. 
See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organ~ 
ization and Activit in the Modern State 3ra English 
ed., trans. Barbara and Robert North London: Methuen, 
1964), pp. 5-6. 
1 
of the Labour Party would be the LRC, which would 
consist of "industrial unions and Federations, Trades 
and Labour Councils, District Councils, Social Demo-
cratic Party branches and other properly constituted 
progressive organizations which subscribe to the con-
stitution and platform of the party•.•. 4 · However, the 
omission of any provision for an individual party mem-
be~hip appears, in retrospect, to have been merely an 
oversight. At its first annual conference in 1917, the 
party amended the constitution to enable emergent Labour 
Party branches to affiliate to the LRCs, along with 
individuals who resided in localities where branches did 
not yet exist. 5 
Thus, the Labour Party was never simply a political 
instrument of the trade union movement. The movement, 
however, was the party's 'bearer' and its 'mid-wife•. 
The unions preceded the party and established it after 
the necessity of a political arm had been impressed upon 
2 
them by the events of 1912 and 1913 and by the introduction 
of conscription during World War I. 6 In 1918, the infant 
party comprised eleven branches and. seventy-two affiliated 
unions (which supplied 10,000 of a total of 11,000 members).? 
Of eight Labour Party candidates elected to Parliament in 
the 1919 General Election, the first it had contested, only 
4. "Official Report of the Joint Conferenceu, in J T Paul, 
Humanism in Politics: New Zealand Labour Party Retro-
spect (Wellington: New Zealand Worker, 1946), p. 157. 
5. Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour: A History 
of the New Zealand Labour Part from 1916 to 1940 
Well1ngton: Pr1ce M1l urn, 19 2 , p. 3. 
6. See Ibid., pp. 18-26. 
7. "New Zealand Labor Party: Annual Conference, July 8, 9 
and 10, 1918", in 1918 Conferences: UFL, NZTU and NZ 
Labor Party (Wellington: Maoriland Worker, 1918), p. 24. 
one had not previously been active trade unionist •. At 
the outset at least, the Labour Party was largely, although 
not exclusively, a trade union party. 
Since they were founded, usually in the early stages 
of industrialization, other working-class political parties, 
like the respective societies in which they are to be found, 
have been transformed. Their widespread ideological trans-
8 formation is well-known and well-:documented, as are the 
3 
· 'bourgeoisification' of their Parliamentary representatives, 9 
and, in the case of the majority, the erosion of their mass-
membership bases. 10 A few attempts have also been made to 
account f'or the apparent fact that the membership as well 
as leadership of the parties has tended to become less and 
less proletarian in composition. 11 Studying the British 
8. See, for example, Leon D Epstein, Political Parties 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 55-59, 
69-72; E Spencer Wellhofer and Timothy M Hennessey, 
Models of Political Party Organization and Strategy: 
Some Analytic Approad1es to Oligarchy"~ in British 
Political Sociol~Yearbook, vol. 1: Elites ~n Western 
Democrac~, ed. Ivor Crewe (London: Croom Helm, 1974), 
pp. 279- 16. 
9. See on the British Labour Party, for example, Barry 
Hindess. The Decline of Workin -Class Politics (London: 
Paladin, 1971 , p. 9; Frank Par ~n, Class Inequality 
and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1972), p. 131; 
Wellhofer and Hennessey, "Some Analytic Approaches to 
Oligarchy", p. 313. 
10. See, for statistics, Walter Kendall, The Labour Move-
ment in Europe (London: Allen Lane, 1975}, pp. 379-
89; and, for theoretical explanation, Wellhofer and 
Hennessey, "Some Analytic Approaches to Oligarchy", 
pp. 298-301. 
11. See Hindess, The Decline of Working-Class Politics, 
pp. 8-9. 
Labour Party, Hihdess, for example, discovered that 
there had been a marked shift in the distribution of the 
party's membership since World War II from more working-
. . 
class to more middle-class types of area. 12 This he 
attributed to the fact that, in policy conflicts, the 
party leadership and middle-class sections of the member-
ship, whose preferences were mutually compatible, had, 
in effect, formed an hegemonic alliance which was contin-
ually unresponsive to the claims of working-class party 
activists. The latter, in their disillusionment and in 
growing nu.mb.ers, were consequently abandoning the party. 13 
Epstein, however, has identified two different causes 
of the erosion of the parties' working class bases: (i) the 
relative decline in the number of manual workers and rela-
tive growth in the number of service employees and white-
collar workers in advanced industrialized economies; 14 
and (ii) the dramatic improvement in the wages, hours and 
conditions of the declining number of industrial workers, 
who are now not nearly as impoverished as they were in 
the early stages of industrialization. 15 Alternative 
•explanations• of the British Labour Party's loss of a 
disproportionately high number of working-class members 
emphasize the role of the Welfare State, of affluence, 
and of the improved opportunities for upward social 
12. Ibid., p. 95. 
13. Ibid., pp. 39, 112-50. 
14. Cf. Jupp, Political Parties, p. 77: "The part of 
the industr1al work1ng class in the Ltabour7 move-
ments diminishes, as that class itself declines and 
is absorbed into tertiary employment". 
15. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 
pp. 153-55· 
4 
mobility for those who would once have become u•orking-
t . . t 16 class, but are now middle-class, party ac 1v1s s. 
Yet no major study has sought to e:?CPlain changes 
in the level of trade union involvement in the working-
class parties to which they can affiliate. 17 Affiliated 
trade unions may respond quite differently, or may even 
be inert to, the stimuli that have brought about the 
diminution of the working-class element in the branch 
membership of these parties. Firstly, general disillusion-
ment among the membership is' likely to cost the party more 
direct than indirect members. Whereas the direct member 
"need merely stop paying his dues by default, the indirect 
affiliate must consciously decide to •contract out 11• 18 to 
avoid having part of his dues forwarded automatically to 
the party1 9 ~r else the union as a whole must make a con-
scious de~ision to disaffiliate. 20 A trade union's or 
16. Hindess, The Decline of Workin~-Class Politics, pp. 
101-02. 
17. such parties exist in almost all the advanced indus-
trialized democracies, as well as in some of the less 
industrialized democracies, such as New Zealand. 
18. Wellhofer and Hennessey, nsome Analytic Approaches 
to Oligarchy", p. 301. 
19. · It is probably safe to assume that many trade union-
ists do not know that they are affiliated to the 
Labour Party. In a survey of the 'affluent' workers 
5 
of Luton in Britain, 27 per cent of the IJabour-voting 
trade unionists were found to be making financial 
contributions to the British Labour Party without being 
aware of it. See John H Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, 
Frank Bechhofer and Jennifer Platt, The Affluent 
Workers: Political Attitudes and Behaviour (Lonaon: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p·:· 28.-
20. Possible alternatives to conscious disaffiliation by 
the individual unionist or the union are that the 
union administrator may decide not to, or else may 
forget to, forward affiliation fees to the party. 
Since affiliation is a charge upon the union member-
ship and not upon the administrator himself, the 
former, however, is unlikely. It would be possible 
only to speculate as to the incidence of the latter. 
trade unionist•s affiliation to the party is rather 
more likely to continue merely out of custom or trad-
ition, without being subject to any kind of cost-benefit 
analysis, than an individual's direct membership. 
Secondly, since trade unions continue to exist 
independently of the party, the party may appear to 
trade unionists to be only an alternative, perhaps 
secondary, vehicle for· the pursuit of their objectives, 
except for those which are attainable only by legislative 
enactment. This is likely to make unions more indifferent 
than individual members toward their links with the party. 
Trade unions and trade unionists will normally be less 
actively involved in the party than branches and branch 
members, but, even though the 'costs' of departure for 
them are likely to be lower, they are also less likely to 
become involved in the kind of intra-party dispute that 
may culminate in the alienation from the party of the 
defeated-sections of the direct membership. We ought not 
to assume that the short- or long-term causes of the 
decline in the direct working-class membership of these 
parties have ha~ the same effect upon the level of trade 
union involvement. Equally, we should take it for granted 
that where trade union involvement has shown a similar 
decline to working-class branch membership, it can be 
explained in terms of the same causes. 
Our knowledge of the variables which influence the 
level of trade union involvement in indirect working-class 
parties is thus vague. Hence the two objectives of this 
study. The first (undertaken in chapter one) is to docu-
'ment in detail the overall change that has taken place.in 
the level of trade union involvement in the New Zealand 
6 
·Labour Party, primarily, but not exclusively, in the 
period since World War II. Four separate dimensions of 
union involvement will be examined. We shall look at: 
(i) changes in the proportion of all FOL and registered 
trade unionists affiliated to the party; (ii) changes 
in trade union representation (in terms of votes and 
delegates) and behaviour at the party's annual conference; 
(iii) changes in the frequency of the meetings of the 
Joint Council of Labour, at which the executive.members 
of the party and the FOL come together to discuss com-
mon interests; and (iv) changes in the proportion of 
former manual workers and trade union officials in the 
PLP and in Labour Cabinets. 
-The second, and rather more ambitious, objective of 
this study is to elaborate a necessarily multi-causal 
explanation of the change that has taken place in the 
level of union involvement in the party. Four historical 
processes (three of which are located outside of the party), 
are identified as causal variables and discussed in sue-
cessive chapters: (i) the enduring, and indeed increasingly 
exclusive, preoccupation of New Zealand trade unions with 
economism, and the extent of their ability to attain 
economistic objectives under conditions of full employment 
such as have prevailed for virtually the entire post-war 
period; (ii) the institutionalization of the FOL and the 
effectiveness with which it has come to fUnction as a more 
or less typical interest group; and (iv) the growing domin-
ation of the rest of the Labour Party by the PLP and the 
party leadership, which have both become increasingly 
middle-class. · 
7 
In Western societies in the course of the twentieth 
-
century, important changes have taken place in the 
relationship of trade unions to the State, in their 
bargaining power and in the composition of trade union 
movements. 21 In these chapters we consider the con-
sequences that these changes have had for the level of 
union involvement in the Labour Party in New Zealand. 
Then, in conclusion, we contemplate some·alternative 
futures for trade union involvement in the party and 
inquire briefly into the current health of the Labour 
Party, in the light of our findings. 
Two points remain to be made. The first is that 
the shortcomings of this study in respect of causation 
are freely admitted. If the relation between cause and 
effect at times appears tenuous, then this is at least 
partly attributable to the non-availability of data and 
to the fact that when historical processes and their 
interplay are the subject matter,- it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to control completely for intervening variables. 
Similarly, again since they are historical processes, it 
is impossible to measure with any degree of precision the 
explanatory power of the causal variables, either singly· 
21. Changes that have occurred in these areas in New 
Zealand are discussed in Alan Williams, "Trade 
Unions and Government in New Zealand: Emerging 
Relationships", in New Zealand Politics: A Reader, 
ed. Stephen Levine (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975), 
pp. 90-93; John M Howells, "Industrial Conflict in 
New Zealand- The Last Twenty Years", in Labour and 
Industrial Relations in New Zealand, eds. Howells, 
Noel S Woods, F J L Young (Carlton, Australia: 
Pitman, 1974), pp. 161-78; H Roth, Trade Unions in 
New Zealand: Past and Present (Well1ngton: Reed, 
1973), pp. 133-37, 1b0-63. 
8 
or collectively. In any event, the study has no pre-
tensions to anything resembling theoretical status. 
Lastly, there are, of course, many facets to the 
relationship which obtains between trade unions and the 
New Zealand Labour Party. Of necessity, only some of 
them can be studied within the confines of a one-paper 
thesis. The legal factors which affect their relation-
' 
. ship, .the controversial subject of union financial con-
tributions to the party, 22 un~on involvement in the 
party's electorate and regional organizations, the 
internal decision-making processes of unions in respect 
of Labour Party affairs - all these facets of the overall 
union-party relationship have been neglected in the hope 
that they will be thoroughly investigated by future 
students. 
22. This facet of the union-party relationship has 
already been studied, although not in great depth. 
See T W Bentley, "Trade Union Financial Assistance 
to the NZLP, 1930-·60 11 (MA research essay, University 
of Auckland, 1973). 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ABANDONMEN'l' OF' THE LABOUR 
PARTY BY THE TRADE UNIONS 
I. THE PARTX'S AFFILIATED MEMBERSHIP 
The proportion of the Labour Party's total 
' 
membership made up of affiliated trade unionists has 
increased considerablY Qver the last twenty years. 
Taking into account the growth in the number of 
unionized workers, affiliated as well as branch mem-
bership of the party has declined in real terms, but 
the decline in branch membership has been much more 
precipitous. In total, 184,656 trade union members 
were affiliated to the La~our Party in 1975, compared 
• 
with 185,431 in 1940. Bran·ch membership fell over the 
same period by more than 70 per cent- from 51,174 to 
14,247 (see Table 1). 
Although not as pronounced as the decline in 
branch membership, the decline in the prouortion of 
trade union members affiliated to the party in the 
post-\vorld War II period has also been substantial. 
The number of trade unionists affiliated to the 
Labour Party as a proportion of those affiliated to 
the F'OL has halved in the last thirty-five years and, 
at 48 per cent, is now at its lowest point since 
Year 
1917-18 
1925-26 
1929-30 
1934-35 
1939-40 
1944-45 
1949-50 
1954-55 
1958-59 
1964-65 
.L069-70 
1974-75 
TABLE l 
BRANCH AND AFFILIATED MEMBERSHIP 
OF THE LABOUR PARTY, 1916-75 
Branch Aff. Total 
1,000 10,000 11,000 
5,278 40,399 45,667 
5,170 45,481 50,651 
6,554 24,663 31,217 
51' 174 185,431 236,605 
20,340 136,923 157,263 
38,155 174,913 213,068 
38,261 135,941 174,202 
30,052 142,873 172,925 
17,812 167,602 185,414 
13,384 189,890 203,-274 
14,2?1-7 184_,·656 198,903 
,:. Aff. 
90.91 
88.46 
89.79 
79.01 
78.37 
87.07 
82.09 
78.04 
82.62 
90.39 
93.42 
92.84 
SOURCES: NZLP, Annex to the Annual Reports of 
the National Executive, 1926-48. (Mimeographed). 
Delegates Attending Annual Conferences, 1949-75. (i•limeographed). 
11 
the FOL was founded in 1937. The 42 per cent of 
trade unionists registered under the Industrial 
Relations Act who were members of the party in 1975 
compared with almost 75 per cent in 1941. In the 
post-war period, only during the five years from 
1959 to 1964 had a smaller proportion of registered 
trade union members been affiliated to the party (see 
Table 2). 1 
Altogether, eighty-one unions and branches of 
unions were .financially affiliated to the Labour Party 
in May 1975. This total amounted to 36 per cent of 
the number of unions affiliated to the FOL and to 27 
per cent of the number registered under the Industrial 
Relations Act (see Table 3). Some seventy-six regis-
tered unions had formerly been affiliated to the party. 
Vlith the addition of eight unions and branches of unions 
nominally, but not financially, affiliated to the party 
and twelve unions, branches of which had once been 
affiliated to the party, formerly affiliated unions 
actually out'J'P :iJered those currently affiliated. These 
unions also contained about 90,000 potential party mem-
bers·. 
Even as the number of trade unionists affiliated 
to the Labour Party increased for a time in the 1960's, 
1. The extremely low proportion of all registered 
trade unionists affiliated to the party from 
1959 to 1964 is explained by the temporary defec-
tion from the party of the New Zealand Hotel i,vorkers' 
Federation, whose membership of 21,783 in 19~9 
exceeded that of any other union affiliated to the 
party. 
1 2 
1 3 
TABLE 2 
INCIDENCE OF AFFILIATION TO THE LABOUR 
PM~l'Y AMONG THE UNIONIZ: .D 'tiORK Fl"YWE 
Year Party . FOL1 if[, Aff. IC & A2 ~;, Aff. 
1917 67,661 
1918 10,000 71,587 13.97 
1919 72,873 
192@ 71,447 
1921 82,553 
1922 96,350 
1923 97,719 
1924 96,838 
1925 94,438 
1926 40,399 96,822 41.73 
1927 )9,992 100,540 39.78 
1923 99,667 
1929 42, 801-r 101,071 42.35 
1930 45,481 103,980 43.74 
1931 44,495 102,646 43.35· 
1932 41,235 101,526 40.62 
1933 34,581 90,526 38.20 
193'-f· 28,628 79,283 36.11 
1935 24,663 71,888 34.31 
1936 24,814 74,391 33.36 
1937 53,546 80,929 66.16 
1938 139,347 163,402 85.28 185,527 75.11 
1'939 170,093 178,724 95.17 232,986 73.01 
1940 185,431 192,548 96.30 249,231 74.40 
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TABLE 2 - Continued 
Year Party FOL %· Aff. IC & A %? Aff. 
1941 190,405 196,909 96.70 254,690 74.76 
1942 173,082 194,320 89.07 248,081 69.77 
1943 141,085 175,173 80.54 231,049 61.06 
1944 130,895 166,810 7?.47 218,398 59.93 
I 
1945 136,923 175.357 78.08 214,628 63.80 
1946 138,911 183,510 75.70 223,027 62.28 
1947 130,620 190,000 68.75 229,103 57.01 
1948 154' 72 7 188,000 82.30 247,498 62.52 
1949 175,837 . 215,000 . 81.78 260,379 67.53 
1950 174,913 222,000 78.79 271,100 64.52 
1951 166,52l 193.522 86.05 275,977 60.34 
1952 127,244 184,669 68.90 275,779 46.14 
1953 133,263 190,000 70.14 272,843 48.84 
1954 136,794 194,147 70.46 283,456 48.26 
] 955 135,941 210,000 64.73 290,149 46.85 
1956 134,162 212,000 63.28 299,242 44.83 
1957 137,730 207,000 66.54 304,277 45.26 
1958 142,097 218,818 64.94 307,619 46.19 
1959 142,873 232,160 61.54 317,137 45.05 
1960 119,293 238,780 49.96 324,438 36.77 
1961 236,500 327,495 
1962 220,000 332,362 
1963 249,333 324,747 
1964 c. 137,000 245,000 55.92 332,801 41.17 
1965 167,602 249,189 67.26 334,128 50.16 
TABLE 2 - Continued 
Year Party FOL %· Aff. IC & A <f:. Aff. 
1966 257,.370 .346,857 
1967 176,185 29.3,249 60.08 .35.3,105 49.90 
1968 180,874 .320,269 56.48 .362,760 49.86 
1969 181,058 .324,.362 55.82 .366,884 49 . .35 
19{0 189,890 .318,.3.30 59.65 .364,872 52.04 
1971 182,.314 .322 '572 56.52 .366,4.36 49.75 
1972 340,105 .378,465 
197.3 
1974 
1975 184,656 .38.3,084 48.20 4.36,62.3 42.29 
SOURCES: NZLP, Annex to the Annual Reports of 
the Nattional Executive, 1926-48; Delegates Attending 
Annual Conferences, 1949-75· Roth, Trade Unions in New 
~ealand: Past and Present, pp. 169-70. 
1 As, except in 1975, affiliated unions have been 
levied and allocated conference votes on the basis 
of their membership in February the year before 
(i.e., 15 months before) each annual conference, 
affiliated membership totals for the party are com-
pared with those for the FOL in the preceding calen-
dar year. 
2 Affiliated membership totals for the party are 
here compared with the total number of trade union-
ists registered under the IC & A Act (since 197.3 
under the IR Act) on December 31, 17 months before 
each annual conference. 
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TABLE 3 
NUfJ:BER AND PROPORTION OF NEW ZEALAND TRADE UNIONS 
AFFILIATED TO THE LABOUR PARTY,- 1941-75 
D&R1 2 Total) Year Nat. IC &A % Aff. Aff. Aff. 
1941 227 15 242 427 56.67 
1942 215 15 230 419 54.89 
1943 205 15 220 416 52.88 
1944 397 
~ 
1945 201 15 216 394 54.82 
1946 ·189 14 203 382 53.14 
1947 193 13 206 374 55.08 
1948 186 15 201 373 5).89 
1949 207 14 221 374 59.09 
1950 198 15 213 372 57.26 
1951 185 H) 201 370 54.32 
1952 145 14 159 415 38.31 
1953 139 14 153 415 )6.87 
1954 154 13 167 412 40.53 
1955 .. 152 13 165 413 39.95 
1956 149 13 162 410 39.51 
1957 146 13 159 413 )8.50 
1958 149 13 162 411 39.42 
1959 138 13 151 405 37.28 
1960 399 
1961 398 
1962 395 
1963 391 
1964 
' 
379 
TABLE 3 - Continued 
Year D&R Nat. Total IC &A ~b Aff. 
Aff. Aff. 
1965 107 15 122 380 32.11 
1966 372 
1967 107 16 123 373 32.98 
1968 100 16 116 372 31.18 
1969 '101 16 117 366 31.97 
1970 87 17 104 359 28.97 
1971 80 16 96 353 27.20 
1972 346 
1973 
1974 
1975 67 14 81 302 26.82 
SOURCES: NZLP, Delegates Attending Annual Con-
ferences, 1941-75. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: 
Past and Present, pp. 169-70. 
1 District and regional unions affiliated to the 
party. 
2 National unions affiliated to the party. 
3 Figures include affiliated branches of non-
affiliated unions counted as unions. Unions whose 
affiliations were not financial have been excluded. 
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the number of affiliated unions continued to decrease. 
The incidence of affiliation to the party has declined 
shar:)ly among unions of biscuit and confectionery 
employees, clothing-trade employees, coal-miners, 
drivers, boilermakers and iron and brass moulders, 
fire-brigades' employees, painters and decorators, 
" 
shop-assistants and storemen and packers. Only among 
the ''·'aterside workers' unions and, to a lesser extent, 
among the labourers' unions has the trend been in the 
dpposite dir~ction (see Table 4). 
Thus,, no "start ling upsurge" 2 in union affi lia-
tion to the Labour Party took place between 1960 and 
1970, although the party's affiliated membership did 
climb from beJow 120,000 to almost 190,000. Nine 
trade unions affiliated or re-affiliated to the party 
between 1961 and 1965, but after the passage of a 
second Political Disabilities Removal Act by the 
Labour Government in 1960, an increase in the number 
of unions affiliated to the party might have been 
expected. (This act provided that trade union ftmds 
could be put to political purposes with the approval 
of a majority of voters in a union ballot, whereas 
between 19Su, when the National Government enacted a 
Political Disabilities Removal Amendment Bill, and 
1960, the approval of a majority of the union's finan-
cial members had been resuired.) In fact, more unions 
2. Bentley, "Trade Union Financial Assistance to 
the NZLP", p. 37. 
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TABLE 4 
INCIDENCE OF TRADE UNION AFFILIATION TO THE LABOUR 
PARTY IN.SELECTED CRAFTS AND INDUSTRIES, 1945-75 
Unions 1945 1950 1955 1959 1965 1970 1975 
Biscuit and confection-
ery employees '4/5 4/5 4/5 3/5 3/4 3/4 1/4 
Boilermakers and iron, 
brass moulders 4/8 5/8 3/8 4/8 3/8 3/8 2/8 
Carpenters and rela d 
trades 4/5 2/3 2/3 2/3 1/l 1/l 1/l 
Clothing-tra~e employ-
ees 5/8 7/7 7/8 7/8 3/7 3/7 3/7 
Coal-mine workers and 
deputies a 18/18 22/15 20/13 16/12 15/11 11/9 6/3 
Drivers 8/12 9/12 4/15 4/14 3/14 3/14 2/12 
ctrical Workers l/2 l/2 l/2 l/2 l/2 -/2 -/2 
Footwear operatives 4/4 4/5 4/4 3/4 3/4 2/4 3/4 
Fire-brigades' employ-
ees 4/4 3/4 3/5 2/4 -/4 -/5 l/6 
..... 
1.0 
TABLE 4 - Continued 
Unions 1945 1950 1955 1959 1965 1970 1975 
Flour-mill employees 4/6 3/6 5/6 5/6 4/6 1/6 1/6 
Freezing v!orkers 8/9 5/5 12/17 7/10 5/10 5/10 . 2/4b 
Furniture-trade 
employees 4/6 4/6 -/5 -/5 -/5 -/5 -/5 
Hotel w,orkers 9/9 9/9 9/9 9/9 9/9 9/9 9/9 
Labourers 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 5/9 5/5 2/4c 
Laundry employees 2/5 2/5 1/5 3/5 3/5 3/5 2/5 
Painters and decora-
.. 
tors 4/13 6/14 5/15 4/15 4/15 3/13 -/6 
Shop assistants 9/25 11/25 8/25 6/25 3/20 1/18 1/14 
Storemen and packers 6/11 6/11 5/11 4/11 3/12 2/11 -/10 
Waterside workers 1/1 1/1 6/26 7/24 9/26 12/22 12/20 
SOURCES: NZLP, Delegates Attending Annual Conferences, 1945-75. 
Lepartment of Labour, Annual Reports (Appendices to the J·ournals of the 
House of aepresentatives, 1945-70, H.ll; 1975, G.l), 1945-75. 
[\) 
0 
TABLE 4 - Continued 
NOTE: First figure is for number of unions affiliated 
to the party in craft or in6ustry. Second figure is for total 
number of unions in craft or industry. 
a The number of coal-mine workers' unions affiliated to the 
party exceeds the cited total for the .industry because some 
of the unions did not register under the IC & A Act and 
therefore have not been included in the Department. of Labour's 
statistics. 
b Excludes three party-affiliated branches of the New Zealand 
Freezing Workers' Union, the majority of whose members were 
not affiliated to the party. 
c =xcludes one party-affiliated branch of the Wellington, Nelson, 
V/estland and J'·.:larlborough Local Bodies and oth-er Labourers • 
Union, the majority of. whose members were not affiliated to 
the party. 
1\) 
_. 
left the party than joined it in the 1960's. Seven-
tenths of the increase from 119,293 to 189,890 is 
attributable to the re-affiliation of the Hotel 
Workers' Federation in 1965 and to an increase in its 
size and the size of the largest and third largest 
unions aff'i.Jiated to the party, the New Zealand 
Engineers' and N.ew Zealand Carpenters t unions. vlhat 
happened essentially in the 1960's was that the party 
replaced a large number of fairly small unions with 
a small number of relatively large ones. In 1975, 
the ten largest affiliated unions accounted for more 
than 75 per cent of the party's affiliated membership 
(see TabJe 5). 
II. TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR 
AT CONFBRENCE 
Measured by changes in the distribution of card 
votes, trade union representation at the Labour Party's 
annual conference has declined by about a third in the 
last half-century. In 1926, trade union delegates 
possessed 65 per cent of all the card votes cast at 
conference. In the post-war period, the card-voting 
strength of the w1ions has fluctuated, but the overall 
tendency has been for it to decline - despite the greater 
fall in the branch than in the affiliated membership of 
the party. Union delegates cast proportionately fewer 
card votes at the 1975 conference than they seem to have 
even in the early 1950's, when, in absolute terms, branch 
membership was much higher and filiated membership 
~uch lower than they are today (see Table 1). In the 
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TABLE 5 
DISTRIBU':riON OF THE AFFILIATED JVI:C:f';JB2RSHIF 
OF TEE LABOUR PARTY, 1975 
Union I.~e;nbers % Conference % 
. Votes 
New Zealand Enginec;rs 43,051 23.31 88. 21.00 
New Zealand Hotel Workers 29,457 15,95 60 14.32 
New Zealand Carpentars 15,123 8.19 32 7.64 
11,300 6.12 24 5.73 
New Zealand ~o~kers 9,500 5.14 20 4.77 
New Zc~land Printers 7,000 3.79 15 3.58 
Northern Drivers 6,338 3.43 14 3.34 
Auckland Freezing Workers 5,787 3.13 13 3.10 
Northern and Taranaki Labourers 5,786 3.13 13 3.10 
Canterbury ~eat Workers 5,699 3.09 13 ':) ..)• 
Ten largest unions 139,041 · 75.30 292 69.68 
611 other unions (71) 45,615 24.70 127 30.32 
Total 184,656 100.00 419 100.00 
SOURCE: NZLP, 
1975· 
s A tt-:.mding 197 5 Annual Conference," 
ograph.:::;d). 
l\) 
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last decade, the proportion of all card votes cast 
by union delegates h.-1s declined quite sharply - from 
57 per cent in 1965 to 43 per cent in 1975 (see Table 
6) • 
But the impact of trade union delegates upon 
the decisions of conference is much less profound than 
is indicated by their card-voting strength. Jn general, 
union. del tes request card votes only on issues about 
which they·are "unusually concerned". 3 Excluding the 
eJection of officers, only two or three such votes 
take place, on average, at each conference. 4 Moreover, 
they are becoming "increasingly infrequent". 5 The 
fact- that almost all conference decisions are made on 
voices means, in effect, that affiliated trade unions 
controlled only 18 per cent of the votes cast on most 
issues at conference in 1975, compared, for example, 
with 34 per cent in 1950 and 60 per cent in 1962 (see 
Table 6). Measured by delegates, rather than by card 
votes, trade union representation at conference has 
declined in the last fifty years by almost 75 per cent. 
The Labour Party's constituent organizations are 
represented at conference according to a formula 
prescribed by the party in its constitution ~nd rules. 
Whereas one of the principal objectives of affiliated 
3. Richard Northey, Interview, Auckland, December 4 
1975. 
4. Idem, "The Annual Conferences of the New Zealand 
Labour Party" (M.A. Thesis, University of Auckland, 
1 97 3 ) , p . 144. 
5. Ibid., P• 339. 
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TABLE 6 - Continued 
NOTE: The party has published the distribution 
of card votes and.the number of delegates attending 
conference only since 1963. All figures for the years 
1926-59 and for the number of union delegates from 
1926 to 1975 are therefore based upon the author's 
own calculations from conference delegate and voting 
entitlemen~ lists and should be regarded as approxi-
mate only. 
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unions in the period before World 'ltlar II was to 
secure more favourable terms for their representa-
tion at conference and thus greater influence over its 
decisions, their approach in more recent years has 
been much more altruistic - even if union delegates 
will still unite to defeat any proposed constitu-
tional amendment li~~cly to put the unions at a 
serious disadvantage alongside other organizations 
represented at conference. 
The constitution and programme on the basis of 
which the Labour Party was founded in 1916 contained 
no reference to conference, apart from stipulating 
that it should be convened by the party•s national 
executive in Wellington every July. 6 However, the 
revised constitution and platform which emerged from 
the third annual conference of the party in 1919, 
was rather more specific. LRC~ were each to be 
entitled to send two delegates to conference (a 
provision which has not subsec;uen.t ly been altered) 
and organizations affiliated to the party - branches 
and. unions - were to be permitted to send one dele-
gate if they had up to one hundred members, two de 
gates if they had between one hundred and three hundred, 
and three if. they had more than three hundred. 
6. Paul, Humanism in Politics, p. 157. 
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Each delegate was to have one vote. 7 Obviously, this 
formula prevented the larger affiliated unions - those 
with four hundred or more members - from casting a 
number of votes proportionate to their membership. 
At the 1925 conference, following the affiliation to 
the party of the NZvl\VF and the Wellington Federated 
Freezing Workers' Union, the national executive recom-
mended that trade unions with more than 1,000 delegates 
be permitted to send six delegates to conference. The 
recommendation was incorporated in the party's revised 
constitution in 1926, although the freezing workers, 
for example, sent six delegates even in 1925. With 
4,698 and 2,553 members respectively, the waterside. 
workers' and freezing workers' federations were by far 
the largest groups of organized workers then affiliated 
to the party. 
Some trade unions did not yet regard the conference 
representation formula as satisfactory. In 1930, the 
AOL expressed the view that the trade unions should 
determine Labour Party policy. 8 The NZ\VI:lF, whose leader, 
Jam~s Roberts, was also secretary of the AOL, sought 
simultaneously to increase the power of conference and 
to increase the ability of affiliated unions to influence 
7. NZLP, "Constitution and Platform" in Conferences, 
\vellington: JuJ::y .l~J.~ ('~:/ellington: Maor1land Worker, 
1919), p. 44. . 
8. P. ]. O'Farrell, Harry Holland: Militant Socialist 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1 964) , p. 1 99. 
its decisions. In 1928, it moved that the party 
leader be elected by conference. However, this motion, 
and similar ones in 1929 and 1930, were defeated. 9 At 
its initiative, the 1931 conference set up a special 
committee, comprising representatives from the water-
sider workers'~and seamen's unions and two representa-
tives from the PLP, to work out a new representation 
formula. Although the two union representatives at 
first pressed for the introdu~tion of a full card-
voting system, the committee finally agreed to recommend 
a system which, although modified, nevertheless increased 
the voting strength of unions so that it was "more com-
mensurate with their si zei11 0 and made them considerably 
more influential in policy formulation. 
Except for one amendment, the formula for representa-
tion at conferencG evolved 1931 remained unchanged 
until 1974. That single amendment, hovmver, was of 
profound importance in the history of the Labour Party, 
for it enabled the party leadership, with large-scale 
trade union support, to expel from the party one of the 
leaders of its 'left-wing', John A. Lee (see chapter five). 
9. 
1 ,., u. 
Ibid., p. 193. 
3ro\lm, The l<ise of New Zealand Labovr, p. 174. 
Branches and vnions were allocated one delegate 
and one vote each if they had up to 200 members, 
two delegates and two votes if they had between 
200 and 500, three delegates and three votes if 
they had between 500 and 1,000, and four delegates 
and ~our votes their membership exceeded 1,000, 
but was less than 2,000. One extra delegate or 
vote w;;.s permitt for each additional· 5DO members, 
tut no legate was permitted to exercise more than 
four votes. 
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As a result of an amendment proposed by the party's 
nation<ll executive in 1940 and approved by conference 
when it adop d the executive's annual report, affilia-
ted trade unions had to send only four delegates to 
conference from 1940 onwards to be able to exercise 
their entire potential vote. The rule that no delegate 
could exercise more than four votes was, at this point, 
discarded. 
The outcome of a further revision of the party's 
constitution and rules undertaken in 1974 was quite 
differen~. On this occasion, although they first had 
to defeat a perceived attempt substantially to reduce 
trade union influence upon the decisions of conference, 
trade unionists and others of 'trade union persuasion' 
on the party's national executive actually conceived 
a new formula which strengthened branch representation 
a time when, in real terms, union representation 
was already on the decline. 
The 1973 conference instructed the standing consti-
tution committee of the national executive to redraft 
the constitution and submit its proposals to conference 
for consideration in 1974. The committee at that time 
consist of the party president, Wallace Rawling; the 
secretary, John vlybrow; Stan Rodger; and ?oger Douglas 
and Trevor Young, who, ke Rawling, were both MPs. 11 
Significantly, no members of the committee had backgrounds 
11. NZLP, Report of the Fifty-seventh Annual Confer-
~ (\velllngton: NZLP, 1973), p. 7. 
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in unions affiliated to the party. It is not clear 
whether this committee began the task of revising 
the constitution, but, according to a trade unionist 
on the national executive, the PLP attempted substan-
tiaJly to reduce the influence of trade unions at 
12 conference. Its proposals, however, were "totally 
unacceptable1113 to the national executive, on which 
trade unions are invariably well represented. At its 
first meeting arter conference, the executive appointed 
a new committee, which comprised the new pre dent of 
the part~, Dr Charles Bennett, a former public servant; 
Douglas; and three members who could be de bed as 
being of 'trdde union persuasion': an MP, Michael Moore, 
a for~er printer and trade unionist; an indust al rela-
tions lecturer and former unionist in the public sector, 
Edward Keating; and the secretary of the Wellington 
branch of the Engineers' Union, Brian Landers. 14 This 
commjttee draft the revised constitution which was 
placed before conference in 1974 and contained the 
amendn;ent providing for increased branch representation. 
Effective from March 1, 1975, the revised constitu-
tion est lished arate representation rat s for 
unions and branches. \tJ'hi le the ratio established in 
1940 was retained for unions, branches are now entitled 
to two votes if they have more than 75 members or three 
1 2. Gerry Ditchfield, Interview, \<!ellington January 1,-
1 97 5 • ' 0 , 
13. Ditchfield, Interview. 
14. NZLP, Report of the Fifty-eighth Annual Conference 
( 1 97 4) , p. . . 
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if they have more than 125. Unions must still have 
at least 500 to be able to cast three. 15 The new ratio 
of representation for branches increased their share 
of the overall card vote at conference. by more than 
four per cent and reduced the unions' share by more 
than three (see Table 7). 
80 
4 
7 
310 
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TABLE 7 
EFFECT OF 1974 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT UPON 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONFERENCE CARD VOTES, 1975 
Old Constitution New Constitution 
(Hypothetical) (Actual) 
LECsa 
Votes % Votes % 
• • . . 159 17.65 159 16.43 
MRCsb 
• • •• 4 0.44 4 0.41 
RCs •• . . 14 1-55 14 1.45 
branches . . 299 33.19 366 '37.81 
unions •• 419 46.50 419 43.29 
LWC d . . •• 6 0.67 6 0.62 
SOURCE: NZLP, Report of the Fifty-ninth Annual 
Conference (1975l~ p. 56. 
a La·bour Electorate Committees, which superseded 
the LRCs. 
b Metropolitan Representation Committees. 
c Regional Councils. 
d Labour.Women•s Council. 
From the fact that trade unionists were instrumental 
in securing more favourable terms for the representation 
of branches at conference, it is possible to conclude 
that unions, as protective as they are of the fundamental 
status quo, do not now aspire to dominate conference. 
15. NZLP, Constitution and Rules, revised ed. 
(Wellington: NZLP, 1975), p. 30. 
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"We could tuke it over and dominate it, but we don't 
want to", 16 is how one trade unionist in the leader-
ship of the extra-parliamentary party assesses their 
current attitude. Other developments point in the 
same direction. Since the 1950's, for instance, the 
proportion of conference remits originating from trade 
unions has declinect. 17 Affiliated unions sponsored only 
8.4 per cent of all remits considered by conference in 
the nine years from 1963 to 1971 inclusive18 and exactly 
half that proportion, 4.2 per cent, while the third 
Labour Government was in office from 1973 to 1975. 19 
Between 1963 and 1975, the Engineers' Union, with 23 
per cent of· the party' s· affiliated membership,. supplied 
only 13.5 per cent of all union remits; the traditionally 
class-conscious affiliates, the waterside workers', sea-
men's and miners' unions, only fifteen remits combined; 
and the New Zealand Hotel 1,·lorkers' F'ederation and the 
16. Ditchfield, Interview. 
17. Northey, Interview. 
18. About 23 ·· cent of the union remits in this period 
.related rna ly to industrial relations, 13 per cent 
to soc~al secur~ty and health, 12 per cent to trade 
and industr.)', and 9 per cent to finance and taxation. 
See Northey, "The Annual Conference of the NZLP", 
pp. 101 
19. Unions havE' a1v:ays sent fewer remits to conference 
than is commensurate with their proportion of the 
party membership, total conference card vote and 
all conference Jelegates. Annual conference remit 
papers show, for example, that unions contributed 
11 out of 81 cemits (13.6~) in 1923 and 29 out of 
133 remits (21.8~) in 1924. But they still contribu-
ted proportionately more remits then than they do 
now. 
jj 
New Zealand \vorkers' and Auckland Freezing T:lorkers' 
unions none at all. (see Table 8). Affiliated unions 
evidently attach very little importance to having their 
policy preferences adopted by conference. Even the 
Auckland Boilermakers' Union, which contributed more 
remits than any other union, spends very little t.ime 
discussion Labour Party politics at its meetings. 20 
Although they sponsor very few remits, the large~t 
affiliated unions are sel.dom unrepresented at confer-
ence and aenerally send the four delegates they require 
if they are to be able to exercise their full card vote. 
In so far as representation at conference is concerned, 
the critical variable which emerged in an analysis of 
w1ion rep1~esentc\tion at conference for the years from 
1969 to 1971 was union size: as a rule, the larger the 
the union, the more likely it was to be represented at 
conference (see Table 9). 21 Thus, although only about 
48 rer cent, on avera]e, o£ the unions affilJ.ated to 
the party were represented at the 1969, 1970 and 1971 
confe~ences, about 78 per cent of the unions' potential 
card vote was exercised. As the average size of unions 
in New ::::ealand has increased, so have the unions exer-
cised a greater proportion of the conference votes to 
which they are entitled: 61 per cent in 1945, 64 per 
cent in 1950, .69 per cent in 1955, 71 per cent in 1959, 
20. John Finlay, Interview, Auc:<land, December 8, 1975. 
21. Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", 
pp. 86-88. 
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TABLE 8 
ORIGINS OF TRADE UNION CONFERENCE 
REffli';rS , 1963-75 
Union Years ~·J 0. of ·% Union % All Sent rlemits itemits .a.emi ts 
Auckland Boilermakers 6 78 20.26 1.28 
ASRS (NUR) 11 73 18.96 .1.19 
New Zealand Engineers 11 52 13.51 0.85 
New Zealand Railway Tradesmen 5 40 10.39 0.65 
Canterbury Footwear.Operatives 10 34 8.83 0.56 
New Zealand Printers 4 16 4.16 0.26 
runedin Footwear Operatives 5 13 J.38 0.21 
New Zealand Carpenters 3 13 J.J8 0.21 
Canterbury Meat Workers 3 11 2.86 0.18 
Tomoana Freezing Workers 1 ll 2.86 0.18 
Auckland Waterside Workers 3 7 1. 82 0.11 
Northern and Taranaki Labourers 3 6 1.56 0.10 
Northern Drivers 2 6 1. 56 0.10 
w 
IJ1 
TABLE 8 - Continued 
Union 
Canterbury Rubber Vvorkers 
'Nellington V,aterside Workers 
N.Z. Tramway Employees 
Canterbury Drivers 
Canterbury Woollen Mill Employees 
Runanga State I;'liners 
Wellin£:;ton labourers 
Napier taterside ~orkers 
Otago Iron and Brass ~oulders 
~ellington Cool Store Employees 
Total 
Years 
Sent 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
l 
1 
1 
1 
1 
78 
No. of r,_, Union 
Remits Remits 
5 1. JO 
5 LJO 
4 1.04 
2 0. 52 
2 0. 52 
2 0.52 
2 0. 52 
1 0.26 
l 0.26 
l 0.26 
J85 100.00 
% All 
Remits 
0.08 
0.08 
0.07 
O.OJ 
O.OJ 
O.OJ 
O.OJ 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
6.29 
30UR.C}:;3: NZLP, Annual ;)onference i~emi t Papers (Wellington: NZLP), 
1972-75. Northey, "The Annual Conferences· of the NZLP", p. 109. 
w 
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TABLE 9 
TRADE UNION SIZE AND REPRESENTATION. 
AT CONFERENCE, 1969-71 
Unions No. %· % Po ten- % % Union tia1 Vote Union De1e-
________________________ A_f_f_. __ 1_~e_P __ . ____ ~C~a~s~t Vote gates 
1- 50 members 15.0 15.5 
51- 125 members 13.7 14.6 
126 - 200 members 13.0 J0,8 
201 - 300· ·members 8. 7 46. 1 
J01 - 500 members 12.0 33.0 
501- 1000 ·members 15.0 73.3 
1001 - 2000 members 13.0 69.3 
200"1- 5000 members 6.0 83.3 
5001- 10,000 members 4.J 82.8 
Over 10,000 members 5.0 100 
NZ Engineers 1 100 
NZ Hotel Workers 1 100 
NZ Carpenters 1 100 
ASRS (NUR) 1 100 
NZ Workers 1 100 
Akld. 'Freezing Workers 1 100 
Northern Drivers 1 100 
NZ Printers 1 100 
Nthrn. & Taranaki Lab-
ourers 1 100 
Canterbury Meat Workers 1 100 
All unions 105.7 47.7 
15.5 
14.6 
30.8 
46.1 
33.0 
7J.J 
69.0 
83.9 
79.9 
97.0 
100 
100 
78 
100 
100 
74 
53 
100 
92 
100 
77.7 
0.6 2.3 
0.5 2.0 
1.0 J.9 
2.1 5.9 
2.1 5.2 
8.6 15.4 
9.7 15.7 
10.4 14.1 
12.8 8. 2 
52.3 27.2 
18.4 6. 6 
.15.2 5.6 
5.8 3.9 
6.7 6.6 
6.3 4.6 
3.1 l.J 
2.1 1.3 
3.4 J.6 
3.1 2.3 
3.0 1.0 
100 25.1 
SOURCE: Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the 
NZLP", pp. 86-87. 
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73 per cent in 1965, 80 per cent in 1970 and 90 per 
cent in 1975. 22 
Por the smaller unions, representation at confer-
ence may often be "a financial impossibility". 23 
Conse~uently, some delegates represent two or more 
unions, a union· and a branch, a union and a branch and 
an LEC, or, as in the case of one trade unionist in 
1972, all three, plus a Divisional Area Counci1. 24 
Delegates accredited to more than one union or to a 
union and one or more other orgahizations accounted 
for 4.1 per cent of all conference delegates between 
1966 and 1971. 25 In addition, some LEC de gates are 
trade unionists. HP::- sometimes represent unions located 
in their electorates - before he became Prime Ministef, 
for example, Wallace Rawling regularly represented t 
Denniston Miners' Union in his electorate of Buller. 
An MP need not even come from the same electorate as the 
union to be able to represent it. In 1968, for example, 
the 1 of the party, Norman Kirk, whose electorate 
was Sydenham, represented the ':!ellington Caretakers' 
and Cleaners' Union. Nothing in the party's constitution 
and rules requires a union to choose its delegate or 
delegates from 
22. NZLP, De 
1 945-7 5. 
ther its membership or leadership. 
es Attending Annual Conferences, 
23. John Wybrow, Interview, Wellington, December 18, 
1 975. 
24. E. Hemmingsen, a Timber ''dorkers' Union delegate. 
, :'5. Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the N ZLP", 
p. 97. 
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Given that very few of them are interested in 
sponsoring remitsfor endorsement by conference, why, 
then, do unions bother to send delegates at all? F'or 
:. t s [>cH't, the Auckland Boilermakers' Union sends dele-
nates to conference to "express the sentiments of the 
union'~ quarterly stop-work meetings" 26 - and to try to 
have conference suoport remits in which those sentiments 
are embodied. As we have seen, however, the Boiler-
ma::crs' Union is quite atypical of the unions affiliated 
to the ?arty. ·A Ear greater number of union delegates 
ap?ea-r to see their presence as ·"a means of assimilating 
thP. att i.tudes expressed and decisions made at conference 
fo'Y' cor:::-:unication to their rank-and-file, an opportunity 
to in!'luence the compo tion of the executive, and a 
watchina brief from which they can intervene if necessary 
to defend their interests". 27 They do not contrive to 
dominate conference. Block voting by union delegates is 
even more exceptional than are card votes. Except on 
some industrial relations and party constitutional reform 
issues, and in the election of officers to the leadership 
of the extra-parliamentary party, the views of trade union 
delegates, as expressed in their voting behaviour, are 
28 
"just as varied as those of other delegates". Union 
delegations do not formulate policies which are binding 
26. Pinlay, Interview. 
27. Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", 
pp. 335-36. 
2 8 • Ibid. , p. 1 96 • 
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on all their members on issues which do not directly 
affect trade unions. On these, the attitudes of the 
individual delegates are expressed. 29 Block voting by 
unions does characterize the election of officers, most 
of those unions with substantial votes having been com-
mitted "Ly their union conference, executive or a caucus 
among their delegates" 30 to cast a block vote for par-
ticular candidates. In the cont~st for the party vice-
presidency at the 1974 conference, a defeated candidate, 
Jonathan Hunt, claims that Gerald O'Brien, who won the 
electio11, received all the more than 80 votes cast by 
the Engineers' Union, whose delegates had decided to 
support O'Brien, instead of Hunt, 'en masse' by only 
twe 1 ve vdtes to ten. 31 
One .former trade unionist and HP has observed, 
confessing his cynicism, that trade union delegates 
attend Labour Party conferences to get "an extra \i!eelc' s 
holiday on full pay". 32 This impression is, at best, 
distorted and, at worst, perhaps entirely incorrect, 
but it.is not surprising that it should be gained in 
the case of a'mc.,jority of union delegates. 'Passive' 
and 'defensive' are the adjectives which best sum up 
29. Ibid. Also Ditchfield, Interview. 
30. Ibid,, p. 218. 
31. jonathan Hunt, Interview, vlellington, December 10, 
1975. Hunt's testimony, however, is unreliable. 
The Engineers' Union has never sent more than about 
twelve delegates to conrerence. 
32. Norman Douglas, Interview, Auckland, December 8, 
1975. 
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the role that trade unions have chosen to perform at 
conference. Sponsoring very few remits, they do not 
see conference as a forum at which they can commit the 
party leadership to the policies that they prefer. 
Preferring to further their interests mainly by other 
means, they oversee proceedings at conference to ensure 
that remits which might prove contrary to trade .union 
interests are not passed. 33 
The chief reason why some unions are not represented 
<:<.t conference and why most of those which are represented 
are inact·i ve appear to be twofold. rstly, almost all 
the unions affiliated to the Labour Party are also 
affiliated to the F'OL, which holds its annual conference, 
also at Wellington, the week before the party's. Unions 
find the F'OL conference rather more "effective, more 
direct" 34 as a vehicle for the furtherance of their policy 
objectives. Unions can see what even;tually becomes of the 
• ~I ~ 
remits that they send to the F'OL Conference - a few, for 
example, will become the subject of deputations to 
Cabinet ministers. On the other hand, some remits sent 
to the Labour Party Conference "never see the light of 
day". 35 Thus, trade unions are more likely to be represen-
ted and·r:ore likely to be active at the F'OL Conference 
than at the Labour Party's. The former, to some extent, 
is a sub~titute for the latter. 
33. Northey, Interview. 
34. Di tchfield, Interview. Also Northey, "The Anm.:tal 
Conferences of the NZLP", p. 335. 
35. Djtchfield, Interview. 
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Secondly, the influence of the annual conference 
is much more limited than is suggested by its designa-
tion in the party's constitution as "the supreme govern-· 
ing body of the party". 36 Its role in reality is."to 
scuss policy, not to formulate it". 37 Consesuently, 
the remits that·conference endorses find their way into 
the party's elf'Ction manifesto only if they fit in with 
its "general tone". 38 Thus, the majority of endorsed 
t"er.lits do no.t, in the end, become party policy. Since 
. the Labour Party was first elected into office, policy-
~aking has increasingly become the prerogative of the 
. 
PLP. But trade union representation in the PLP has also 
ste~d~ly declined. 
III. THE JOINT COUNCIL OF LABOUR 
Consultation between the Labour Party and the indus-
t aJ wi~? o0 the lahour movement in New Zealand was 
~st fo·mali.ed in 19 In that year, the Labo~r Party 
CtJnfere:r~ce: cr:dor';ed a renli t from the NZT.'J'I'lF reco:rnrnendinJ 
t est<:~~)li sh::10nt of a corru;~i ttee, on which t AOL, the 
.~ Lc:bour Party national executive and the PLP 
v.r1uld be reprl.: sen ted, to "discuss and arrive at dcci sions 
on all ~uestions affecting industrial leuislation bror.tght 
befort:.: Pa-:oJiament 11 .39 
3ci. N~LP, Constitut on and Rules, revised ed., p. 4. 
37. ~J'.rtrow, IntervieY'. 
38. Hybrrnv, Intervie':/. 
39. NZlP, I<eport of the Tenth Annual Conference ( 1 926) , 
p. 
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Th~ result of the waterside workers' remit was 
the National Labour J,eqis lation Committee, (NLLC), which 
comprised three r~presentatives of the AOL, three of the 
TLCF', and two each from the· national executive and 
Parliar.1entary wing of the Labour Party. Between 1926 
and 1935, before ·Labour came to power, the PLP generally 
submitted its proposed bi lJ.s to the committee for discus-
sian and opproval and consulted it before determining its 
attitude toward industrial legislation proposed by the 
Reform, United and Coalition governments. 40 But the 
committee did not long survive the election of a Labour 
Government. In 1937, the TLCF and the AOL merged into 
the FOL. To the extent ·that the FOL' s leaders had direct 
a~cess to Labour Cabinet ministers, the need for the NLLC 
was obviated. While Peter Fraser was Prime Minister, F'OL 
representatives even attended party caucus meetings. 41 
The event which precipitated the formation o£ the 
Joint Council of Labour (JCL), the NLLC's successor, was 
the 1951 waterfront dispute, which incited unprecedented 
hostility between the party and the F'OL (see chapter four). 
Responding to an initiative from Angus t·~cLag an, a former 
FOL pre".ident and Labour Cabinet minister, the FOL and 
Labour Party conferences in 1952 decid~d to set up a body 
43 
at which members of the respective national executives could 
meet "Dar the purpose of ensuring that a common policy is 
40. Brown, !he r~ise of New Zealand Labour, p. 130. 
41. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and 
P r'e sent , p. 1 56 • 
adopted on matters affecting the labour movement 
At the same time, neither organization was meant to try 
to coerce the other into accepting the 'common policy' 
that it proposed. The council resolved at its inaugural 
meeting that: "As the New Zealand Federation of Labour 
and the New Zealand Labour Party are both self-LS"ic7 
autonomous bod·i.es, the functions of the Joint Counci 1 
. 43 
shall be purely advisory". 
Having decided at the outset to meet monthly, the 
JCL lived u~ to its resolution for the first five months 
of its e~istence, but thereafter met increasingly infre-
quently and irregularly. Conscious of this fact, its 
members twice re-affirmed their:- determination to meet 
monthlv- in September 1955 and October 1958 - and then 
44 
resolved after the 1964 conferences that the council shou1d 
"meet regularly on a r;uarterly basis with the proviso that 
intermeJiate meetings shall be convened when considered 
t l . . . d d . 44 necessary ·y t1e JOlnt presl ents an secretarles". 
But the fre"luency of the council's meetings declined as 
if none o~ the resolutions had been passed. It met on 
twenty-t'.:'o occasions between 1952 and 1 957, on thirteen 
occasions between 1958 and 1963, on eight occasions between 
1964 and 1969, and only twice in the six-year period from 
1970 to 1975 (see Table 10). In a formal sense at least, 
co-opera:-ion tetween the Labour Party and the POL is now 
at a ver'r J.O'.I.' ebb. 
42. NZLP, "I11dustrial Relations Policy", 1952. 
graphed.) 
(Himeo-
43. JCL, Minutes of Meetings, 1952-66, meeting of July 21, 
1952. (Typewritten.) 
44. NZLP, Report of the Forty-eighth Annual ConFerence 
( 1 964) , p. 8. 
TABLE 10 
CONFIRMED fiiEETINGS OF THJ.:; JOINI' 
COUNCIL OF LABOUR, 1952-75 
Year No. Year No. Year No. 
1952 5 a 1960 1 1968 1 
1953 4 1961 3 1969 1 
1954 3 1962 1 1970 
1955 4 1963 3 1971 
1956 3 1964 1 1972 1 
1957 3 1965 2 1973 ·1 
1958 3 1966 3 1974 
1959 2 1967 1975 
SOURCES: Joint Council of Labour, ~anutes 
of lYeetings, 1952-66. FOL, Annual Report of the 
Zealand Federation of Labour (Vvellington: Stan-
dard Press), 1953-75. NZLP, Annual· Report of the 
New Zealand Executive (Wellington: NZLP), 1953-75· 
·a 
The council did not meet, of course, until 
July 1952. 
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In practice, the functions of the JCL have become 
increasingly narrow. The topics that the council dis-
cussed up until 1963 were numerous and diverse - they 
included immigration; compulsory unionism, the Arbitra-
tion Court, and the arbitration system; economic stabil-
ization regulations, the cost-of-living, and general 
wage-order applications; trust control of breweries; 
social security and superannuation; Saturday trading; 
defence and disarmament; the Soviet invasion of Hungary; 
the Suez cri~is; the 1960 All' Blacks' tour of South Africa; 
and the p~ssibility of the entry of Britain into the 
Europear. Economic Community. 45 Since 1963, the council's 
deliberations have been 'confined almost solely to remits 
. . 
t'eferred to it by two conferences and, triennially, to the 
Labour Party's industrial relations policy46 and trade 
union fi!1ancial contri.bvtions to the party's election 
~ro~ 1938 to 1963, the Labour Party sent 
a1~·:1o:ct zill th2 h:J:~:".tri&l relations remits from its 
A5. JCL, J:inutes o 0 Neetings, 1952-63. 
46. The JCL pliyed ~major part in the formulation of 
·the Labour P~rtv's industrial relations policy in 
19~3, 1966 and ~969 at least. See JCL, minutes of 
meeting of J\pril 1963; FOL, 1967 Annual Report; 
NZLP, ReEort of the Fifty-fourth Annual Conference 
(1J70), pp. 5-o. For an account of how 1t d1d not 
help formulate Labour's industrial relations policy 
in 1975, see chapter five. 
47. Thi:; assessment of the current functions of the JCL 
correlates with that of the Labout Party's general 
secretary, who Sciys it exists mainly (i) to help win 
elections, and (ii) to consider remits referred to it 
by the two conferences. Wybrow, Interview. 
46 
constituent organizations directly to the FOL for its 
recommendations. If this .practice had not been discon-
tinued, it is probable that the JCL would by now have 
lost its 'raison d'etre•. 48 
The FOL attributed the council's failure to meet 
in 1970 and 1971 to the burdensome demands that had 
been made on the labour movement's time by the National 
Government and its 'anti-working-class' legislation. 49 
Its testimony is supported by the general secretary of 
the Labour Pa-rty, who emphasizes.how difficult it is to 
bring a do:.~en or more "very busy" 50 people together for 
c; JCL :neeting. Moreover, while the third Labour Govern-
ment was in office, the leaders of the FOL and Labour 
Cabinet ministers were in "continuous [Si£7 contact" 51 
anJ there was thus little need for the council to meet. 
Yet neither explanation is convincing. The executive 
members of the party and the FOL have not become so much 
more busy that where they were once able to meet almost 
four times annually, they can now meet only triennially. 
In addition, the JCL met no more frequently in the last 
Parliamentary term in which the Labour Party was in 
opposition than it did when Labour was in power - in 
each term only once. 
48. For reasons as to why this practice ceased, see 
Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", 
p. 152. They are not important in the context of 
this discussion. 
49. FOL, Annual Reports, 1971, p. 52; 1972, p. 53. 
50. \vybrow, Interview. 
51. Wybrow, Interview. 
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How, then, is the increasing obsolescence of 
the JCL to be explained? According to one account, 
the party has been "dragging its feet 1152 because the 
F'OL has habitually used the council to impose its 
policies on the political wing, as in the case of the 
joint statement .opposing the New Zealand commitment in 
Vietnam in 1966. But this is probably true more of the 
days in which F'intan Patrick ~N'alsh led the F'OL than of 
today. Two members of the J~abour Party's national 
executive who are nominally members of the council 
assert that it is the FOL's reluctance which prevents 
the council from meeting more often. 53 The FOL has lost 
interest in the council· because of its "growing ability 
to realize its objectives independently of the Labour 
Party", 54 while, on the party's side, there are fewer 
former trade unionists in Parliament and consequently 
fewer MPs interested in maintaining the party's tradi-
tiona~. association with the trade union movement. The 
FOL's president, Sir Thomas Skinner, is described as 
"very coy" 55 in his attitude toward the JCL and its 
effective operation and as a pragmatist in·the sense 
that he likes to be able to deal as easily with a 
National Government as with a Labour Government. The 
fact that the frequency of the JCL's meetings declined 
52. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present, 
p. 157. 
53. Stan Rodger, Interview, Wellington, January 16, 
1975. Also Ditchfield, Interview. 
54. Ditchfield, Interview. 
55. Rodger, Intervie~. 
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very sharply at about the time that Sir Thomas became 
president of the FOL in 1973 tends to validate these 
analyses. We may therefore conclude tentatively that 
trade union, more than party, reluctance has brought 
about the decline of the institution which was to bring 
together the leaders of industrial and political labour 
and unite them in their views. 
IV. TRADE UNIONISTS IN THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY 
The purpose of the Labour Party's annual conference 
is thus to discuss, rather than to formulate policy and 
the JCI., which builds the trade union movement into the 
party's policy-making process, is, in effect, in recess. 
If tr~de unions are to influence party policy other than 
by pressure group tactics, overt or covert, they must, 
therefore, be represented in the PLP. 
Unli:ce their British counterparts, New Zealand trade 
tmions do not 'sponsor' Labour Party election candidates. 56 
Consesuently, once a trade union member or official 
becomes an MP in New Zealand, there is little doubt that 
his primary loy-alty is to the PLP: "He acts as a Labour 
MP 11 • 57 Although he may have secured the party's nomina-
tion with the aid of trade unionists on the candidate 
selection panel, individual ambition, rather than the 
organized efforts of his union, will have motivated him to 
56. 'Sponsorship' involves a union in sustaining the 
finances of a constituency organization of the 
party in return for its adoption of the candidate 
that the union recommends. See Martin Harrison, 
Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 273-79. 
57. Hunt, Interview. 
49 
contest it. In any case, sponsorship as it is practised 
in Britain is "less a means of achieving precise policy 
objectives than of maintaining a distinctive trade union 
and working-class presencen 58 on the Labour Party benches. 
In policy conflicts between the trade union movement 
and the PLP, most sponsored MPs side with the partv. 59 
New Zealand trade unions have often quarrelled 
bitterly with politicians who rose frofll their ranks, 
with former prominent trad~ unionists such as Praser, 
McLagan and Robert Semple. According to Hichels, such 
conflict is caused essentially by the psychological 
transformation of working-class political leaders. 
Irrespective of their soci origins, leaders tend to 
draw together with the exercise of responsibility and 
60 become "a leader class". Duverger argues that tension 
bl::twcen the Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings 
oF socia st wor~ing-class parties is natural: 
Socially the parliamentary representatives become, 
from the working-class militants' point of view, 
member~, of the middle class. A working-class 
deputy !J1!:.7 is always more of a deputy than a 
member of the working class - and as time passes 
he becomes less and less ·<J.rorking class and more 
and more of a deputy •.• Hore than the income 
figure it is the genera~ mode of existence which 
separates the member of par ament and the mili-
tants. Through his surroundings, his connections, 
and his contacts the deputy leads a typica11y 
middle-class existence. The general atmosp~~re 
of parliament is a middle-class atmosphere. 
58. Harrison, "Trade Unions and the Labour Party", in 
Pressure Groups in Britain, eds. ~ichard K 
and J J R1chardson (London: Dent, 1974), p. 71. 
59. \·?illiam D Huller, "Union - MP Conflict: An Overview", 
Parliamentary Affairs 26 (Summer 1973): 336-55 passim. 
60. See Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 159-60. 
61. Ibid., pp. 190-91. It is arguable, of course, that 
MPs, far from leading a 'typically middle-class' 
existence, become part of a much more excJusive 
social elite. 
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In the light of Duverger's observations, it is 
perhaps sign1ficant that relations between the PLP 
and the trade union movement were most strained in 
precisel.y those years when the average length of ser-
vice of the trade union MPs was at its greatest - in 
the late 1940's 0nd early 1950's (see Table 11). 
TABLE 11 
AVERAGE LENGTH OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE 
OF TRADE UNION MPS 
Years Years Years 
1 91 9: 0.3 1938: 10.3 1957: 10.0 
1922: 1.6 1943: 11.7 1960: 9.5 
1925: s.s 1946: 10.8 1963: 9.2 
1 928: 6.2 1949: 1 3. 4 1966: 9.8 
1 931: /.6 1 951 : 12.75 1 969: 9.0 
1 935: 7.0 1954: 8.7 1972: 8.7 
1 97 5: 9.5 
NOTE: Calculatidns are on the basis of length 
of Parliamentary career immediately after 
each General Election and include newly-
elected MPs. 
Conversely, trade union leaders have sometimes 
established very harmonious wor.king reL1tionships with 
party leaders such as Hugh Watt, the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Labour from 1972 to 1974, who, although 
once active in the Engineers• Union, had been a business-
man for some years before he entered Parliament in 1954. 
In 1974 and 1975, trade unions were also the principal 
supporters of Gerald O'Brien, a businessman, in his 
successful candidature for the party ordinary, and then 
senior, vice-presidency. There is thus no 'iron 1 w' 
.,)I 
that former trade unionists in the PLP will concur 
with trade union policy objectives or that those with 
othc:r backgrounds will not, and there is no insepa~"'.""':ble 
or even identifiable trade union faction in the p.trty 
u2 caucus. This casts doubt upon the entire notion that 
trade m1ion MPs might represent trade union interests 
in any direct sense. The most that appears to be expected 
of trade m1ion HPs is that they should possess and demon-
strate an ability to empathize with the attitudes and 
behaviour of the leaders and members of the indust-rial 
wing of the.movement. 63 
I~respective of whether or not they 'represent' trade 
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m1ions, the proportion of Labour HPs with union backgrou:nds 
declined from almost 90 per cent after the first General 
Election that the party contested in 1919 to 27 per cent, 
its nadir, in 1972 (see Table 12). Between 1972 aYJ.d 1975, 
manual workers and trade union officials were outnumbered 
in the PLP b~r members of another occupational category, -
those who ha.d been professionally employed. 64 The trend, 
however, has not been uniform. There were proportion-
ately more trade unionists in Parliament in 1966 than in 
1938 and almost as few in 1957 as in 1975, although the 
62. Douglas, Interview; Hunt, Interview. Also Edward 
Isbey, Interview, Wellington, December 11, 1975. 
63. Isbey, Interview. 
64. After the 1975 General Election, the number of former 
trade unionists in the PLP temporarily equalled the 
number of 'professionals'. In early 1976, however, 
the M~ for Nelson, Sir Stanley Whitehead, a former 
trade unionist, died and was succeeded in Parliament 
by a businessman, Melvin Courtney. At this point, 
31.25% of the members of the PLP were 'professionals', 
28.1% manual workers or trade union officials, 21 • 9~~ 
businessmen or farmers, 12.5% public servants, and 
6. 25;~ white-collar workers. 
TABLE 12 
OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS OF ME~ffiERS 
OF THE PLP, 1919-75 
TU 1 wcw 2 PS 3 
. 4 B-F 5 Year PROF. 
1919 7 87.5 1 12.5 - o.o - 0.0 - 0.0 
1922 14 82.3 1 5.9 - 0.0 1 5.9 1 5.9 
1925 9 75.0 1 8.3 - 0.0 1 8.3 1 8.3 
1928 14 73.7 - 0.0 - 0.0 3 15.8 2 10.5 
1931 17 70.7 1 4.2 
-
0.0 5 20.8 1 4.2 
1935 24 45.3 1 1.9 - 0.0 11 20.7 17 32.1 
1938 6 23 2 3.8 - 0.0 14 26.4 13 24.5 
1943 22 48.9 2 4.4 1 2.2 9 20.0 11 24.4 
1946 21 50.0 2 4.8 2 4.8 8 19.0 9 21.4 
1949 16 47.1 2 5.9 3 8.8 7 20.6 6 17.6 
1951 12 40.0 3 10.0 2 6.6 7 23.3 6 20.0 
1954 12 34.3 3 8.6 6 17.1 10 28.6 4 11.4 
1957 13 .7 5 12.2 7 17.1 11 26.8 5 12.2 
V1 
w 
Year 
1960 
1963 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1975 
15 44.1 3 
14 40.0 4 
16 45.7 3 
13 32.5 I 3 
15 27.3 5 
10 31.25 2 
TABLE 12 - Continued 
v:cw 
8.8 
11.4 
8.6 
7.5 
9.1 
6.25 
4 
4 
2 
5 
6 
4 
PS 
11.8 
.4 
·s. 7 
12.5 
10.9 
12.5 
PROF. 
8 23.5 
10 28.6 
10 28.6 
10 25.0 
17 30.9 
10 31.25 
B-F 
4 11.8 
3 8.6 
4 11.4 
9 22.5 
12 21.8 
6 18.75 
SOURCES: .Who's Who' in New Zealand, 3rd, 4th, 5th eds., edited by 
G. H. Scholefield (Wellington: Rangatira Press (1924), watkins (1941), 
Reed (1951); 6th ed., edited by Frank A. Simpson (Wellington: Reed, 
1956); 7th, 8th, 9th, lOth eds~, edited by G.C. Petersen (Wellington: 
1961, 1964, 1968, 1971). General Assembly Library, Biographical Files. 
1 Manual workers (all of whom were trade union members) and trade 
union officials. 
2 White-collar workers. 
3 Public servants. 
4 Professionals. 
5 Businessmen and farmers. 
6 One l'lP, Mrs Catherine Stewart (Wellington Viest), who was a 
housewife, has not been categorized. V1 
-f:>. 
proportion of the party's thirty safest seats occupied 
by former trade unionists declined between 1935 and 
1975 by over 50 per cent (see Table 13). 
Interruptions in the overall decline in the propor-
tion of trade unionists in the PLP are largely explained 
by the party's changing electoral fortunes. When the 
party wins well, as it did in 1935, 1938 and 1972, the 
trade unionist component in the PLP generally becomes 
proportionately smaller with the entry of successful, 
professionally or self-employed candidates from the mar-
ginal, usually mixed rural-urban, seats. T.Jhen the party 
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loses leavily and the size of the PLP decl s, as happened 
in 1960 and 1975, its trade unionist component tends to 
increa:;e, because trade union MPs hold proportionately 
more safe urban seats than MPs with other bac}:grounds 
(see table in appendices). The crushing de inflict 
upon the party in the 1975 election increased the trade 
unionist component in the PLP only minimally (and tertpor-
arily), but it did leave unionists in possession of over 
half of the party's remaining safe seats~ The that 
unioni~)ts have been cl1osen to occtlpy nine o.f t\venty scfe 
Labqur s.eats that have become vacant in the last ~ifteen 
years indicates that the influence of 
unions in the selection of candidates 
constant. 65 
iliat trade 
remained rairly 
65. The group of nine MPs, with the swing against the 
party to which their seats were vulnerable when 
they were selected as candidates, comprised: 
Rontlld Bailey (Heretaunga, 17.T/o), Norman Douglas 
(Auckland Central, 12.7~0, Sir Basil Arthur (Timaru, 
which was vulnerable to a 1.1% swing in 1962, but 
which had been h.eld by Labour since 1928), Matiu 
Rata (Northern Maori, 13.4%), Fraser Colman (Petone. 
7.8%), Faraone Reweti (Eastern Haori, 10.4/0, Edwin 
Isbey (Grey Lynn, 15.8%), Mary Batchelor (Avon, 
19.3~~) and John Kirk (sydenham, 21.4%). 
TABLE 13 
OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS OF l'Jf..ElVIBERS OF THE PLP 
·IN 30 SAFEST LABOUR SEA.TS, 1935-75 
wcw PS PROF. B-F 
1935 19 63.33 1 3.33 - 0.00 6 20.00 4 13.33 
1938 17 56.67 2 6. - 0.00 7 23.33 4 13.33 
1943 . 18 60.00 2 6.67 1 3-33 6 20.00 3 10.00 
1946 19 63.33 2 6.67 2 6.67 4 13.33 3 10.00 
1949 14 46.67 2 6.67 2 6.67 7 23.33 5 16.67 
1951 12 40.00 3 10.00 2 6.67 7 23.33 6 20.00 
1954 10 33.33 3 10.00 4 13.33 9 30.00 4 13.33 
1957 10 33.33 4 13.33 4 13.33 9 30.00 3 10.00 
1960 12 40.00 3 10.00 4 13.33 7 23.33 4 13.33 
1963 13 43.33 3 10.00 3 10.00 8 26.67 3 10.00 
1966 13 43.33 2 6.67 2 6.67 10 33.33 3 10.00 
1969 12 40.00 2 6.67 3 10.00 7 23.33 6 20. 
1972 9 30.00 2 6.67 4 13.33 9 30.00 6 20.00 
1975 9 30.00 2 6.67 4 13.33 9 30.00 6 20.00 
SOURCES: Who's Who in New Zealand, a eds. General Assembly 
Library, Biographical Files. 
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As the proportion of former trade unionists in 
the PLP has declined, s6, too, has the proportion of 
trade unionists moving 'sideways' into Parliament from 
position~ of leadership in the industrial wing of the 
movement. Of all the trade unionists who have entered 
Parliament in the post-war period, only four had pre-
viously achieved eminence in the trade union movement. 66 
A career in politics seems to have appealed much more 
strongly to the leaders of indnstrial labour before 
\vorld i·lar I :I;. After the 1 935 election, the PLP contained 
not only seven former presidents and vice-presidents of 
provincial trades councils, but also six former leaders 
of the short-lived, syn.dicalist-oriented • Red' Federation 
of Labour. Five of the six - Fraser, a member of the d-
eration's national executive; Patrick Webb, its president 
from 1910 to 1912; Semple, president in 1908 and 1909 and 
thereafter full-time organizer; William Parry, vice-presi-
57 
dent in 1911 and 1912; and Hubert Armstrong, vice-president 
in 1 908 and 1909 and later a member of the executive - \Vere 
Cabinet ministers in the first Labour Government. 67 
66. · The four were McLagan (Riccarton, 1946-56), president 
of the United Mine \-lorkers' Union and, at its 
inauguration, of the FOL; William Fox (Miramar, 1954-
66), vice-president of the FOL; Isbey (Grey Lynn, 
1969- ), president of the NZ\·MF, 1957-68; and Douglas 
(Auckland Central, 1960-75), secretary of the AucJ~land 
Trades Council and vice-president of the Auckland 
Dist ct Council of the FOL. 
67. Another Cabinet minister, Mark Fagan, leader of the 
!Jegi slati ve Cotmci 1, had also been a member of the 
national executive of the 'Red' Federation. See 
H E Holland, F E O'Flynn L!Ballot Box'7, and R S Ross, 
The Tragic Stor::y of the Waihi Strike TWellington: 
The 'Worker' Pr1ntery, 1913; facsimile edition, 
Dunedin: Hocken Library, 1975), pp. 11-14. . 
Since Cabinet makes the authoritative decisions 
in the New Zealand political process, representation in 
the caucus of the governing party is not as accurate an 
indicator of the influence of the members of a given 
occupational category than representation in Cabinet. 
Ex-trade unionists, with ten out of thirteen ministers 
from 1935 to 1940, dominated the first two Labour Cabinets 
(see Table 14). In the second Labour Government, however, 
only five of sixteen ministers had trade union bacl~arounds, 
and in the third only six out of twenty. The in.fluence of 
former trade unionists in Cabinet was rather Jess in the 
third than in the second Labour administration. Three of 
the first eight minist~rs in the Cabinet rankings Prom 
1957 to 1960 had once ~een manual workers'or trade union 
' 
officials, but, after the Cabinet reshuffle that occurred 
a_ er Rawling Lecarne Prime Minister in September 1974, not 
one of the seven most influential Cabinet minister", the 
members of the Policy and Priorities Contmittee, had either 
a trade union background or was knmvn to be of 1 trade U.."lion 
persuasion' (see Table 25). Under ~owling, th~ in°lucnce 
of ex-trade un~onists in tte party leadership also r~ached 
its·nadir (see chapter five). 
vlhat has caused the decline in the proportion of trade 
unionists in the PLP? One view is that as many trade 
unionists as in earlier years are being nominated r.or selec-
tion as Parliamentary candidates, but that, althouJh they 
are not deliberately excluded, nominees with professional 
backgrounds tend more often to command the attributes which 
impress candidate 'selectors' and make them potentially 
6'8 good MPs. The other view, of which there are two variants, 
68. Isbey, Jh terview. 
TABLE 14 
OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS OF KENIBERS 
OF LABOUR CABINETS, 1935-75 
Year TU wcw PS PROF. 
1935 10 76.9 .1 7.7 - 0.0 1 7.7 1 
1938 10 76.9 1 7.7 - 0.0 1 7.7 1 
1940 9 69.2 1 7.7 - 0.0 2 15.4 1 
1943 10 58.8 2 11.8 - 0.0 3 17.6 2 
1946 1 9 60.0 2 13.3 - 0.0 3 20.0 1 
1957 5 31.25 3 18.75 2 12.5 4 25.0 2 
1972 6 30.0 2 10.0 2 10.0 7 35.0 3 
1974 6 31.6 2 10.5 2 10.5 7 36.8 2 
SOURCE: Who's Who in New Zealand, all eds. 
1 Figures exclude James O'Brien, a· trade unionist, who died in 1947, 
and include his replacement, Terry McCombs, a professional. 
B-F 
7.7 
7.7 
7-7 
11.8 
6.7 
12.5 
15.0 
10.5 
Vl 
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is that trade unionists have voluntarily opted out of 
Parliamentary politics. Once "very poorly paid and 
very poorly treated", trade union secretaries were 
attracted by a career in Parliament because "the pay 
was better and the job security greater" 69 - in te 
of the pos bility of feat in triennial elections. 
To the extent that they have become more secure and 
more prosperous, however, their interest in a political 
co.reer has diminished. One former }1P and prominent 
trade unionist believes similarly thn_t t unioni-:;ts 
are "just not coming forward 1170 as potential Parliamen-
tary candidates. In the 1930's, the labour movement, 
industrial and political, attracted workers with ability, 
but with no alternative avenue:; of social i t~r. The 
welfare state, however, h~s emanci ed the offspring of 
the wor\ing class, so that the very le who, in t 
1930's, would have become t union acti s and 
leaders now take higher education and subse ~1Jent obtain 
professional employment. The 'intel tual wor~·:er' is a 
sappearing phenomenon whose extinction left the 
trade union movement dominated by "the mediocre" 7l the 
Unimaginative and the unambitious. 
The evidence certainly tends to substantiate the 
view that fewer trade union personnel in post-war than 
in pre-war years have had political ambitions. S 
the mid-1950's, the proportion of the Labour Party's 
69. Ditchfield, Interview. 
70. Douglas, Interview. 
71. Douglas, Interview. 
60 
total membership supplied by affiliated trade unions 
has increased from 78 to 93 per cent (see Table 1). 
This means that trade union deleoates have been able 
to build up their stre~gth in the LECs and - despite 
the centralist bias of the party's candidate selection 
system - should have been able to ensure the adoption 
of more, rather than fewer, union nominees as Parlia-
mentary candidates. In fact, of seventy-four Labour 
candidates elected to Parliament between 1918 and 
1945, thirty-four (46 per cent} were trade unionists, 
cor.1parcd with twenty-four (29 per cent) of eighty-two 
between ·1946 and 1975. Significantly, those unions 
which lFwe displayed a low propensity to produce Labour 
MPs are precisely those which have become increasinaly 
dominant - in numerical terms, at least - in the trade 
union movement in the post-war period: the Enoineers' 
Union (no MPs since 1 945), the hotel wor}:.ers', clerical 
workers' and shop-assistants 1 unions· (one t·1P from ec?-ch 
group), and the freezing workers', drivers' and carpen-
ters' unions (none of which has produced any !1Ps). The 
unions which produced alr.1ost half of the trade 1mion ~IPs 
in the pre-war period are those whose numbers and whose 
influence in the trade union movement have since declined: 
the miners', railwaymen's, tramwaymen's and workers' 
unions. Except for the ASRS, these w1ions have all pro-
duced fewer HPs in the post-war than in the pre-war period 
(see Table 15). 
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TABLe 15 
AFFILIATIONS OF THAi..ii UNIONISTS 
IN THE: PLP • 1919-75 
-
Union 1919- 1928- 1938- 1946- 195.4-27 37 45 53 62 
Bakers' employees 1 a 1 
Bank officers 
Boilermakers 
Brewery workers 2 b 1 c 
Clerical workers 
Cooks and stewards 1 
Engine-drivers 1 1 d 
Engineers 1 1 
Furniture-trade 1 
employees 
Footwear operatives 1 
Hotel workers 
Labourers 2 1 1 
1963-
71 
1 
1 
l972- Total 
75 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 ~ 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 1 
4 
0\ 
1\) 
TABLE 15 - Continued 
Union 1919- 1928- 1938- 1946-27 37 45 53 
Miners 3 1 1 
Plumbers and gas- 1 e 
fitters 
Printers 1 1 
ASRS (NUR) 1 f 2 1 
Shop-assistants 
Storemen and packers 
Tai1oresses 2 
Timber workers 1 
Tramway employees 1 h 1 2 1 
Unemployed workers 1 
·waterside workers 1 
New Zealand Workers 1 3 1 
Total 16 12 6 5 
1954- 1963-
62 71 
1 1 
1 
1 g 
3 
2 
8 7 
1972- Total 
75 
5 
1 
1 3 
6 
1 1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
1 
4 
7 
4 58 
0'\ 
(..) 
TABLE 15 - Continued 
SOURCES: Who's Who in New Zealand, all e~s. General Assembly 
Library, Biographical Files. 
NOT3: Subjects have been classi~ied according to th~ period in 
which they were elected to Parliament. 
a Also active in tailoresses' union. 
b One was also secretary of grocers• and match factory employees' 
unions. 
c Also secretary of rubber workers', coach-workers', woollen mill 
employees' and journalists' unions. 
d The first Prime Minister in the third Labour Government, Norman 
Kirk, who was also an engineer-boilerman, casual waterfront 
labourer and ferry worker. He first came into contact with the 
Labour Party as the Auckland Ferry Workers' Union delegate to 
the iVaitemata LRC. See John Dunmore, Norman Kirk: A Portrait 
(Palmerston North: New Zealand Books, 1972), pp. 29-50 passim. 
e The president of the FOL (1963- ), Sir Thomas Skinner, who was 
a pllliuber by occupation and union membership and secretary.of 
musicians', shipwrights• and other unions. 
f A o member of the Amalgamated Society of ers. 
J • 
o Also transport workers• un1on secretary. 
h Also storemen and packers' union se~retary. 
0\ 
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CHAPTER II 
TRADE UNION ECONOMISM AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
New Zealand trade unions have historically 
displayed little interest in carrying out the great 
task assigned by the industrial working class by 
' Marx - that of overthrowing capitalism and estab-
lishing in its wake the socialist order in which 
workers would control industry and society. Instead, 
they have preoccupied themselves increasingly exclu-
sively with the pursuit of financial and related 
improvements within an implicitly accepted capitalist 
industrial structure. In this chapter we shall first 
examine, and attempt to account for, the predominance 
of this orientation among New Zealand trade unions. 
It shall then be argued that the unions' primary objec-
tive~ are so narr6w in their scope that they can be 
achieved, under certain conditions, without the unions 
having recourse to the Labour Party. These conditions 
were notably lacking in the 1930's, when the unions• 
commitment to political action via the Labour Party was 
strong, but have prevailed for more or less the entire 
post-war period, during which time, trade union involve-
ment in the Labour Party has, of course, declined. 

January 1913, if the Federation had not been demoral-
ized by the complete defeat of the Waihi Miners• Strike, 
which lasted from May to November in 1912. The indus-
trial unionists of the Federation hastened to achieve 
unity with the craft union or 'moderate• wing of the 
industrial labour movement at the Unity Conferences o£ 
1913. The product of the compromise of the 'militant• 
and •moderate' unions was the Qnited Federation of 
Labour (UFL), whose slightly less aggressive objective 
was "to organiz~ systematically and scientifically upon 
an industrial union basis, in order to assist the over-
throw of·the capitalist system, and thus bring about a 
Co-operative Commonwealth, based upon industrial demo-
cracy".2 But the UFL, too, was short-lived - it was 
crushed by the employers and the Reform Government in 
the great strike of November-December 1913. 
The formation in 1919 of the AOL, which commanded 
the allegiance of many of the unions that had affiliated 
to the Federation, was a direct consequence of the shift 
of emphasis toward political action that had occurred in 
the New Zealand labour movement in the wake of the calam-
itous events of 1912 and 1913. Political action of the 
type practised by the newly-established Labour Party was 
anathema - at first - to the leaders of the AOL, who 
regarded themselves as the new bearers of the abandoned 
syndicalist objectives of the 'Red' Federation. Craft 
unionism, destructive as it was of working-class indus-
trial solidarity, was the •bete noire' of the AOL. It 
2. Hickey, 'Red' Fed. Memoirs, p. 71. 
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envisaged the establishment of 'One Big Union•, an 
alliance of national unions, divided into industrial 
departments, which would not only use strike action 
to win better wages and conditions for workers, but 
would also "pave the way for worker control of indus-
try",3 its ultimate objective. But as conditions in 
the 1920's became less and less supportive of success-
ful industrial action, so did the AOL gradually lose 
sight of its revolutionary goal. 
In action, as opposed to proclamation, the 'Red' 
Federation and the AOL were similarly ~revolutionary. 
Far from·being oriented toward increasing workers• con-
trol over the productive process, the Federation based 
its claim that it was effective on the successes that. it 
haq achieved in negotiating wage increases for its mem-
ber unions. 4 Like the Federation, the AOL opposed the 
existence of the Arbitration Court, the institution 
created in 1894 to rule upon claims for wage increases 
(or decreases) and settle other industrial disputes which 
employers and workers could not together resolve. Its 
approach to industrial relations problems turned out, 
however, to be pragmatic. As the economic boom caused 
by World War I collapsed and unemployment increased in 
the 1920's, the Alliance was induced to co-operate with 
the Court and even to shelter under its protective 
3. R C J Stone, "The Unions and the Arbitration 
1900-1937", in Studies of a Small Democrac~, 
Robert Chapman and Keith sinclair (Aucklan : 
Auckland University Press, 1963), p. 209. 
System, 
eds. 
4. Holland, 0 1 Flynn and Ross, The Tragic Story of the 
Waihi Strike, pp. ·26-28. 
umbrella. 5 Having failed in several instances to give 
effective support to affiliated unions during strikes, 
the AOL by 1925 had been "weakened and discredited". 6 
The event which could have been expected to cause 
an upsurge of trade union interest in questions of 
workers' control was the election of the first Labour 
Government in 1935. But this was not the case. The 
only experiments in workers• control - by several 
branches of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and 
Joiners in the building industry- failed miserably.? 
With the encouragement of Lee, who, as under-secretary 
to the Minister of Finance, was in charge of housing, 
branches of the society formed co-operative companies 
in Wellington, Dunedin and Hamilton. The company in 
Wellington foundered because "every workman wanted to 
be the boss". 8 In Hamilton, the experiment failed 
when a building contractor offered the men running their 
own enterprise "10/- a day more in wages· and £10 a house 
less" 9to work for him. Rather more successful, the 
Dunedin venture lasted about a year, then it also folded 
up. Lee was motivated to write that: 
Merely by becoming a member of a trade union 
and by being automatically affiliated by a majority 
vote to the New Zealand Labour Party, the trade 
unionist does not become a socialist. We have 
socialist institutions dominated by capitalist 
culture, and a period of time must elapse before 
that.mental transformation can be achieved that 
5. Stone, "The Unions and the Arbitration System", p. 211. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Erik Olssen, "John A Lee, The Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters and Joiners and •worker Control' of the 
Building Industry", Political Science.27 (July-
December 1975): 40-55 pass1m~ 
8. Ibid., P• 47. 
9. Ibid. 
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will enable the workers to· control industry as 
well as to secure an increased proportion o£ 
its fruits •••• 
How to achieve a new outlook among our own 
people is10he difficulty confronting the Labour movement. 
The nature of the industrial relations remits con-
sidered at Labour Party conferences at about this time 
reflects the unions• overwhelming preoccupation with 
questions of wages, hours, holidays, accident compensa-
tion, and union membership requirements. In 1941, for 
example, 46 remits that went before conference were 
addressed to these topics - and only four to workers• 
control or to worker participation in industrial decision-
making.11 At the 1945 conference, the president of the 
Labour Party and former secretary of the AOL, Roberts, 
expressed his disappointment that workers did not seem 
at all interested in controlling and owning industry. The 
time had come for the Labour Government to implement the 
.Party's socialist objective, he said, but: 
••• Only in a few cases has anything been 
done in that direction. Neither does there appear 
to be any serious effort on the part of the wage-
workers to demand it ••• The workers through the 
years have by the system under which we lived 
been made irresponsible, merely to do as they were 
told. Now Labour has come of age, and there is 
only one cure for irresponsibility and that is 
responsibility to do the job. It requires the 
joint co-operation of the Government, the political 
and the trade union side of our Movement to intro-
duce and make a success of co-operative producl~on 
and co-operation in the rendering of services. 
10. John A Lee, Socialism in New Zealand (London: 
T. Werner Laurle, 1938J; quoted ibid., p. 51. 
11. NZLP, Report of the Twenty:-fifth Annual Conference 
( 1941), passim. 
12. NZLP, Report of the Twenty-ninth Annual Conference 
( 1 94 5 ) , p • 4 • 
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Since World War II, the :socialist content in the 
ideology of New Zealand trade unionism has been further 
diluted, a trend of which there is evidence in the 
changing objectives of the FOL itself. The objectives 
that it chose in 1937 were "the socialization of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange" and 
the ''complete organization of all workers by grouping 
them to secure the full value of their labour". 13 It 
discarded these objectives in 1951 and decided then 
that it should work for "a more equitable share of 
the national income, and ultimately, production for 
social us.e and not private profit". 14 In retrospect, 
the FOL's new objective seems to have been its formal 
.. " 
acknowledgement that its primary function was to bargain 
for and secure on behalf of organized labour a greater 
share of the surplus produced by private enterprise -
without raising the issue of whether enterprise should 
be private or public. There was subsequently a sharp 
decrease in the number of remits advocating nationaliza-
tion and schemes for workers• control considered by the 
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FOL's annual conference. At every conference in the 1940's, 
an average of three or four remits on these subjects had 
been considered; after Labour lost the 1949 election, and 
even while it was in office again from 1957 to 1960, 
"hardly any similar remits" 15 were put forward. In the 
13. 
14. 
15. 
NZFOL, Constitution and Rules (Wellington: NZFOL, 
1937), p. 1. 
NZFOL, Constitution and Rules, revised ed •. , 
(Wellington: NZFOL, 1952), P• 1~· 
R s Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand (London: 
Oxford University Press~ 1966), p. 108. 
1970's, issues of ultimate socialism and the like do 
not concern the trade union movement in New Zealand. 
Today, as one student of New Zealand trade unions has 
noted, "the high-flown ideals of the past, enshrined 
in the preambles and objectives of earlier organiza-
tions, are seldom mentioned ••• 'Bread and butter• 
issues, here and now, have become the first priority" 16 
- if ever they were not. 
The decline in socialist ideology which has thus 
occurred in the New Zealand trade union movement is 
characteristically caused, argues Mann, by "the growth 
of capitalist hegemony11 • 17 In the ideology of hegemonic 
capitalism, "freedom an~ justice are best secured by 
'breaking down' man's needs and activities into separate 
segments and providing each one with a separate market 
in which individuals can express their preferences and 
realize their needs". 18 Industrial and political behav-
iour in this type of social structure is characterized by 
"the separation of each sector, and implicit acceptance 
of the 'laws of the market' regulating each sector". 19 
In advanced capitalist societies, "industrial action has 
generally split off from political action, and ·industrial 
action itself has split into two subordinate and separate 
spheres: the economic and the job Lfhat is, shop floor, 
16. Roth, 11 Trade Unions", in Labour and Industrial 
Relations in New Zealand, p. 12. 
17. Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the 
Western Working Class (London: Macmfilan, 1973), 
P• 42 • 
18. Ibid., p. 19. 
19. Ibid. 
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not industrY? control spheres". 20 Since employers will 
·make concessions on economic, but not on control, issues, 
trade,unions typically preoccupy themselves with the 
attainment of economic bargaining gains and, in the 
process, tend to "lose sight of control issues, whether 
these concern the immediate work situation or wider-
ranging questions of industrial structure". 21 Indeed, 
the existing industrial structure tends to be legitimated 
by the very activity of compromise economic bargaining. 
Trade unions in hegemonic capitalist societies are thus 
preoccupied almost exclusively with economism, "the 
pursuit of financial improvements, ••• within the exist-
ing structure of industry". 22 
The history of the New Zealand trade union movement 
since the passage of the IC & A Act by the Liberal Govern-
ment in 1894 is largely a history of changing union atti-
tudes toward a system.whereby they have been required to 
submit irreconcilable disputes with employers to a third 
party, the Arbitration Court, whose rulings on the disputes 
20. Ibid., p. 20. 'Political' or 'protest' stoppages 
in industry, defined as those in which no demand 
is made on an employer, represented 13.4 per cent 
of all stoppages in New Zealand in 1972, 5.7 per 
cent in 1973, and 15.5 per cent in 1974. See 
Department of Labour, Industrial Stoppages Re}ort 
1974 (Wellington: Department of Labour, 1975 , 
p:-13. The National Government elected in 1975 
proposes to amend existing industrial relations 
legislation to permit civil action to be taken 
against trade unions for damages arising out of 
their •non-industrial' activities. The separation 
of industrial and political action would thus be 
reinforced by law. 
21. Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western 
Working Class, p. 21. 
22. Ibid., p. 20. 
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23 they have been bound to accept. Without exception, 
the radical trade union organizations in New Zealand 
labour history- the 'Red' Federation, the.AOL and the 
TUC, which survived for barely a year- are the ones 
which asserted that organized labour was strong enough 
to win bigger wage increases in direct bargaining with 
employers than under the arbitration system. Above 
all else, the great industrial confrontations of this 
century have been revolts against that system. The 
radical trade union organizations sought to practise 
and popularize aggressive economism, as opposed to 
the passive economism which has traditionally been 
favoured by the craft unions and the smaller, weaker 
and less class-conscious unions, many of which were 
virtually created and maintained as autonomous units 
by the provisions of the 1894 Act. 24 However, the 
'Red' Federation never commanded the allegiance of more 
than about 20 per cent of New Zealand's org~ized workers 
and the delegates at the inaugural conference of the 
TUC in August 1950 represented only 22,765 workers, 
8.25 per cent of the total number of trade unionists 
then registered under the IC & A Act. 25 Not until the 
late 1960's did alienation from the arbitration system 
seem to engulf a majority of New Zealand trade unions. 
23. See, for example, Stone, "The Unions and the Arbi-
tration System", p. 201; Michael Bassett, Confronta-
tion '51: The 1951 Waterfront Dispute (Well1ngton: 
Reed, 1972), pp~-12. 
24. "In some respects, many unions become mere state 
agencies and cease to be unions in any real sense; 
they have no reason for their existence except to 
secure an award of the Courttt (Howells, "Industrial 
Conflict in New Zealand", P• 170). 
25. Bassett, Confrontation '51, p. 223. 
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The causes of industrial stoppages which have 
.taken place in New Zealand this century are categor~ 
ized in Table 16, which reveals that disputes over 
wages have inspired mo~e stoppages than any other cause 
in five out of seven ten-year periods since 1906 and 
34 per cent of all the stoppages recorded over the 
entire period from 1906 to 1974. The proportion of all 
stoppages incited by disputes specifically about wag~s 
has shown an especially marked increase in the last 
decade. In an analysis of industrial conflict in New 
Zealand between 1951 and 1971 and on the basis also of 
a break-down of the number of workers involved in stop-
pages and the number of working-days lost, one observer 
has concluded that: "By far the most important source of 
conflict ••• has been in the brdad area of wages". 26 
II. WHY ECONOMISM? 
How, then, do we explain New Zealand trade unions' 
enduring and increasingly exclusive preoccupation with 
economism? The existing literature on international 
variations in working-class consciousness, 27 which is 
quite substantial, but essentially speculative, suggests 
26. Howells, "Industrial Conflict in New Zealand", 
p. 172 •· 
27. For a selection, see Perry Anderson, "Origins of 
the Present Cri s", in Towards Socialism, eds. 
Anderson and Robin Blackourn, American edition 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 
pp. 11-52; Richard F Hamilton, Affluence and the 
French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Pr1nceton University Press, 1967); 
Everett M Kassalow, Trade Unions and Industrial 
Relations: An International Comearison (New York: 
Random House, 1969); Seymour Martin Li"pset, "The 
Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European 
Politics", Daedalus 93 (Winter 1964); and Mann, 
Consciousness and Action among the Western Working 
Class· 
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several possible reasons for the •economistic• 28 
orientation of New Zealand trade unions. 
(1) The (Non-)Ideological Heritage 
Socialism has turned out to be "a philosophy 
which is [_Or is nay learned", 29 not one which suddenly 
and spontaneously explodes within the working class as 
Marx seemed to think it would. 30 Not widely exposed 
to revolutionary working-class ideologies in its 
formative sta'ges, the trade union movement in this 
country i~stead 'learned' an ideology which did not 
demand the overthrow of capitalism. In nineteenth 
century New Zealand, the.norm was established that the 
State should intervene in any sphere of social life 
where its intervention was popularly demanded or seen 
to be necessary. (Hence the IC & A Act to help 
trade unionism when it was unable 
28. 'Economistic' is preferred to •economic' in this 
context because it connotes 'within the existing 
structure of industry•. A trade union's 'economic' 
objectives could feasibly include the overthrow 
of capitalism and the achievement of public 
ownership and control of industry. 
29. Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western 
:w:.owns.-ID ass, p. 71 • 
30. It is also, therefore, a philosophy which is, or 
is not, taught. New Zealand has never possessed 
an intellectual or 'political' class whose role 
would be to discuss and disseminate alternative 
ideologies. This may account for the fact that 
the New Zealand labour movement has traditionally 
been very •non-ideological' - in the sense that 
ideology is something which is consciously articu-
lated. Hence, also, the description of the domin-
ant political ideology in New Zealand at the 
beginning of this century as 'socialism without 
doctrine•. See Keith Ovenden, "Prospect: On the 
Absence of Political Ideas", in Labour in Power: 
Promise and Performance, eds. Ray Goldstein ana 
Rod Alley (Wellington: New Zealand University 
Press, 1975), pp. 192-94. 
to help itself. 31 ) Socialist theories were not widely 
accepted, it has been argued, "because demands for 
changes in .conditions usually received the attention 
of t~e ltiberalJ Governmentn, 32 which solved problems 
without either referring to or using a socialist plan. 
In any case, the .socialist writings which did enter 
New zealand before the turn of the century - British 
Fabian tracts, for example - were oriented much more 
toward social reform (within capitalism) than toward 
social revol~tion. The Trades and Labour Councils, 
which later combined with the 'Red' Federation to form 
' the Labour Party as their political instrument and 
with the AOL in 1. 937 to .form the FOL, were interested 
in "promoting the general welfare of the worker", 
rather than in building a socialist society. 33 
The mainstream of the New Zealand trade union 
movement has never departed from the tradition which 
was thus established in the final years of the nineteenth 
century and the first few of the twentieth. The collapse 
of the 'Liberal-Labour' alliance after the death of 
Seddon in 1906 was a consequence more of the •conserva-
tization' of the Liberal Party than of a widespread 
radicalization of the trade union movement. The United 
Labour Party, based upon the trades councils, was formed 
31. See E J Keating, Trade Unions and Industrial 
Relations in New Zealana, revised ed. (Wellington: 
Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University 
of Wellington, 1974), pp. 4-5. 
32. Josephine F Milburn, "Socialism and Social Reform 
in Nineteenth Century New Zealand", Political 
Science 12 (March 1960): 70. 
33. Ibid., p. 66. 
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because the Liberal Government had £ailed "to move 
forward" and no longer realized "the ideals o£ true 
Liberalismu~4 Significantly, when the Labour Party 
was finally swept into o££ice in 1935, the new Prime 
Minister, Michael Savage, told the people: "We take 
up where Seddon .left o££". 35 
The 'Red• Federation and the AOL, o£ course, 
adopted the revolutionary syndicalist ideology o£ the 
IWW introd~ced into New Zealand by Hickey in 1906, but 
both attracted the support o£ only a minority o£ unions -
the former the miners•, watersiders' and labourers' 
' 
unions and the latter mainly the unions in the trans-
port industries - and both, moreover, £ailed. Partly 
because o£ New Zealand's geographical isolation and 
partly because the government by this time was banning 
the introduction o£ radical political literature, Com-
munism was virtually unknown in New Zealand "until the 
newspaper headlines announced the October Revolutionn. 36 
I 
Por the New Z~pland working class, as £or British working 
class, whose "maximum ardour and insurgency coincided 
with the minimum-availability o£ socialism as a struc-
tured ideology"~? revolutionary socialist theories arrived 
too late, and they became influential in only a few unions, 
34. George Fowlds, leader, United Labour Party; quoted 
in Holland, O'Flynn and Ross~ The Tragic Story of 
the Waihi Strike, p. 80. 
35. Quoted in W T G Airey, "The Rise of the Labour Party", 
in Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics, 2nd ed., 
edited by Robert Cnapman (Auckland: University of 
Auckland, 1963), p. 37. 
36. Roth, "The October Revolution and New Zealand Labour", 
Polit'ical Science 13 (September 1961): 46. 
37. Anderson, "Origins o£ the Present Crisis", p. 20. 
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such as the miners' and seamen's, and in the Unemployed 
workers' Movement during the Depression. But, even if 
they had arrived somewhat earlier, it is doubtful 
whether their impact would have been profound in a 
country which had not widely experienced either "the 
grosser evils of industrialism1138 or of feudalism. 
(2) Absence of a Feudal Tradition 
The absence. of a feudal tradition in New Zealand 
may, in fact, account·for the shallowness of its 
socialist tradition. More than anything else, a feudal 
tradition and the persistence of feudal industrial and 
social relations are likely to produce revolutionary, 
as opposed to reformist, working-class movements - as 
they have done, for example, in France and Italy. Gener-
ally, industrial workers seem to be least revolutionary 
in those countries which either did not experience feudal-
ism and its concomitant class polarization, such as the 
United States, or else succeeded in eliminating it at 
the beginning of or early in their capitalist phase, 
such as Britain. Revolutionary socialist ideologies 
are.characteristically the product more of "the carry-
over of a feudal tradition than of the emergence of 
capitalism". 39 Thus, societies that lack a feudal tradi-
tion tend also to lack a deeply-rooted socialist tradi-
tion: "The hidden origin of socialist thought everywhere 
in the West is to be found in the feudal ethos". 40 
80 
38. Stone, "The Unions and the Arbitration System", p. 207. 
39. Kassalow, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations, p. 7. 
40. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America; 
quoted ibid. 
The working-class is most reformist in the most capital-
ist societies and most revolutionary in those in which 
capitalism and other forms of social organization 
co-exist.41 
(3} Early Integration into Society 
One of the reasons why revolutionary ideologies 
have retained their grip among industrialworkers in 
societies in which feudal values have proved most tena-
cious is that these workers have typically been most 
deprived in respect of their economic and.political 
81 
rights. Conceivably, no trade union movement can preoccupy 
itself exclusively with economistic objectives until it 
has "come to terms with the social and political insti-
tutions of its own society". 42 In numerous countries in 
Western Europe, for example, workers did not achieve 
the right to organize into trade unions, the right to 
vote or freedom of movement until the very late nine-
teenth or the first half of the twentieth century. In 
France, in Italy and in other countries (but to a much 
lesser extent, significantly, in Britain}, workers were 
'locked out' of society and consequently set themselves 
the task of radically transforming it. Industrial workers 
in New Zealand suffered no comparable discrimination. 
Indeed, the State actively assisted in the development 
of trade unionism. Trade unions became legal under 
41. Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western 
Working Class, p. 42. 
42. Adolf Sturmhal, "Unions and Economic Development", 
Economic Development and Cultural Change; quoted 
in Kassalow, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations, 
p. 30. 
the Trade Unions Act of 1878, just as they were begin-
ning to proliferate, and the IC & A Act of 1894 was~ 
according to its preamble, "an Act to encourage the 
formation of industrial unions and associations". 
(Italics mine). 43 An overseas visitor was moved to 
observe that New Z~aland unions were nlitigious. rather 
than militant organizations, the creatures and instru-
ments of State regulations". 44 Unions existed, 'Hickey 
later wrote, "not as fighting battallions [Si:iJ in a 
Workers• Army,. but merely as revenue-paying propositions 
that made possible office equipment, salaries and the 
expenses en'tailed in securing awards". 45 
On the political front, the franchise was extended 
to all adult men in New Zealand in 1890 and to all adult 
women in 1893. The very early enfranchisement of the 
industrial working class meant that when trade unions 
failed to realize their goals by industrial action, they 
could - and frequently did - resort to political means. 
Thus, after the collapse of the Maritime Strike, the 
first major industrial confrontation in New Zealand, in 
1890, the trade.union movement allied itself with the 
Liberal Party, which won the General Election the same year 
and remained in power until 1912. Similarly, the catas-
trophic industrial defeats of 1912 and 1913 gave rise to 
the Labour Party itself three years later, and the 1932 
43. Quoted in Speeches and Documents on New Zealand 
History, eds. W David Mcintyre and W J Gardner 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 226. 
44. See Roth, "Trade Unions", p. 8. 
45. Hickey, 'Red' Fed. Memoirs, p. 4. 
amendment to the IC & A Act, which enabled employers 
to impose substantial wage-cuts and decimated union 
membership, to the consolidation of trade union support 
for the Labour Party in the 1935 election. In New 
Zealand, as the Wellington Trades and Labour Council 
told the 'Red' Federation when it appealed for financial 
assistance for the Waihi·strikers, the working-man's 
·vote vias "of the same value as that of the managing 
director of the Waihi mines". 46 Thus, so long as they 
were able to ~apture the capitalist State and use it 
in their interests (as they perceived them), workers 
. 
in New Zealand did not feel compelled to try to over-
throw capitalism itself •. 
(4) Repression 
The same capitalist State, however, has been hostile 
more often than benevolent in its attitude toward virile 
trade unionism. In successive years, 1912 and 1913, 
the might of the State was mobilized against unions which, 
• 
as members of the 'Red' Federation and its successor, had 
resorted to direct action to defend or promote their 
interests. In 1913, the Reform Government recruited 
rural supporters as special constables and used them to 
reopen by force the ports occupied by striking water-
siders. Of the events of the previous year, the propa-
gandists of the 'Red' Federation had written that: 
The outburst of outrage and lawlessness at 
46. Quoted in Holland, O'Flynn and Ross, The Tragic 
Story of the Waihi Strik~, p. 57· 
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Waihi was undeniably planned by the mine-owners, 
with the Government for aiders and abettors, the 
rolice for organizers, ••• and the law courts 
or instruments of oppression ••• 
••• There are red stains of blood on the 
hands of the men of the Massey Government; ••• 
there are black stains of guilt on their souls; 
••. there is a mantle of conspiracy and corruption 
and crime over their administration. If there were 
no conspiracy, and if the Government had nothing 
to hide, it would long ago have courted the fullest 
inquiry into every circumstance that led up to the 
riots, the attempted and successful raids on the 
halls, the murder of Evans La striker, the first 
and hitherto the only person to die in an indus-
trial dispute in New Zealan~, the driving out of 
Waihi citizens by thugs and police, and every 
linked-up event that followed. (Italics mine.) 47 
As a,substitute for the naked physical force used 
to suppress the Waihi Strike, successive New Zealand 
governments·have accumulated a potentially devastating 
arsenal of legal ammunition with which they were long 
able to either dissuade or to crush any challenge to 
the arbitration system, let alone to the State itself. 
Initially arbitration was voluntary for workers• unions. 
If they considered they would fare better in direct bar-
gaining with employers than under the arbitration system, 
they were able to cancel their registration under the 
IC & A Act and·legally use strike action by registering 
instead under the Trade Unions Act. From 1905 onwards, 
however, it became increasingly difficult for unions to 
adopt this practice. The IC & A Amendment Act of 1905 
contained a provision which bound every worker - whether 
or not a member of the union which obtained it from the 
arbitration Court - to the terms of "any award covering 
the industry or trade in which he was employed"48 and 
47. 
48. 
Ibid., p. 191. 
R M Martin, "Twenty Years of Compulsory Unionism", 
Political Science 8 ~eptember 1956): 114. 
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which helped provoke and defeat the strike by the 
Waihi Miners' Union. {According to the policy of the 
'Red' Federation, the union had cancel.led its IC & A 
Act registration to gain the right to strike.) After 
the events of 1912 and 1913, the legislation relating 
to strikes was tightened by the passage of a Labour 
Disputes Investigation Bill which instituted financial 
penalties for strike action by unions registered under 
the 1878 Act and effectively closed the loophole that 
had been left for legal direct action. 49 The Chief 
Justice had already declared that it was illegal for 
. 
a union registered under the IC & A Act to divert any 
of its funds to support .striking workers. 
The first Labour Government made its contribution 
to existing anti-strike legislation in 1939 by further 
amending the IC & A Act, this time to empower the 
Minister of Labour, against whose decision there could 
be no appeal, to cancel the registration of any union 
which failed to comply with the other provisions of 
the Act. In co-existence with compulsory unionism, 
which had been introduced in 1936, deregistration of 
a union made it possible for any fifteen workers to 
register a new union under the IC & A Act and make 
agreements on wages and conditions which would bind 
every worker in the industry or trade. Labour utilized 
this weapon on six occasions before it was defeated in 
1949, but it was handled most effectively by the National 
Government in the 1951 waterfront dispute. Again, after 
49. Stone, "The Unions and the Arbitration System", 
p. 206. 
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the striking unions had been crushed, the existing 
industrial relations legislation was supplemented 
the further to discourage unions from striking. By 
1972, a member of a union registered under the IC & A 
Act who took part in a strike was liable to a penalty 
of up to $100, a trade union official $500, and a 
union $1,000. In industries where stoppages were 
deemed likely to cause serious public inconvenience, 
the penalties were $150 for a worker, $700 for a union 
official and $1,500 for a union. Moreover, if a strike 
took place after a secret ballot of members had not 
produced a majority in favour of such action, penalties 
for both workers and officials were doubled. 50 
These inhibitions on the right to strike explain 
why the economistic objectives of New Zealand trade 
unions have from time to time been frustrated better 
than why the objectives themselves have been econom-
istic. But, in a case in 1919, the Arbitration Court 
interpreted an amendment made to the IC & A Act in 
1898 as having restricted the lawful activities of 
trade unions .solely to the settlement of industrial 
di'sputes by conciliation and arbitration. Up until 
1964, trade unions were not even permitted to develop 
welfare funds for their members. 51 It is possible to 
argue, therefore, that the IC & A Act "blinkered 11 52 
50. Howells, "Industrial Conflict in New Zealand", 
p. 163. 
51. NoelS Woods, "Industrial Relations Legislation 
in the Private Sector", in Labour and Industrial 
Relations in New Zealand, p. 85. 
52. Ditchfield, Interview. 
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unions and contributed materially to their almost 
exclusive preoccupation with the improvement of 
wages and conditions. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
Although industrial relations legislation in 
New Zealand has clearly tended to become more, rather 
than less, oppressive, the long-term tendency has been 
for industrial conflict to increase. Of all the indus-
trial stoppages recorded in New Zealand between 1906 
and 1974, almost 40 per cent took place in the last 
nine-year·period (see Table 17). This process seems 
to have been inte·rrupted only three times - by the 
defeat of the anti-arbitrationist unions in 1913 and 
1951 and by the depression. 
The fact that fewer stoppages occurred in the years 
1931 to 1935 inclusive than in any other five-year period 
between 1910 and 1974, ·together with t;he generally much 
higher incidence of conflict in the years since 1945, 
confirms that "the aggregate level of strike activity 
is behaviourally related to the degre~ of tightness of 
the,labour market". 53 Before World War II, unemployment 
in New Zealand was persistently high - probably never 
lower than about 2.5 per cent and as high as 22.5 per 
cent during the depression (see Tables 18 and 21). Since 
World War II, on the other hand, there has been sustained 
full employment. In every year since 1947, the number of 
87 
53. Orley Ashenfelter and George E Johnson, "Bargaining 
Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity", 
American Economic Review; quoted in Howells, "Indus-
trial Conflict in New Zealand", p. 172. This is not 
to say, of course, that other factors such as an 
increase in the average size of firms and faster rates 
of price inflation have not also contributed to 
increased industrial unrest. 
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TABLE 17 
INCIDENCE OF .INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
IN·NEW ZEALAND, 1906-74 
Year No. of No. of As %· All No. of Per 1000 
Stop- Workers w & s Working w & s 
pages Involved Earners Days Lost Earners 
1906 1 88 
1907 6 558 
1908 2 63 
1909 1 N.A. 
1910 15 255* 
1911 22 1,375* 
1912 24 5,746* 
1913 73 13,400* 
1914 20 4,089* 
1915 8 295-~~ 
·1916 15 899* 
1917 45 2, 734-~~ 
1918 40 4, 056i< 
1919 45 4 ,030-:;. 
1920 75 9' 612* 
1921 77 10,433 119,208 
1922 58 6,414 93,456 
1923 49 7,162 201,812 
1924 34 14,815 89,105 
1925 83 9,905 74,552 
1926 59 6,264 47,811 
1927 38 4,476 12,485 
l928 39 9,258 21,997 
1929 47 7,151 25,889 
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TABLE 17 - Continued 
Year No. of No. of As 'fi· All No. of Per 1000 
Stop- Workers w & s Working w & s 
pages Involved Earners Days Lost Earners 
1930 38 5,467 31,669 
1931 24 6,356 . 48,486 
1932 23 9,355 108,605 
1933 15 3,558 65,099 
1934 24 3,773 1.0, 393 
1935 12 2,323 18,563· 
1936 43 7,354 16,980 
1937 52 11,411 29,916 
1938 72 11,388 35,456 
1939 66 15,682 ·53,801 
1940 57 10,475 28,097 
1941 89 15,261 26,237 
1942 65 14,345 51,189 
1943 69 10,915 14,687 
1944 149 29' 766 52,602 
1945 154 39,418 66 629 
1946 96 15,696 30,393 
1947 134 26,970 4.94 102' 725 188.31 
1948 101 28,494 5.12 93,464 168.01 
1949 123 61,536 10.83 218,172 384.04 
1950 129 91,492 15.91 271,475 472.21 
1951 109 36,878 6.33 1,157,390 1' 985.23 
1952 50 16,297 2.76 28,123 47.55 
1953 73 22,175 3.64 19,291 31.69 
1954 61 16,153 2.59 20,474 32.83 
.1955 65 20,224 3.16 52,043 81.41 
1956 50 13,579 2.08 2.3,870 36.58 
TAB IE 17 - Continued 
Year No. of No. of As % All No. of Per 1000 
Stop- V!orkers w & s Working w & s 
pages Involved Earners Days Lost Earners 
1957 51 15,545 2.33 28,186 42.18 
1958 49 13,709 1. 99 23,870 27.30 
. 1959 73 18,762 2.70 29,651 42.74 
1960· 60 . 14,305 2.00 35,683 49.98 
1961 71 16,626 2.21 38,185 50.73 
1962 96 39,921 5.23 93,157 121.95 
1963 60 14,911 1. 89 54,490 69.15 
1961-t 93 34,779 4'.27 66,834 82.05 
1965 105 15,267 1. 80 21,814 25.76 
1966 145 33,132 3.79 99,095 113.25 
1967 89 28,490 3.27 139,490 160.00 
1968 153 37,458 4.28 130,267 148.71 
1969 169 44,041 4.90 138,675 154.13 
1970 323 110,096 11.85 2 77 t 348 298.60 
1971 313 86,009 9.19 162,563 173.77 
1972 266 60,429 7.18 134,505. 148.31 
1973 394 115,865 11.73 271,706 2 75.17 
1974 380 70,904 6.98 183,688 180.83 
SOURCE: Department of Statistics, New Zealand 
Official Yearbook, 1921-75. 
*Statistics for'all stoppages not available. 
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Census 
Year 
1901 
1906 
1911 
1916 
1921 
1926 
1936 
1945 
1951 
1956 
1961 
1966 
1971 
TABLE 18 
UNEMPLOYmENT IN NEW ZEALAND BY 
QUINQUENNIAL CENSUS, 1901-71 
All Wage Unemployed ~(, 
Earners Males 
224,346 8,467 
' 269,039 8,189 
304,272 7,152 
302 t 161 5, 920 
370,692 11,061 
414,673 10,694 
496,563 35,774 
473,684 5,823 
577,694 7,902 
653,358 5,558 
750,882 4,674 
870,813 5,125 
958,563 8,757 
Unemployed 
3.77 
3. 01-t 
2.35 
1. 96 
2.98 
2. 58 
7.20 
1. 23 
1. 37 
0.85 
·o.62 
0.59 
0.91 
SOURCE: Department of Statistics, New Zealand 
Official Yearbook, 79th ed., 1974, p.918. 
::JI 
registered unemployed has averaged out at less than 
1 per cent of the estimated labour force {see Table 19). 
How, exactly, do levels of employment affect indus-
trial relations? Galbraith explains that: 
When unemployment is small, the bargaining 
position of unions is, in general, strong. 
Members can face a strike with the assurance 
that they cannot be replaced. As a more prac-
tical matter they know that they will be inflict-
ing the maximum loss of business on the employer 
and that after the strike is over they will 
promptly be recalled to work. 
Employers, on· their side, will deem it wise 
under s.uch circumsta~ces to grant increases in 
wages ••• By the time unemployment is reduced to 
the hard-core categories, there will usually be 
a shortage of some classes of production workers. 
Higher wages will seem to be a way of holding, or 
recruiting manpower.54 
As a rule, then, the lower the level of unemployment, 
the greater is the bargaining power of trade unions and 
the greater is likely to be their attraction to direct 
industrial action as a means of attaining their econom-
istic objectives. Of those stoppages which took place 
between 1906 and 1935 and ended in a decisive victory 
for either side, workers won 42 per cent. With the 
labour market gradually tightening, however, they won 
considerably more disputes than employers in the last 
decade before the end of World War II and 64 per cent 
of those which produced decisive results - under condi-
tions of more or less permanent full employment - between 
1946 and 1973. The post-war labour market, in marked 
contrast to the pre-war market, has thus favoured the 
seller (see Table 20). nstrikes have proved a fruitful 
54. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 
2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), 
pp. 250-51. 
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TABlE 19 
REG IS TERED UNEIVIPLOYN!ENT 
IN NEW ZEALAND, 1947-74 
Year Average Est. labour 
"' 
Unemployed 
Unemployed force (April) 
1947* 83 542,600 0.02 
1948* 61 547,000 0.01 
1949* 88 553,300 0.02 
1950* . 34 561,600 0.01 
1951"'~ 28 566,300 0.005 
1952* 33 575,600 0.01 
1953'1~ . 67 588,100 0.01 
1954* 48 601,800 0.01 
1955* 44 609,200 0.01 
1956"""· 240 . 619,500 0.04 
1957 394 829,900 0.05 
1958 785 847,900 0.09 
1959 1,210 861,800 0.14 
1960 633 875,600 0.07 
1961 376 895,300 0.04 
1962 1,041 911,400 0.11 
1963 849 929,700 0.09 
1964 650 956,500 0.07 
1965 512 988,700 0.05 
1966 460 1,021,800 0.05 
1967 3,852 1,052,500 0.37 
1.968 6,877 1,043,400 0.66 
TABLE 19 - Continued 
Year Average Est. labour 5(. Unemployed 
Unemployed force (April) 
1969 2, 926 1,061,200 0.28 
1970 1,600 1,090,700 0.15 
1971 3,115 1,112,000 0.29 
1972 5,684 1,122,900 0. 52 
1973 ,2, 321 1,150,200 0.21 
1974 955 1,188,700 0 .. 08 
SOURCE: Department of Labour, Labour and Emplox-
ment Gazette (Wellington: Department of Labour) 1-25 
{1951-75). 
*Statistics for males only. 
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TABLE 20 
RESULTS OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
IN NEW ZEALAND, 1906-73 
Result 1906- 1916- 1926.;. 1936- 1946-15 25 35 45 55 
I 
Workers' 14 119 77 226 188 
% 8.1 22.8 24.1 27.7 20.0 
Employers' 83 119 88 169 81 
o1 7 48.3 22.8 27.6 20.7 8.6 
Compromise 23 79 70 101 175 
q/ 
;C· 13.4 15.2 .9 12.4 18.6 
Indeterminate 52 204 84 320 497 
crt_ 
/~ 30.2 39.2 26.3 39.2 52.8 
Total 172 521 319 816 941 
f 100 100 100 100 100 
SOURCE: De-partment of Statistics, New Zealand Official 
Yearbook, 192 75. 
1956- 1966-
65 73 
122 388 
17.2 20.7 
89 217 
12.6 11.6 
565 
25.8 30.2 
314 700 
44.3 37.4 
708 1870 
100 100 
Total 
1134 
21.2 
846 
15.8 
1196 
22.4 
2171 
40.6 
5347 
100 
\.0 
V1 
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tactic and appear to give quick and satisfying results •••• 
Unions have had little motive ••• to find other ways 
of achieving their purposes". 55 
Trade unions should consequently have gained 
rather more substantial wage increases .for their 
members in the post-war than in· the inter-war period. 
As the graph illustrates, this has indeed been the 
case. After World War I, real wages did not reach 
the level that had been attained in 1914 until 1928, 
except temporarily in 1922, and no great progress was 
made until 1936. The average annual increase in real 
wages from 1914 to 1940 was 2.8 points on the effective 
weekly wage rates index., compared with 13 .o points for 
the period .from 1946 to 1973. Moreover, the real wage 
increases that were obtained between the end of World 
War I and about 1935 were spread over an ever smaller 
section of the available labour force - those that were 
employed. Wage increases since 1945 have been distrib-
uted throughout a labour force that has been virtually 
fully employed. 
What have been the political consequences of the 
greatly increased 'industrial power' of trade unions 
in the post-war period? In the inter-war period, when 
unemployment was high, the bargaining position of trade 
unions weak and \industrial action for economistic ends 
was not feasible, the trade unions' commitment to polit-
ical action and the Labour Party was very strong. In 
55. Howells, "Industrial Conflict in New Zealand", 
p. 172. 
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the post-war years, during which unemployment has been 
very low, the bargaining position of the unions very 
strong and economistic ends have·been readily attain-
able by industrial action,. trade union involvement in 
the party has declined considerably, as we saw in the 
first chapter. It thus appears that to the extent that 
full employment enables them to practise economism 
successfully and independently, trade unions attach less 
importance to political action and to involvement in the 
Labour Party .. ·56 
Before a case study of the political consequences 
of mass unemployment is presented in the next section 
of this~ chapter, let us briefly consider two weaknesses 
~· 
possibly appdrent in the argument just stated. Firstly, 
trade union ~conomism was not as successful for much of 
~ 
the post-war period as is perhaps indicated by the over-
all increase in the index of effective wage rates. The 
average annual i~rease in real wages over the entire 
period has been g. '.atly inflated by the substantial gains 
made in the years om 1969 to 1973. If the period is 
shortened to the years from 1946 to 1969, the average 
56. Lewis Minkin, in "The British Labour Party and the 
Trade Unions: Crisis and Compact", Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 28 (October 1974): 12-13, 
suggests that full employment and the effectiveness 
of their industrial activities has made trade unions 
in Britain feel more secure and strong, less reliant 
upon the party, and less predisposed toward adopting 
a positive role within it. Kassalow, Trade Unions 
and Industrial Relations, p. 30, notes that, accord-
ing to some theor1es, 11 1n times of economic grovth 
and expansion there is a satisfactory •bargaining 
margin' in the economy, and unions can be expected 
to place a relatively heavy emphasis upon collective 
bargaining", vis-~-vis political action. 
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annual increase falls by more than 50 per cent to 
6.3 points. The graph also reveals that real wage-
rates increased overall by only two points in eleven 
years from 1957 to 1968. Thus, the increase in the 
success of trade union economism has been overall 
rather than uniform. 
Likewise, however, the decline in trade union 
involvement in the Labour Party has not been exactly 
uniform. Perhaps understandably, when trade unions 
were unable to improve real wages while the second 
Labour Government was in office from 1957 to 1960, 
they seem 'to have been alienated from, rather than 
attracted to, the party and their involvement in it 
declined (see Table 2). But for much of the decade 
from 1960 to 1970, while real wages remained fairly 
static and the National Party was in power, their 
involvement in the party - at least in terms of member-
ship - increased. From 1970 onwards, as they gained 
substantial wage increases, the extent of their involve-
ment, measured by the same indicator, declined again. 
By 1975, trade .unions - by almost all indicators - were 
less· involved and less active in the Labour Party than 
they had been when the second Labour Government fell in 
1960. 
A second, and related, point is that trade unions 
have not become so preoccupied with industrial action 
for economistic ends that they have completely eschewed 
political action. Indeed, the degree of State interven-
tion in wage determination in New Zealand is so high 
that this would be quite impossible. However, their 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVr:;till Y 01' CANTERBURY 
r-t tnll"TrUIIOrU l\.1 7 
99 
principal political objective since the 1961 FOL 
Conference has been to achieve the right to bargain 
collectively with employers without third-party inter-. 
ference. Under the arbitration system, trade unions 
were severely constrained in their ability to translate 
their considerable bargaining power under full employ-
ment into wage increases for their members. This was 
proved when, after the Arbitration Court's refusal to 
grant a general wage-order in 1968, unions took the 
right to bargain directly with employers unilaterally 
and succeeded in increasing real wage-rates substantially 
between 1969 and 1973~ They had to await the return of 
the Labour Party to office to have this right recognized 
in legislation, but not to achieve it in practice. 
Paradoxically, in the same year that it was recognized 
in legislation, it was, in practice, taken away. The 
FOL subsequently co-operated with the Government in its 
implementation of a policy of wage restraint on the 
explicit condition that as soon as it was practicable, 
there would be a return to free collective bargaining. 57 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MASS UNEMPLOYMENT: THE 
DEPRESSION (A CASE STUDY). 
Our movement is essentially a dual one -
industrial and political dual, yet so inter-
twined that it is next to impossible to draw 
a line marking which is industrial and which 
political.58 
57. See, for example, "Addresses by NZ Federation of 
Labour Officials", in NZLP, ReTort of the Fifty-
eighth Annual Conference (1974 , P• 53. 
58. Walter Nash, secretary, NZLP, in Report of the 
Fourteenth Annual Conference (1930), p. 12. 
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The industrial defeats of 1912 and 1913 and 
the .formation o£ a Reform-Liberal coalition and the 
introduction of conscription during World War I con-
vinced~leaders o£ moderate and militant trade unions 
alike of the necessity of a single, independent polit-
ical party based· upon the trade union movement. But 
the prospects for successful industrial action were 
good in the period of labour shortage which .followed 
World War I. The leaders of the newly-formed AOL 
were conseqUently scathing in their condemnation o£ 
the Labour Party. "If we have elected our •rats• to 
Parliament it is a good means o£ getting them out o£ 
the way", proclaimed the AOL's secretary, Roberts,.in 
1919, only six years before he was to become a member 
of the Labour Party's national executive. ttParlia-
mentary action has been the anchor which has dragged 
the industrial movement in the mud £or yearsu. 59 
Political action had become "too.damn respectable" in 
the labour movement, the AOL president, Arthur Cook, 
told the Workers' Union conference in 1920. "You will 
gain more in one day by job action than can be obtained 
in a hundred years by political action". 60 
However, increasing unemployment gradually under-
mined the bargaining position o£ the unions in the 
1920's. The AOL moderated its opposition to the arbitra-
tion system and tried to unite the trade union movement 
behind a policy of acceptance of the Arbitration Court, 
59. Quoted in Stone, "The Unions and the Arbitration 
System", p. 209. · 
60. Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 47. 
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at the same time as protesting at the inadequacy of 
its awards. By 1926, even this position had become 
untenable. Almost the entire trade union movement began 
to fight gamely to defend compulsory arbitration and 
prevent employers from enforcing wage-cuts. 61 
As the unions came to depend more and more on the 
court, rather than on their own strength, to maintain 
real wage-levels, they also became increasingly aware 
of the fact that the arbitration system was not inviol-
able, that the powers of the court could be amended at 
any time at the leisure of the governing party. Not 
surprisingly, the unions which had once scorned political 
action began to reconside.r the wisdom of their former 
stance. In 1931, the United Government enacted legisla-
tion which empowered the court to amend any award before 
it was due to expire if an amendment was justified by 
~conomic circumstances. Civil service salaries had 
already been reduced by 10 per cent; now all awards in 
the private sector were similarly reduced. Worse was to 
come for the unions. Farmers• and employers• organiza-
tions had been campaigning since 1927 for the introduc-
tion' of voluntary arbitration, whereby wage disputes 
would be referred to the court only upon the agreement 
of both employers and employees and, if employers did 
not agree, awards would lapse. The Coalition Government 
acquiesced in their demands with the IC & A Amendment Act 
of 1932. 
Employers were freed to reduce wages and unilaterally 
61. See, for example, ibid., p. 132; Stone, "The Unions 
and the Arbitration System .. , pp. 214-15. 
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alter conditions of work and employment at the very 
time that the unions were least able to resist. In 
1931, the leader of the Labour Party, Harry Holland, 
had warned the unions that: "Wi.th a falling market 
and nearly 40,000 unemployed workers, the economic 
dice are heavily.loaded against the industrial move-
ment •••• The e.f'fective battleof the wage-reductions 
must be fought out on the political field 11 • 62 In 
1932, after the amendment to the IC & A Act and with 
unemployment .still rising (see Table 21), the accuracy 
of Holland's observation was indisputable. As Table 
17 illustrates, trade unions, in terms of industrial 
action, were more quiescent in the years from 1931 to 
1935 than in any other five-year period between 1906 
and 1974. Employers easily defeated strikes by New 
Zealand's strongest unions -the United Mine Workers, 
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whose membership fell by over 50 per cent in less than 
five years after 1929, the NZWWF and the Freezing Workers' 
Federation. Having refused to accept an award which pro-
posed wage reductions ranging from 16 per cent to 66 
per cent, the freezing workers decided to strike in July 
1932. Taking advantage of the extremely high level of 
unemployment, the freezing companies reacted by engaging 
non-union labour on the terms rejected by federation mem-
bers and organizing them into enterprise unions. The 
original unions were, in the end, annihilated. 63 
62. NZLP, Supplementary Report of the PLP (Wellington: 
N ZLP , 1 9 31 ) , p • 4 • 
63. Stone, "A History of Trade Unionism in New Zealand, 
1913-37" (MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1948), 
p. 141· 
TABLE 21 
REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT IN 
NEW ZEALAND, 1930-38 
No. totals·on Average_ Year which average a 
calculated Unemployed 
1930 26 5,025 
1931 12 38,941 
1932 12 51,151 
1933 12 53,714 
1934 13 47,198 
1935 13 38,572 
1936 9 37,406 
1937 2b 23,405 
1938 2b 12,135 
SOURCE: Department of Statistics, New Zealand Official 
Yearbook, 1932, 1934-37,.1942. 
NOTE: The total number of adult males registered 
unemployed or on relief work reached a peak of 79,435 
(22.5 per cent of the estimated available work force) 
on September 30, 1933. 
a Totals are for males only, and exclude those on 
relief work. 
b The highest and .lowest monthly totals recorded in 
each year. 
The employers boasted that, in the circumstances 
which prevailed, they could not be •coerced' into 
."anything against their will". 64 By 1933, the unemployed 
in New Zealand outnumbered trade union members. Indus-
trial action was, at best, futile, and, at worst, com-
pletely counter-productive for trade unions. Thus, 
"more than any other single event", 65 the 
passage of the 1932 amendment to the 
64. Ibid., pp. 149-50 
65. Ibid., PP• 151-52. 
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IC & A Act was instrumental in turning the attention 
of the unions away from industrial to political action 
and strengthening the link between the unions and the 
Labour Party. 66 
But the impetus for closer co-operation between 
the party and the unions did not come exclusively 
from the unions.· The leadership of the Labour Party 
had been campaigning vigorously in the 1920's and 
1930's, trying to persuade all trade unions to affili-
ate to the party. ·Holland had long sought to bring 
about complete working-class industrial and political 
unity - he had blamed the defeat of the Waihi Strike, 
for example, on 'class-unconsciousness•, on sectional-
105 
ism induced by craft, as. opposed to industrial, unionism. 67 
In his view, political 'non-unionism' - the failure of 
all trade unionists to vote for the Labour Party and of 
all trade unions to affiliate to it - explained why the 
. 68 party could not achieve electoral success. The party 
also needed the revenue that could be obtained from union 
affiliation fees. In the words of John A.Lee, it was 
"perpetually broke" and won the 1935 election "with mere 
pen~e". 69 Not until 1938 was it able to afford the cost 
of standing candidates in all seats at a general election. 
66. Cf. An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Vol. 2, s.v. 
"Labour Party'1, by Brown: "Tne toll of unemploy-
ment ••• rendered the trade unions virtually help-
less and created within the labour movement a 
degree of unity and determination rarely llf eve!7 
equalledn. 
67. See Holland, O'Flynn and Ross, The Tragic Story of 
the Waihi Strike, p. 191. 
68. For more extensive coverage of Holland's views on 
political •non-unionism•, see O'Farrell, Harry 
Holland, pp. 196-200. 
69. John A Lee, Interview, Auckland, December 4, 1975· 
Political 'non-unionism' was a recurrent theme 
in Holland's addresses to the party's annual conference. 
Non-affiliated unions were urged to "cast aside the 
vestiges of political non-unionism and get into line 
with the rest of the wealth producers, in order that 
a united front may be presented to the combined forces 
of reaction". 7° From 1928 to 1931,·he waged a personal 
campaign among the •non-political' unions to try to 
secure their affiliation. During this period, the 
party also sent deputations to the annual conference 
of the New Zealand Workers• Union and to a meeting of 
the United Mine Workers• Council to "explain the party's 
policy in the present political situation" and to "dis-
cuss methods of co-operating in the best interests of 
the movement".7 1 The Workers• Union had actually voted 
to affiliate to the party in 1925, but had still not 
acted upon its decision in 1930. The delay in its affili-
ation led to an acrimonious debate at the party's 1930 
conference between members of the PLP and the secretary 
of the union, Cook, who, along with Roberts, was anxious 
to assert the supremacy of the industrial wing over the 
political wing of the labour movement - in spite of the 
times. The main point at issue was the Labour Party•s 
continued support of the United Government, which Cook 
70. NZLP, Report of the PLP (1924), p. 4. 
71. NZLP, Report of the Fourteenth Annual Conference 
(1930), p. 9. For an interesting theoret1cal 
discussion on bargaining between trade unions and 
working-class parties for operational resources 
for the parties, see Wellhofer and Hennessey, . 
"Some Analytic Approaches to Oligarchy", pp. 286-91. 
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opposed because conditions on the public works schemes 
for the unemployed had deteriorated since the United 
(former Liberal) Party had defeated the Reform Party 
in the 1928 General Election. But Cook at least 
indicated that his formerly hostile attitude toward 
political action had mellowed. He told the delegates 
that: "The sooner we get both the political and indus-
trial wings of the labour movement working together, 
the sooner we will get the best results for the working 
class".7 2 Soon after the conference, a joint meeting 
qf the executives of the Labour Party and the AOL was 
held. The two organizations attained "a general amityu73 
and co-operated fairly closely in this and following 
years - particularly on the question of unemployment. 
The chief reason why the Workers• Union had post-
poned its affiliation to the party, according to Cook, 
was poverty. For a number of years, he said, the union 
had had "a tremendous struggle to keep its head above 
water, and to look after the interests of the men and 
women it represented". 74 When it could afford it, how-
ever, the union would not be "behind in doing its dutyn75 
- which was to affiliate to the party. Many other unions 
were similarly poverty-stricken. Up until 1932, the 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
NZLP, "Address to Conference by Mr A Cook" (1930), 
p. 1. (Mimeographed.) 
Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 142. 
NZLP, "Address to Conference by Mr A Cook", p. 1. 
Ibid. 
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growing attraction of political, compared with indus-
trial, action had been reflected in a fairly constant 
increase in the proportion of all trade union members 
affiliated to the Labour Party (see Table 2}. However, 
some unions did not long survive the passage of the 
amendment to the IC & A Act in 1932 - hence the decline 
in the number of registered trade unionists from almost 
108 
104,000 in 1929 to less than 72,000 in 1934 and the 
decline in the number of unions affiliated to the party.76 
Affiliated membership of the party began to decline in 
real terms as well, for the financial position of those 
. 
unions that did survive was so precarious that many could 
not afford to pay affiliation fees to the Labour Party.77 
National executive reports in the 1930's contained 
detailed lists of unions in arrears with their,affilia-
tion fees. Some indication of the financial difficulties 
that the labour movement as a whole faced during the 
depression was given by the party•s general secretary, 
James Thorn, when, in a circular to affiliated organiza-
tions which were in arrears with their fees, he explained 
that: 
"··· At the present moment the arrears of 
affiliation fees· amount to over £1,400. It 
must be obvious to you that the party can only 
carry on under the greatest difficulty whilst 
this state of things continues. Indeed it is 
76. The party•s national executive reported to the 
1935 conference that, because of the depression 
and the practical abandonment of the arbitration 
system, "a number of the smaller unions have gone 
out of existence, with the result that the number 
of unions affiliated to the party has decreased 
from 189 to 151". NZLP, Report of the National 
Executive (1935), p. 1. 
77. Lee, Interview. 
hampered in every direction. 
"I know that times are bad and that the 
industrial unions in particular have been 
badly hit financial!~, but nevertheless I 
appeal to your organ1zation to pay the dues 
owirig ••• if at all possible, or at the very 
least to pay such an amount as may be conven-
ient. (Italics mine.)78 
In any event, the failure (or inability) of 
AOL and other unions to affiliate to the party did 
not preclude the development of other forms of party-
union co-operation. As early as 1922, "economic 
pressures" -·that is, higher unemployment- had 
heightened trade union interest in the Labour Party 
and union and party representatives had conferred in 
order to unite the labour movement in its opposition 
to a proposed amendment to the IC & A Act. 79 By 1924, 
the party and the AOL had achieved "a practical work-
ing unity". 80 In that year, they established a joint 
research bureau; in 1925, the NZWWF, one of the biggest 
and most influential industrial unions in the AOL, 
affiliated to the party and its secretary, Roberts, was 
elected to the party's national executive; and, in 1926, 
the NLLC was set up. The party also began to send indus-
trial relations remits submitted to its conference to the 
two national trade union organizations for their consid-
eration. As unemployment continued to increase and the 
bargaining strength of the unions was further eroded, 
especially after the 1932 IC & A Act amendment, the 
relationship between the party and the unions became 
78. 
79. 
80. 
NZLP, "Circular to Affiliated Organizations", 
dated January 20, 1933. (Mimeographed.) 
O'Farrell, Harry Holland, pp. 116-18. 
Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 52. 
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increasingly intimate. One indicator of the •conver-
gence' of the unions and the party was the fact that, 
whereas only a few trade union officials publicly 
81 . 
supported the Labour Party in 1922 and some unions 
even passed resolutions supporting Massey and his. 
conservative Reform administration in 1925, 82 union 
support for the party in 1935 was 11 almost unanimous". 83 
The extent of the goodwill that the Labour Party 
had built up for itself within the trade union move-
ment while it had been in opposition was illustrated 
by the great upsurge which took place in the party's 
affiliated membership after 1935 (see Table 2). The 
. restoration of the depression wage-cuts, the enactment 
of compulsory unionism and the passage in 1936 of a 
Political Disabilities Removal Act, which removed any 
doubts as to the legality of the use of union funds 
for political purposes, all made unions more eager, 
more prosperous and more easily able to affiliate to 
the party. In its report to the 1939 conference, the 
party's national executive remarked that there were 
"very few unions now that have not linked up with the 
party11 • 84 This was a gross overstatement and rather 
81. Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 52. 
82. Sutch, W B, The Quest for Securit in New Zealand: 
1840 ·to 1966 Well1ngton: Ox or Un1vers1ty Press, 
1966), p. 132. 
83. Stone, "A History of Trade Unionism", p. 152. 
84. NZLP, Report of the Twenty-third Annual Conference 
(1939), p. 6. 
11U 
more than one-third still had not, but the trade 
unions• commitment to political action was more 
complete in the last few int·er-war years than at 
any other time in the.history of the Labour Party 
(see Tables 2 and 3). With the •Red Fed.' veterans, 
Fraser, Webb, Semple, Parry, Armstrong and Fagan in 
Cabinet and Roberts as president of the part:y from 
1937, and with almost the entire membership of the 
FOL also affiliated to the party, the industrial 
and political. arms of the labour movement did appear 
so intertwined that it was almost impossible to 
distinguish one from the other - at least in terms 
of personnel. The principal agent of their inter-
twinement, as we have seen, was mass unemployment. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT: 
THE GROWTH OF THE NON-POLITICAL UNIONS 
Full employment has enabled trade unions to 
revive industrial action as an effective strategy for 
the pursuit of economistic objectives in the post-war 
period. Whereas, during the depression, mass unemploy-
ment reduced the unions ~o impotency in their re-lations 
with employers and caused their involvement in the Labour 
Party to increase, in post-war years unions have been 
able to get for themselves what they want above all 
else - higher wages for their members. Consequently, 
the level of their involvement in the party has declined. 
But the trade union movement itself, as well as the 
bargaining position of unions, has been transformed in 
the post-war period. At least part of the increase in 
political •non-unionism' in the last thirty years must 
be attributed to the rise within the movement of normally 
'non-political' unions. 
In at least one major study (carried out in Britain), 
far more white-collar than manual workers expressed the 
view that trade unions and the (British) Labour Party 
should be 'kept separate•. 1 Certainly, in all the 
1. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Political 
Attitudes and Behaviour, p. 26. 74 per cent of the 
authors' white-collar sample believed that trade 
unions and the British Labour Party should be kept 
separate, compared with 55 per cent of the manual 
workers. 
advanced industrialized democracies, the incidence 
of affiliation to labour or social-democratic parties 
is lower among white-collar than among manual workers• 
unions. White-collar unions in New Zealand nave been 
even more reluctant to affiliate to their Labour Party 
than their counterparts in other countries have been to 
theirs. In Britain, as an example, nine purely white-
collar unions and eighteen partially white-collar unions, 
accountjng for 34 per cent of total white-collar union 
membership,' were affiliated to the Labour Party in 1970 
and in Australia at least 22 separate white-collar unions 
were affiliated to one, "or more in the case of inter-
?tate unions", 2 of the state branches of the Australian 
Labor Party in 1965. In New Zealand, on the other hand, 
the unions currently affiliated to the Labour Party 
include only three which could be described as white-· 
collar. They make up 19.9 per cent of total white-collar 
union membership and 16.3 per cent of the party's current 
affiliated membership. 
The failure of the Labour Party to attract more 
white-collar unions into its ranks means that its affili-
ates include very few of the unions that have been grow-
ing most rapidly in the post-war period. The proportion 
of white-collar workers in the unionized work force 
increased from about 13 per cent in 1935 to about 22 per 
cent in 1946 and to 34.5 per cent in 1975. Although 
2. George Sayers Bain, David Coates, and Valerie Ellis, 
Social Stratification and Trade Unionism: A Critique 
(London: Heinemann, 1973), P• 66, 
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technological change has undoubtedly been important in 
precipitating the decline of the Pew manual workers• 
unions which once dominated the trade union movement, 
the enactment o£ compulsory unionism in 1936 seems to 
have made the greatest contribution to the increase in 
the size o£ white-collar vis-~-vis manual workers• 
unions - between 1935 and 1945, for example, the number 
of unionized clerical workers increased from 111 to 
22,560 (see Table 23, group B). In contrast to what 
is happening·in more advanced industrialized societies, 
blue-collar industrial employment seems actually to have 
increased relative·to white-collar employment in New 
Zealand in the last forty years. Between 1936 and 1971, 
the proportion of the New Zealand labour force employed 
in the service sector increased by 4.6 per cent, compared 
with a 13.5 per cent increase in employment in secondary 
industry (see Table 22). 
TABLE 22 
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE IN NEW 
ZEALAND, 1936 AND 1971 
Group Percentage of 
1936 
Primary Production 27.1 
Secondary Industry 24.2 
service 48.7 
labour force 
1971 
12.0 
34.7 
53.3 
SOURCE: Department of Statistics, New Zealand Official 
Yearbook, 80thed., 1975, p·. 848. 
Of all the white-collar unions, then, only three -
the Nelson Operative Butchers• (c~rent membership 75), 
the New Zealand Theatrical Workers' (484) and the New 
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Unions 
(Group A) 
ASRS (NUR) 
Carpenters 
Clothing-trade employees 
Engineers 
Footwear operatives 
TABLE 23 
THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF TIE TRADE 
UNION MOVEMENT, 1915-75 
. 
1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 
1915a 1945b 
Proj. Proj. Actual 
8,247 10,007 6,589 11,700 14,900 13,807 48,657 22,909 11,932 
4,335 5,608 3,686 8,335· 10,480 15,679 25,576 16,320 15,278 
2,622 4,157 2,923 12,138 .12,872 13 .• 526 15,470 23,766 15,202 
1,408 2,929 . 1,998 14,220 23,410 32,431 8,307 27,843 43,171 
1,229 1,170 962 2,872 4,023 3,867 7,251 5,623 4,389c 
..... 
-> 
V1 
Unions 
{Group A, contd) 
Hotel workers 
Labourers 
Miners 
Plumbers and Gasfitters 
Printers 
Tramway employees 
TABLE 23 - Continued 
1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 
1915 1945 
Proj. Proj. Actual 
-
3,475 7,525 5,397 12,942 17,795 24,549 20,502 25,340 34,310 
4,823 6,241 2,264 6,913 10,319 12,584 28,456' 13,536 12,091 
4,621 2,377d 2,154d 3,069 . 1,537 1,135 27,624 6,009 l,094e 
779 .853 654 1,391 1,530 1,410 4,596 2,724 1,604 
1,444 2,352 1,865 3,250 4,663 6,270 8,520 6,363 7,500 
936 2,122 2,135 2,653 2,495 1,657 5,522 5,195 1,826 
..... 
..... 
0\ 
Unions 
(Group A, contd) . 
Waterside workers 
Woollen mill employees 
NZ workers 
(Group B) 
Clerical workers 
rrivers 
Electrical workers 
TABLE 23 - Continued 
1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 
1915 1945 
Proj. Proj. Actual 
6,528 6,416 5,536 6,138 6, 15"8 6,793 38,515 12,018 6,661 
'507 1,141 1,127 4,281 4,167 6,299 2,991 8,394 9,697 
f g 
9,003 3,066 14,892 ;6,179 15,594 40,604 29,159 12,165 
95 129 111 22,560 33,657 41,696 560 44,172 63,706 
2,121 2,638 1,338 7,729 13,002 16,140 12,514 15,133 19,399 
140 633 754 1,89l 4,158 7,070 826 3,703 9,412 
..... 
..... 
....,;) 
Unions 
(Group B, contd) 
Freezing workers 
Seamenh 
Shop-assistants 
Storemen and packers 
All IC & A registered 
trade unionists 
TABLE 23 - Continued 
1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 
1915 1945 
Proj. Proj. Actual 
2,968 5,895 3,969 13,242 16,513 21,841 17,511 25,928 28,648 
3,093 3,130 1,747 2,366 2,325 2,074 18,249 4,633 1,708 
1,749 5,599 3,837 14,444 22,753 21,852 10,319 28,281 30,134 
319 938 994 4,222 8,218 12,052 1,882 8,267 13,539 
73,991 96,822 74,391 223,027 299,242 346,338 436,623 
_. 
_. 
0: 
TABLE 23 - Continued 
SOURCE: Department of Labour, Annual Reports, 1915-75. 
NO : Group A consists of unions or groups of unions, ~half of whose members are 
currently affiliated to the Labour Party. Group B consists of unions or ,groups of unions, 
less than half of whose members are currently affiliated to the party. 
aMembership of unions inl975 if they had retained same proportion of all trade union 
members that they held in 1915. 
bMembership of unions ln 1975 if they had retained same proportion of all trade union 
members that they held in 1945. 
cTotal is for 1974. 
dOnly one of the numerous v:est coast miners' unions registered under IC & A Act. 
eTotal is for 1974. 
fTotal is for 1921. 
gTotal is for 1934. 
hThe New Zealand Seamen's Union was affiliated to the Labour Party from 1919 to 1971. 
~ 
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Zealand Hotel Workers• (29,457) - are currently affili-
ated to the Labour Party. Although the Wellington 
Clerical Workers• Union was affiliated from 1937 to 
1942 and, as Table 4 indicates, eleven out of twenty-
five shop-assistants• unions were affiliated to the party 
as recently as 1950, none of the clerical workers' unions 
and only one o£ the shop-assistants• unions (the Nelson 
Butchers) now belong to the party. Both these groups 
of unions have grown at a disproportionate rate in 
the post-war period, as have a number of other groups, 
the majority of whose members are not affiliated to 
the Labour Party. These include the drivers•, electrical 
workers•, freezing workers• and. storemen and packers• 
unions (see Table 23, group B). The same period has 
also witnessed a substantial increase in the size of 
numerous professional associations, none of which 
are affiliated to the Labour Party. 3 
The trade unions which are affiliated to the Labour 
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Party are thus almost all manual workers' unions. Since 
these unions are almost all getting smaller and smaller, 
some in absolute as well as in relative terms, the party's 
base in the trade union movement is becoming increasingly 
narrow (see Table 23, group A). Of the major unions 
or groups of unions, over half of whose members are 
affiliated to the Labour Party, only the Hotel Workers•, 
the Engineers' and the woollen mill employees• unions 
have grown at a disproportionate rate over the last fifty 
3. See Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and 
Present, p. 1 1. 
years. The Engineers•, Hotel Workers• and Carpenters• 
unions have emerged as easily the biggest affiliated 
to the party, providing 47.5 per cent o£ its affiliated 
membership in 1975 and holding 43 per cent o£ the union 
card votes at conference (see Table 24). However, 
generalizing from the number o£ remits that they send 
to conference and the number o£ members that they have 
contributed to the PLP, these unions are not character-
.ized by a high degree o£ political consciousness. By 
• 
these indicators, they do not. constitute a political 
• vanguard •. as did the watersiders', miners •, labourers •, 
railwaymen's, workers• and seamen's unions in the inter-
war years. Most o£ the latter unions were prominent in 
the 'Red' .Federation or the AOL or both and had once 
shunned political action. As the depression set in, 
however (and as Labour appeared likely to become the 
governing party), they began to realize the advantages 
of having a political arm and making their muscle felt 
in it. Almost hal£ o£ the trade unionists elected to 
Parliament have come from these unions - sixteen out o£ 
thirty-four before, and ten out o£ twenty-three since, 
1945 (see Table 15). But only the railwaymen now send 
a large number of remits to conference - 113 in thirteen 
years from 1963 to 1975 inclusive, compared with twenty-
three for all the watersiders•, miners•, labourers• and 
workers' unions combined (see Table 8). 
As these once highly politicized unions have become 
smaller, their potential influence in the Labour Party 
(see Table 24) and thus their incentive actively to 
participate in it have declined and they have become 
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TABLE 24 
ME!V!BE!tSHIP AND CONFERENCE VOTES OF SELECTlm 
PARTY-AFFILIATED UNIONS, 1941 AND 1975 
1941 1975 
Union 
f·7embers Votes Members 
NZ Engineers 5,260 12 4),051 
NZ Hotel Workers 14,973 41 29,457 
NZ Carpenters 7,335 19 15,123 
---
27,5-68 72 37,631 
1(, all affiliated unions 14.5 14.6 47.5 
NZ Workers 28,000 57 9,500 
ASRS (NUR) 13,000 27 11,300 
I,abourers 9,934 27 6,970 
Waterside \'.orkers 6,203 14 5,819 
J'tiners 3,929 14 584 
61,006 139 )4,173 
--
'f· all affiliated unions 32.1 28.2 18.5 
SOURCES: NZLP, "Delegates Attending 1941 Annual 
Conference," 1941; "Delegates Attending 1975 Annual 
Conference," 1975. 
Votes 
88 
60 
32 
180 
43.0 
20 
24 
17 
15 
1 
77 
18.4 
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politically apathetic or •unconscious•. (This last 
trend ~ common to all unions - is, of course, also 
related to the growth of capitalist hegemony already 
discussed.) Moreover, the radical political tradi-
tion of which they have been bearers is in danger of 
dying with them,. since no other unions are seeking to 
perpetuate it - at least, not within the Labour Party. 
Of the unions currently affiliated to the party, the 
most radical are probab~y the Auckland Boilermakers' 
and Northern·Drivers' Union. The former, as we have 
seen, contributes more remits than any other union 
for consideration by conference, but still attaches 
very little importance to participation in Labour Party 
politics. 4 The Northern Drivers• Union is not always 
represented at conference and has closer ties with the 
pro-Soviet Socialist Unity Party, of which the union's 
secretary, 'Bill' Andersen, is president, than with the 
Labour Party. 
Why, though, have so few white-collar unions decided 
to affiliate to the Labour Party? Firstly, the work 
situation of the typical white-collar worker is such 
that he is likely to be less class-conscious than his 
blue-collar counterpart. As Mann explains, employers 
normally subject manual workers to a very close form 
of control, gearing their pay as closely as possible 
to their work effort and reinforcing close monetary 
4. The president of the Boilermakers• Union describes 
the issues which union delegates bring back for 
discussion from the Labour Party as being usually 
"a decade behind the political times". Finlay, 
Interview. 
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control with the physical presence of supervisors. 
The fact that "virtually all manual workers" 5 are thus 
•coerced' generally distingu~shes them from office staff, 
from white-collar workers. "The latter are usually 
assumed to have internalized the employer's work norms"6 
and consequently are not controlled nearly as rigidly. 
White-collar workers, according to the secretary of a 
national union, "have a different approach to trade 
unionism11 • 7 They tend to regard themselves as •assist-
ants' or 'administrators' rather than workers. Where 
they work, the division between management and labour 
is less clear-cut than it is on the factory, or shop, 
floor. As well as being subject to less rigid control, 
they are closer to the employer and therefore more sus-
ceptible to his influence. 
But this is only part of the explanation. As 
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New Zealand has become more industrialized and technology 
more·sophisticated, the bargaining power of professional 
associations and some white~collar unions has been enhanced 
by their members• possession of qualifications for which 
there is a constantly growing demand. 8 A member of the 
5. Mann, Consciousness and Action Amon the Western 
Working Class, p. 2 • 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ditchfield, Interview. 
8. Galbraith argues that education is to advanced 
industrial society what capital was to early industrial 
society. If he is correct that the unemployed will 
come to consist more and more of the uneducated, who 
are unemployable in the advanced industrial society, 
then perhaps-we-should expect unions of manual workers, 
especially of unskilled manual workers, to become 
increasingly rel1ant upon the political protection of 
the Labour Party. See The New Industrial state, 
pp. 249. 283. 
New Zealand Airline Pilots• Association, which is 
affiliated to neither the FOL nor the Labour Party, 
commands a higher salary than the Prime Minister. 
Unions such as these (although this example is per-
haps exceptional) have no need for a political arm. 
Also, by not registering under the IC & A Act and 
this not being subject to its provisions, such public 
service unions as the Public Service Association 
{1971 membership of 48,741), the Post-Primary Teachers' 
Association (10,835) and the New Zealand Educational 
Institute.(20,463) became sufficiently prosperous to 
be able to operate welfare and emergency funds and 
sponsor a major investment society. 9 Because of legis-
lative restrictions on the sum of money that they may 
levy from their members, many unions registered under 
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the old IC & A Act were "permanently short of funds". 10 
They have been able to maintain welfare funds since 1964, 
but the proportion of a members• fees that may be channel-
led into the funds is severely limited. In Britain, 
unions which paid below-average welfare benefits placed 
a greater emphasis upon legislative enactment (collec-
tive, as opposed to exclusive, goods) as a means of 
furthering their members• interests and thus demonstrated 
a greater propensity to affiliate to the Labour Party 
when it was founded than did those unions which paid 
9. See Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and 
Present, p. 127. 
10. Ibid., p. 126. 
above-average benefits. 11 If New Zealand unions become 
steadily more capable of tending to their members• 
interests themselves, their reliance upon the Labour 
Party to enact legislation designed to advance that 
same end is likely to diminish, causing a further decline 
in the proportion of the unionized work force affiliated 
to the party. 
Lastly, especially in view of the faet that the 
Labour Party has been in office for only six of the 
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last twenty-five years, white-collar and manual workers• 
unions alike may have decided that the FOL is a better 
vehicle than the party for the furtherance of their 
political objectives. Significantly, white-collar union-
ists make up 29.2 per cent of the FOL's affiliated member-
ship, compared, of course, with only 16.3 per cent of .the 
party's. Whereas only 27 per cent of the unions registered 
under the Industrial Relations Act were affiliated to the 
Labour Party in 1975, a total of 75 per cent was affili-
ated to the FOL. And, while the proportion of all regis-
tered trade unionists affiliated to the Labour Party has 
declined steadi_ly from 75 per cent in 1941. to 42 per cent 
in 1975, the proportion affiliated to the FOL has increased -
from 79.4 per cent in 1941 to 87.7 per cent in 1975. 
11. Arnold J Heidenheimer, "Trade Unions, Benefit Systems, 
and Party Mobilization Styles: 'Horizontal• Influences 
in the British Labour and German Social Democratic 
Parties", Comparative Politics 1 (April 1969): 328. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTEREST-GROUP REPRESENTATION: THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE FOL 
I. AN HISTORICAL EVENT: THE 1951 WATERFRONT DISPUTE 
The state of the economy has long determined the 
attitudes of workers• and employers• organizations 
toward New Zealand's system of compulsory arbitration 
. 
of industrial disputes. As long· ago as 1927, the 
Arbitration Court was likened to an economic barometer 
which registered the conflict between workers and 
employers and was opposed or supported by each side 
according to its immediate interests. 1 In 1912 and 
1913, the 'Red Fed' unions had attacked, and the 
employers had supported, compulsory arbitration; 
during the depression, as unemployment soared and the 
bargaining power of unions was correspondingly weakened, 
these attitudes had been reversed. It was probably 
inevitable, therefore, that the post-war period, char-
acterized as it was by full employment and a persis-
tent shortage of labour (see Table 19), should have 
produced a militant trade union organization, the TUC, 
which was intent upon bypassing the arbitration sys·i:em 
and using organized labour's considerable bargaining 
1. See Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pP. 130-31. 
power to the fullest advantage in direct negotiations 
with employers. But both the TUC and the union which 
dominated it, the NZWWU, were annihilated by a National 
Government in a prolonged dispute - essentially over 
the arbitration system- in 1951. 
Relations between the Labour Party and the water-
side workers• and other anti-arbitrationist unions had 
been strained for some years before 1951. In the 
period between 1945 and 1949, .while the Labour Party 
was still in 'power, New Zealand experienced more indus-
trial un~est than it had in any previous five-year 
period. The number of workers involved in disputes 
and the number of workipg-days lost in disputes in 
1949 were the highest ever recorded (see Table 17). The 
Labour Government regarded strikes as unnecessary while 
it was in power, supposedly protecting trade union inter-
ests, and as a threat to its policy of economic stabiliz-
ation. Its attitude toward trade union direct action was 
as expressed by Roberts, when he told conference delegates 
in 1947: 
The Labour Government has by legislation given 
the industrial organizations their proper status 
in society, it has guaranteed full employment, 
provided a guaranteed wage and improved the living 
standards of the workers and all those who render 
service •••• 
••• The Government has already provided the 
means by which most industrial disputes can be 
adjusted, and to the ordinary person it would 
appear that the commonsense thing to do would be 
to utilize those avenues of adjusting disputes.2 
Moreover, in the atmosphere of the Cold War, the 
Prime Minister, Fraser, had ~ome to see all industrial 
2. NZLP, Report of the Thirty-first Annual Conference 
(1947), p. 2. 
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unrest as the work of Communists, whose 'sinister 
motives• were generally "concealed under a spurious 
concern for trade union principles and the welfare of 
the wage-earners 11 • 3 In 1949, during a dispute in the 
building industry, the Government deregistered the 
Auckland branch of the Carpenters• Union. The dispute, 
according to Fraser, had been organized and controlled 
by Communist leaders, whose real purpose was to "create 
"'"",;{ industrial anarchy by undermining th~ destroying the 
arbitration system". 4 Industrial trouble was being 
deliberately fomented, magnified and protracted by 
Communists as part of a policy of "weakening New Zealand 
in the present international situation". 5 
The unions which were to withdraw from the FOL 
and form the TUC had revived the syn.dicalist notions 
that had been embraced by the 'Red' Federation and the 
AOL, but had been extinguished temporarily by the depres-
sion. The carpenters' dispute wiped out any residual 
friendship between these unions and the leadership of the 
Labour Party. As far as the leaders of the militant 
unions were concerned, the Government's action in deregis-
. 6 
terihg the carpenters had been "unforgivable". By 1949, 
the NZWWU and the Northern Drivers' Union were contemplat-
ing disaffiliating from the party. 7 As the watersiders 
3. NZLP, Report of the Thirty-third Annual Conference 
( 1 94 9 ) ; p • 1 3 • 
4. Ibid., P• 17. 
5. Ibid. 
, 6. Bassett, Confrontation '51, p. 11. 
7. Ibid., p. 32. 
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withdrew from the FOL to set up the TUC in 1950, 
their secretary, •Toby' Hill, let it be known that 
his union would do nothing to see that the Labour Party 
was returned to power. 8 In accordance with the senti-
ments that Hill expressed and the TUC unions• interpre-
tation of the nature of the relationship between the 
party and the FOL, the new trade union federat1on 
emphasized in its constitution that it would res'ist 
domination "by any political party". 9 
The Labour Party initially maintained a very low 
profile in the dispute between the watersiders, who 
insisted on their right to bargain directly with employ-
ers for increased wages, ·and the National Government, 
which insisted that the watersiders use the machinery 
provided by the IC & A Act. The attitude that it even-
tually adopted was somewhat equivocal. on the one hand, 
the party re-affirmed its support for industrial concili-
ation and arbitration as the basis for the settlement of 
industrial disputes - which displeased the watersiders -
and, on the other, it urged that an attempt be made to 
settle the existing dispute by a compulsory conference of 
the disputants, as had been provided for in the 1949 
Industrial Relations Act. This method of settlement 
appealed to neither the Government, which realized it 
could make political capital out of a prolonged dispute, 
and the FOL, which was keen to see the rival TUC crushed. 
8. Ibid., p. 43. 
9. Ibid., p. 47. 
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on this count, therefore, the party displeased the 
FOL. Nash's statement thus "satisfied no-one1110 -
except, perhaps, in a sadistic sense, the Government. 
As the dispute wore on and the Government's con-
ditions for a settlement became increasingly harsh, 
the Labour Party's attitude toward the watersiders 
became increasingly sympathetic. Nash persuaded the 
watersiders to accept settlement of their wage claim 
by compulsory arbitration, but the Government then 
announced it would settle for nothing less than the 
dissolution of the national union. 11 When it also 
became clear that the Government and the employers 
were victimizing individuals among those deregistered 
watersiders who were applying to return to work, Nash 
and a number of other Labour MPs advised the men not to 
return at a11. 12 The watersiders welcomed the party's 
moral support. When the vice-president of the NZWWU 
addressed the party's annual conference in June 1951, 
he told delegates that the feeling for the Labour Party 
within the union had "never been stronger than it is at 
present because. our members believe that the party has 
recaptured the fighting spirit of 1935". 13 Ironically, 
it was at this conference that the Labour Party abandoned 
the objective that the TUC a year earlier had adopted: 
10. Ibid., p. 144. 
11. Ibid., PP• 150-51. 
12. Ibid., p. 159. 
13. Quoted ibid., p. 179. 
13, 
'the socialization of the means of production, distrib-
ution and exchange•. 
To the exten·t that the party moved nearer to the 
watersiders, it moved further away from the FOL. A 
joint meeting of the executive members of the FOL and 
the party was held and Nash, as party leader, addressed 
the FOL's annual conference; otherwise there was virtually 
no communication at all between the two organizations 
during the dispute. To Fintan Patrick Walsh, the domin-
ant figure in .the FOL, the party seemed to be "in enemy 
hands". 14 Nash had to tread carefully or else the party's 
relationship with the FOL would be irreparably damaged. 
After the dispute had ended and the Government had called 
a 'snap• election, the watersiders• president, Harold 
Barnes, urged members of his union 11 to do all within their 
15 
power" to secure the election of a Labour Government if 
they wanted to return to work on the waterfront. But the 
watersiders• support was harmful not only to the Labour 
Party's electoral prospects - since the electorate had 
been fed on a diet of aggressive anti-unionism for several 
months while emergency regulations had been in force and 
normal democratic freedoms suspended - but also to the 
prospects of a reconciliation with the FOL, which is 
reported to have considered standing its own candidates 
in Labour seats. 16 Nash was forced to renounce the 
14. Ibid., p. 178. 
15. Ibid., p. 198. 
16. Ibid., p. 199. 
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watersiders, thereby diminishing the enthusiasm with 
which they and their TUC colleagues subsequently 
campaigned £or the pa;ty. 17 In the end, Nash and the 
party, by attempting to negotiate a 'middle course• in 
the dispute, alienated neither the FOL nor the TUC 
totally, but both.substantially. 
The Labour Party lost more·trade unionists from 
its membership between May 1951 and May 1952 than it 
has hitherto in any other year. The total number of 
trade union m~mbers financially affiliated to the 
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party fell by nearly 25 per cent from 166,521 to 127,244 
(see Table 2) and the number of unions financially affil-
iated from 201 to 159 (see Table 3). However, this decline 
was not exclusively a consequence of the waterfront dispute 
and its outcome. Party records reveal that forty-eight 
trade unions either disaffiliated from the party or lapsed 
into unfinancial membership (most of them later to dis-
affiliate completely) between 1951 and 1952. 18 Of these· 
unions, twenty-eight, containing about 15,000 members, had 
not withdrawn from the FOL to join the TUC. Since the 
demise of the T~C actually strengthened the FOL, it seems 
unlikely that the waterfront dispute would have motivated 
these unions to leave the party - they would have had no 
grudge to bear against theLabour Party, unless they had 
happened to sympathize with the watersiders' cause. Although 
the disaffiliation of the majority of the twenty-eight 
17. Ibid., p. 200. 
18. NZLP, "Delegates Attending 1951 Annual Conference"; 
"Delegates Attending 1952 Annual Conference". (Mimeo-
graphed). 
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unions must remain unexplained, a few of these unions, 
at least, were likely to have been affected by the 
National Government's passage in 1950 of a Political 
Disabilities Removal Amendment Act, which made it illegal 
for trade unions to contribute to the funds of a political 
party without the· prior approval of an absolute majority of 
its entire financial membership and which meant that in 
any affiliation ballot, those who did not vote would be 
counted among those who opposed affiliation. Ballots 
in two unionS· of four that are known to have held them 
failed to produce an absolute majority of the financial 
membership in favour of affiliation, although, in both 
cases, a majority of those who voted approved. 19 In the 
ballots held by the other two unions, the majority by 
which affiliation was approved was reduced substantially 
by the inclusion of those who did not vote with those who 
opposed affiliation. 20 According to Alan McDonald, who 
was then general secretary of the Labour Party, the 1950 
Act had little effect upon the number of affiliated unions. 21 
19. The unions were the New Zealand Bakers' and Pastry 
Cooks' Union and the New Zealand Shipwrights' Union, 
whose combined membership was less than 2,000. See 
R M Martin, "Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand" 
(MA Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1954), 
p. 124. 
20. The Wellington Rubber Workers' and New Zealand Tram-
way Employees' unions. 
21. Correspondence·quoted in Bentley, "Trade Union 
Financial Assistance to the NZLP", pp. 42-43. The 
current party secretary, John Wybrow, identifies the 
1950 Act as the major cause of the decline in the 
number of trade unions affiliated to the party during 
the post-war period. However, as McDonald was secre-
tary when the effect of the Act would have been felt, 
his testimony must be accepted. In any case, the 
second Labour Government again amended the Act in 
1960 to enable trade-unions to contribute to the 
party's funds on the same basis as they had before 
1950. 
1 . tt 22 . . . "One or two sma ler un1ons , a maJor1ty of whose 
financial members were unlikely actively to have 
approved affiliation, did leave the party, but the 
great majority of those.affiliated continued to make 
financial contributions to the party either in the 
form of 'written~off' loans or by .levying their mem-
bers on the job. 23 Whatever the reasons were for the 
departure of these twenty-eight unions, only nine sub-
sequentiy re-affiliated to the party and only two - the 
Nelson Operative Butchers' Union and the Auckland Wharf 
Foremen's Union -were still affiliated in 1975. 
The other twenty unions, whose combined member-
ship exceeded 22,000, had all been associated with the 
ill-fated TUC, as had four which had left the party in 
1950. 24 The affiliations of four unions of the twenty-
the NZWWU, the Wellington Drivers• Union, and the Nelson 
and Wellington freezing workers• unions - lapsed when 
they were deregistered during the dispute. The drivers' 
union has never re-affiliated to the party, the Wellington 
Freezing Workers• Union re-affiliated in 1970, but has 
since left again, and the Nelson freezing workers are 
now ·affiliated to the party as part of the Canterbury, 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid., P• 32. 
24. The Auckland Boilermakers' and General Labourers• 
unions, the Dunedin Tramwaymen' s Union and the 
Brunnerton Miners' Union. The boilermakers and 
tramwaymen re-affiliated in 1952 and the labourers 
in 1962. The miners' union is now non-existent. 
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Marlborough and Nelson Meat Workers' Union. 25 The 
NZWWU was fragmented into twenty-six separate port unions. 
Although they formed a national federation in 1967, 
re~affiliation to the Labour Party on a national basis 
26 has never been seriously proposed. The individual 
unions slowly drifted back into the party: the Timaru 
and Nelson unions (1952), the Westport and New Plymouth 
unions (1953), the Port Chalmers' union (1954), the 
Wellington and Napier unions (1956), the Lyttelton 
union (between 1960 and 1964), the Gisborne union (1963), 
the Auckland union (1964), the Whangarei union (1968) 
and the Mount Maunganui and Tauranga union (1970). Thus, 
by 1975, twelve out of twenty separate waterside workers' 
unions, accounting for 87 per cent of the NZWWF's member-
ship, had affiliated to the party. In the course of the 
1951 dispute, the watersiders' enthusiasm for the Labour 
Party had been rekindled. But, although it is claimed 
that their defeat left no legacy of bitterness between 
their unions and the party, they were, at the very least, 
»disappointed" 27 that the party had not supported them 
more strongly •. The depth and persistence of this disap-
pointment is reflected in the slowness with which the 
watersiders, traditionally New Zealand's most highly 
politicized workers, straggled back into the party in 
25. Among the unions currently affiliated to the party, 
the Runanga State Miners' Union, the Christchurch 
Rubber Workers' Union and the Auckland Freezing 
Workers' Union were also TUC unions that had disaf-
filiated from the party in 1951. 
26. Edward Thompson, Interview, Wellington, December 17, 
1975 •. 
27. Thompson, Interview. 
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the 1950's and 1960's. 
In retrospect, however, the TUG unions• disap-
pointment with the equivocation of the Labour Party 
during the waterfront dispute was probably less impor-
tant than the party's estrangement of the FOL. During 
the dispute, Walsh had discovered that he could work 
very closely and very well, if need be, with a National 
Government. Simultaneously, the Labour Party's rather 
sympathetic attitude toward the watersiders and the 
TUG had antagonized him and his dislike of Nash, which 
was mutual, had intensified. Under Walsh's leadership, 
therefpre, the FOL came to assume a role that made it 
less necessary for its affiliated unions to maintain 
links with the Labour Party as well. The most important 
consequence of the waterfront dispute for union-party 
relations was identified by Bassett when he stated: "One 
of the militants' aims of the immediate post-war years, 
that of making the industrial movement its own man, has 
most certainly been achieved". 28 
Yet the trade union movement has become its •own 
man• neither solely nor primarily as a result of the 
1951 waterfront dispute, but rather as a result of an 
historical process which the dispute sharply accelerated. 
We now turn to consider how trade union involvement in 
the Labour Party has been affected by the gradual 
institutionalization of the trade union movement, along 
with other organized interests, in the post-war period. 
For, to a much greater extent than in the years before 
World War II, organized labour now participates in the 
governmental decision-making process in 
28. Ba~sett, Confrontation '51, p. 212. 
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its own right., irre'specti ve of which political party 
happens to be in power. 
II. THE HISTORICAL PROCESS 
~rade unions have everywhere grown up in societies 
whose economic and social agencies tended to favour the 
interests of capital "at the expense of Lfhose oij 
labour". 29 If. they were to have any chance of remedy-
ing the injustices which were the workers' lot, they 
had to form their own political parties or else ally 
themselves with existing.ones. In the twentieth cen-
tury, however, trade union movements in most advanced 
. 
industrialized societies have been gradually integrated 
into society and r:ecognized by governments as "essential 
components of the legitimate decision-making estabiish-
ment".30 In Britain, for example, "well-established, 
regular and quite formal consultation ••• goes on between 
members of the government Libether it is Labour or Conser-
vative? and the representatives of the trade unions on 
matters of policy".31 
Trade unions used to band together simultaneously 
to seek proteGtion in numbers - to make i•an injury 
to bne an in.jury to all1132 - and to maximize the effec-
tiveness of their industrial action. Today, however, 
one of the main roles of the FOL in New Zealand is to( 
29. Williams, "Trade Unions and Government in New 
Zealand", p. 90. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. This was part·of the IWW preamble adopted by the 
'Red' Federation. See Holland, O'Flynn and Ross, 
The Tragic Story of the Waihi Strike, p. 13. 
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minimize, rather than exacerbate or widen, industrial 
conflict. Many trade unions affiliate to the central 
organization in their respective movements for reasons 
quite different from those which could be considered 
'class-conscious•. Again in Britain, four major white;... 
collar unions abandoned a separate white-collar congress 
that they had created- the>Conference of Professional 
and Pubiic Service Organizations (COPPSO) - and affili-
ated during the 1960's to t'he TUC. The decision in each 
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case was "a .response to the TUG's presence on the national 
planning bodies and COPPSO's exclusion from them •••• By 
' 
staying outside the TUC they would have LfiasJ no access 
to policy-making bodies. which directly affected their 
bargaining position". 33 In the words of the national 
executive council of the National and Local Government 
Officers' Association (NALGO): 
So long as NALGO remains outside the TUC it 
must become a powerless spectator on the sidelines. 
Only inside the TUC has it any hope of influencing 
nationa~ ec~nomic and wages policy and adequately 
protectJ.ng J.ts members.34 
The integration of New Zealand trade unions into 
their society can be considered to have oegun in 1868, 
when they were given their legal existence in the Trade 
Unions Act. Although they had to await the election of 
the first Labour Government in 1935 to become an integral 
part of the governmental decision-making process, trade 
33. Bain, Coates and Eilis, Social Stratification and 
Trade Unionism, p. 92. 
34. Ibid. 
unions did actually communicate with Liberal and Reform 
administrations in earlier years. Although the leaders 
of the 'Red' Federation regarded political parties as 
"rather spineless organizations and individuals", they 
"never" missed an opportunity of advising Cabinet minis-
ters of "the urgent need for this or that reform" 35 
which could be achieved only by legislative enactment. 
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They were thus able to secure "many reforms of a lasting 
character". 36 Trade unions were represented independently, 
for example,. at the National Industrial Conference, con-
vened by the Reform Government primarily to consider the 
problem of unemployment, in 1928. At the party's annual 
conference in 1930, Fraser accused the president of the 
AOL, Cook, of having co-operated "in a movement among 
certain trade union officials" 37 to exc.lude Labour Party 
MPs from deputations that they were sending to meet 
Cabinet ministers. For all this, however, far less con-
sul tation too·k place between trade unions and the govern-
ment in this period than takes place today. 
After the Labour Party came to power in 1935, 
representative.s of the FOL attended Labour Party caucus 
meetings and, during World War II, the president of the 
FOL, McLagan, became Minister of National Service (Later 
Minister of Labour, Mines, Employment and Immigration) 
in the Labour Cabinet. As the party president, Roberts, 
argued, admonishing the militant unions, at the 1947 
35. Hickey, 'Red' Fed. Memoirs, P. 32. 
36. Ibid. 
37. NZLP, Report of the Fourteenth Annual Conference 
(1930), p. 11. 
conference: "When the working class of New Zealand 
elected a Labour Government, trade unionism came of 
age" 38 and vas given its proper status. 
The close co-operation that characterized rela-
tions between the government and the FOL at this 
time seems to have been based primarily on the close 
personal links among the leaders "and particularly 
between Fraser and Walsh", 39 but, in 1949, legislation 
was finally enacted to put it'on a formal basis. The 
function of the Industrial Advisory Council, described 
"40 by Fraser as "the most important piece of legislation 
passed by the government in its last year in office, 
was to be "to inquire into and make reports and recom-
mendations to the Minister LQf Laboui7 on such ways 
and means of improving industrial relations and indus-
trial welfare as from time to time appear to be practic-
able".41 Comprising eight representatives from the FOL, 
eight from the Employers• Federation, and an independent 
chairman, it first met in 1952. In 1963, it was reported 
that the council had discussed such matters as joint 
consultation in industry, labour turnover, fact-finding 
in industrial disputes, channels of communication in 
38. NZLP, Report of the Thirty-first Annual Conference 
. ( 1 94 7 ) , p • 2 • 
39. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present, 
p. 156. -
40. NZLP, Report of the Thirty-fourth Annual Conference 
( 1 950) ' p. 14. 
41. Woods, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in 
New Zealand {Wellington: Government Printer, 1963), 
p. 181. 
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industry, incentive schemes, and productivity. It 
had provided "a useful forum for discussion" and had 
been "very successful in exploring and establishing 
common ground between workers and employers in such 
matters". 42 However, as a result of the Arbitration 
Court's nil wage-order in 1968 and the trade un,ion 
movement's unilateral decision to bypass the arbitra-
tion system and enter into direct collective bargain-
ing with' employers, the council, which had been: meeting 
quite regularly, went into recess. Communications 
between the National Government and the FOL began to 
break down, especially after the long-serving Minister 
of Labour, Thomas Shand,- died in 1969. The Government 
began to ignore the trade union movement; "measures 
which would normally have been discussed with the Fed-
eration of Labour were pushed through without consulta-
tion".43 For this reason, more than for any other, the 
FOL decided to give "all possible support"44 to the 
Labour Party in the 1972 General Election. Significantly, 
this had never previously been necessary. 
The third.Labour Government provided for the estab~ 
lisnment of a new, but similar, council in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. The Industrial Relations Council, 
which consists of the Minister of Labour (the chairman), 
the Secretary·of Labour, and ten representatives each 
42. Ibid., pp. 181-82 .. 
43. in Ri~ht Out: 
, ed. Brian 
129. 
44. Ibid. 
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from the FOL and the Employers• Federation, first met 
in August 1974. Its functions are much the same as 
its predecessor's - to facilitate co-operation between 
organized management, organized labour and the govern-
ment in the formulation and implementation of manpower 
policies, the development of codes of practice relating 
to industrial relations and the improvement of industrial 
organizations and industrial welfare. 45 
The Industrial Relations Council symbolizes the 
integration of the New Zealand trade union movement 
into. the governmental decision-making process. But the 
FOL is also represented on numerous other statutory 
agencies, including, among others, the Consumer Council, 
the Metric Advisory Board, the Immigration Advisory 
Council, the Trades Cert~fication Board, the Government 
Superannuation Board, the Vocational Training Council, 
the Apprenticeship Commission, the New Zealand Shipping 
Corporation, the National Advisory Council on the EmPloy-
ment of women, the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, the 
Industrial Commission, the Industrial Court, the Construe-
tion Advisory Council Committee and the board of the 
Reserve Bank. Trade unions are thus able - via the FOL 
and its delegates on the statutory agencies - to take 
part, or at least to be implicated, in the formulation 
of governmental policy in a large number of areas -
irrespective, moreover, of whether the Labour Party or 
the National Party is in power. Apart from exceptional 
45. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, 
"Trade Unions and Industrial Relations - New 
Zealand", in ANZ Quarterly Surv~ 24 ·(october 1975), 
p. 9. 
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periods, as b~tween 1970 and 1972, the FOL is in 
touch with the government constantly and on a wide 
range of issues. On matters of urgency or of special 
importance, it is likely to seek an audience with the 
government - or the initiative for a meeting may come 
from the government itself. 
Before World War II, then, trade Unions might have 
believed - understandably - that affiliating to the 
Labour Party and participating in the formulation of 
its policy was the only available means o£ having their 
policy preferences ultimately translated into enacted 
legislation. Now, as we have seen, they have other ways 
of getting what they want. Moreover, the £act that the 
National Party has been in power £or nineteen o£ the 
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last twenty-five years means that there has been a partic-
ularly compelling reason for trade unions to adopt alter-
native means of influencing governmental policy to affili-
ation to, and active participation within, the Labour 
Party. There has been a strong incentive for them visibly 
to play down their involvement in the Labour Party so as 
not to antagontze the 'party o£ government' and prejudice 
their chances of having it implement at least some of 
the policies that they prefer. 46 
The FOL has also come to offer services to affiliated 
trade unions that were once provided more or less exclusively 
46. Conversely, when a given interest group is associated 
with a political party which is entrenched in power, 
there is a tendency for them to form an especially 
intimate relationship - as in the case of the Social 
Democratic Party and organized labour in Sweden and 
the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party and big 
business in Japan. 
by the Labour Party. In Sweden, £or a comparison, 
the Social Democratic Party was founded almost a decade 
before the £irst·central trade union organization. It 
therefore tended to dominate the labour movement at 
first, providing "critical services £or the unions, 
especially those weaker unions that were in the great 
majority". 47 The New Zealand experience appears to 
have been very similar, political unity having been 
achieved in the labour movement in 1916, but industrial 
unity not until the FOL was founded in 1937. In the 
interim period, the £unctions that normally would have 
been performed by a single central trade union organiza-
tion were carried out p~rtly by the Labour Party and 
the AOL in collaboration, but mainly by the Labour Party 
alone. 
A resolution adopted at an open conference convened 
by the AOL in December 1923 instructed the two organiz-
ations to set up an information and research bureau to 
provide data for use by affiliated unions in negotiations 
to obtain awards and agreements. Little is known of the 
history of the bureau, except that it seems to have been 
sta£fed and operated solely by the party, whose represen-
tatives stressed its utility when they tried to persuade 
the New Zealand Workers' Union, which belonged to the 
AOL, to affiliate to the party as well. Addressing the 
union's annual conference in 1930, the general secretary 
of the party, Walter Nash, said the party had helped 
"with all the means at its disposaln48 when unions had 
tried to improve wages and working conditions or to 
47. !assalow, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations, 
p. 33. 
48. NZLP, Report o£ the Fourteenth Annual Conference 
(1930), p. 10. 
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resist attacks on the living standards of workers. 
As the party's annual conference report recorded: 
With the limited resources it had available, 
the Labour Party had set up an Information Bureau 
for the definite purpose of supplying facts and 
figures to assist in the presentation of the 
workers• case. The information supplied by the 
bureau had greatly assisted the Seamen, Shipwrights, 
and other industrial organizations in building up 
their cases .for awards and agreements. The figures 
and tables supplied, combined with the advocacy of 
Mr Arthur Cook and Mr James Roberts, were responsi-
ble for the increase of 2/6d per hundred in shear-
ing rates •••• The information was so complete, 
and the facts so carefully prepared, that the court 
was compelled to increase the rates. This increase 
has plac~d an additional £30,000 every year into 
the pockets of the members of the union.49 . 
Toda~ the Labour Party performs no such tasks for 
its affiliated unions, except perhaps to a minor extent 
through the industrial relations sub-committee of the 
national executive, which was established in 1972. A 
research unit was set up during the term of the third 
Labour Government, but to serve only the PLP. Until 
the last few years, the FOL, on the other hand, had the 
only full-time research staff (albeit a small one) in 
the entire trade union movement, excepting the public 
service unions. 50 If trade unions did not possess the 
resources to compile their own data for use, for example, 
in award negotiations, they would affiliate to the FOL, 
rather than to the Labour Party, to obtain them. 
Certain historical events and certain leaders have 
also precipitated the FOL's assumption of the role of an 
independent interest group, protecting and promoting 
the interests of its members as vigorously and as effect-
49. Ibid. 
50. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present, 
'p. 1 27. 
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i vely under National as under Labour administrations.: 
The scars of easily the most important of the events, 
the 1951 waterfront dispute, had still not healed by 
the time the second Labour Government brought down the 
infamous 'Black Budget', which further displeased the 
FOL, in 1958. Of the leaders, the most important has 
probably been Fintan ,Patrick Walsh, the dominant person-
ality in the FOL from the time of World War II until his 
death in 1963. 
Walsh had been a close personai friend of Fraser, 
but Nash, Fraser's successor as leader of the Labour 
Party, was· "everything that Walsh wasnot". 51 Especially 
after the waterfront dispute, relations between Nash and 
Walsh were, to say the least, cool. Thus, although Walsh 
veered erratically from one side of the ideological spec-
trum to the other during his eleven-year term as formal 
leader of the FOL, the "one constant thread 11 52 in his 
policy was his concern for the independence of. the trade 
union movement. His approach produced results. As the 
FOL secretary of the same period subsequently remarked: 
"Whatever the criticism of him in the rank-and-file from 
time. to time, he was always successful in bringing home 
the bacon". 53 For most of the time, Walsh was able to 
work amicably with National Cabinet ministers, even to 
the point where, on one occasion, he is supposed to have 
been consulted by the party's leaders before they chose 
51. Douglas, Interview. 
52. Roth, "Trade Unions", p. 15. 
'53. Kenneth Baxter, quoted in Christchurch Star, February 
1. 1969. 
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a Minister of Labour.54 
Adoptinr:! a similarly flexible, pragmatic approach, 
Walsh's successor, Sir Thomas ·skinner, has tended to 
de-emphasize the trade union movement's organic links 
with the Labour Party. 55 The FOL and the Labour Party 
have very similar views, according to Sir Thomas, but 
they are functionally separate. The Labour Party seeks 
to become the government, "charged with governing in the 
interest of all the people", 56 whereas the FOL's respon-
sibility is to its member unions. His view is that, 
although a Labour Government is rather more likely to 
legislate in the interests of wage-earners than a 
National Government, the trade union movement is "neces-
sarily and essentially non-political" 57 because it has 
to deal with the government of the day, whatever its 
colour, on matters which concern the members of trade 
unions. Sir Thomas's rationale for the lack of liaison 
between the FOL and the Labour Party when it is not in 
power (as reflected, for example, in the infrequent meet-
ings of the Joint Council of Labour) is that "the opposi-
tion party has.little real influence in Pa~liarnent". 58 
When' votes are taken, it invariably loses; so it is gener-
ally more effective for the FOL to approach the government 
54. This revelation is contained in the Walsh papers, 
held by the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington. 
55· See section on Joint Council of Labour above. 
56. Skinner, "All Possible support", p. 130. 
57. Ibid., P• 123. 
58. Ibid., p. 132. 
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on its own behal£. overall, the attitudes o£ Skinner 
and the FOL secretary, James Knox, toward the Labour 
Party are highly instrumental. They are typified by 
Knox's statement to the party's 1971 conference that 
the FOL supported the Labour Party "because o£ the 
assurances which.had been given of what a Labour Govern-
ment will {Sis] do when elected".59 
The attitudes and behaviour of important individual 
actors have thus reinforced the effect of historical 
events and historical processes (including the develop-
ment of a complex interest-group structure in an increas-
ingly industrialized and differentiated society in the 
post-war period as well.as the assimilation of trade 
unions into the decision-making •establishment') that 
have induced trade unions to place a steadily greater 
emphasis upon the FOL vis-a-vis the Labour Party as the 
articulator of their political interests. By separating 
itself from the Labour Party and developing into an 
increasingly independent interest group, the FOL has 
enhanced its political effectiveness and diminished the 
need for trade unions to retain a separate and distinct-
iveLy political arm. Thus, to a considerable extent, 
the FOL has prospered at the Labour Party's expense. But 
it is well to remember that leaders ofthe FOLand the 
Labour Party are not cornpl~tely impotent actors in the 
grip of irresistible historical forces and that their 
behaviour is neither wholly 'determined' nor wholly 
inconsequential. If the post-war leaders of the Labour 
59. NZLP, Report of the Fifty-fifth Annual Conference 
(1971), pp. 33-34. 
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Party had been willing to .try, they might have been 
able to arrest or slow down the flight of the trade 
unions from the party. The party's first leader, 
Holland, campaigned ceaselessly between 1919 and 
1933 to bring all the trade unions within the ambit 
of the Labour Party. But, except for a brief perio·d 
from about 1965 to 1970, the post-war leadership of 
the Labour Party has ignored the diminution of the 
party's base of support in the trade union movement. 
Why? 
150 
CHAPTER V 
OLIGARCHY IN THE PARTY: THE NEWLY-
HEGEMONIC ·1 INTELLECTUALS' 
socialist working-class parties have character-
istically placed a strong formal emphasis on the main-
tenance of intra-party democracy, whose operation, in 
theory, is' supposed to enable rank-and-file members to 
govern the parties and determine their policies. In 
the case of the New Zealand Labour Party, which certainly 
saw itself initially as a socialist working-class party, 
the annual conference remains formally "the supreme 
governing body of the party". 1 Over the years, however, 
a great difference has developed between 'theory' and 
practice' in the distribution of power among the various 
party organs. Conference still monopolizes the right to 
alter the party's constitution and rules, but, as we have 
seen,, its role now is to discuss, rather than formulate, 
policy. In any event, its policy-making role, even in 
the narrow sense of discussion, is secondary to its other 
role of projecting an attractive image of the party to the 
national electorate. 
In the twentieth century, the evolution of political 
parties, whether or not they profess to be democratic in 
1. NZLP, Constitution and Rules, revised ed. (1975), p. 4. 
their internal processes, has been dominated, according 
to Duverger, by two essential facts: (i) an increase in 
the authority of party leaders (at the expense of members) 
and (ii) a tendency toward personal forms of authority. 2 
Only a fixed amount of control over the party and its 
policy is, of course, available. Thus, to the extent 
that oligarchy grows, intra-party democracy is diminished. 
Arguably, once they become unable to force their policy 
preferences upon the leaders, rank-and-file members 
begin to leave the party. 3 This may explain why the 
membership of most socialist working-class parties has 
declined in the period since World War II. 4 
Oligarchy is often seen to be at the root of the 
widespread ideological transformation of socialist 
.working-class parties. For members, who are primarily 
interested in policy outputs, electoral success is a 
means to an end, but for party leaders, who have the 
prospect of enjoying the benefits of office, it may be 
an end in itself. To win elections, a party must gain 
the support of voters whose commitment to the party and 
its ideology is much weaker than that of party members. 
To gi:lin the allegiance of these voters, it must "moder-
ate its dogma, must provide continuity of leadership to 
give an assurance of stability, /and7 must devote itself 
to organizing its vote rather than maintaining the purity 
of its doctrine 11 .5 
2. Duverger, Political Parties, p. 168. 
3. See Wellhofer and Hennessey, "Some Analytic Approaches 
to Oligarchy", pp. 297-300. 
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4. See Kendall, The Labour Movement in Europe, pp. 379-89. 
5. Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1969), p. 43. 
I. THE UNIONS AND THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE PARTY 
The ideological transformation of the Labour Party 
from a party which proclaimed "boldly and fearlessly116 
that its objective was the socialization of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange into one which 
has now deleted the term •socialism' from its vocabu-:-
lary, combined with the huge decline in its branch member-
ship sin~e 1940, indicates that it has been far from 
immune to oligarchical tendencies in its sixty-year 
history. But what has been the role of the affiliated 
trade uni~ns in the party's ideological transformation? 
Has ideological change taken place with or without their 
approval? 
Historically, 'direct• working-class parties - those 
whose members belong 'directly' to the party via its 
branches - have tended to preoccupy themselves with the 
maintenance of ideological purity. By comparison, 
'indirect• working-class parties - those which have been 
formed by trade unions and whose members are mostly trade 
unionists affiliated to the party through .the unions -
have tended to be much more pragmatic'· giving precedence 
to "immediately effective reforms" over "complete trans-
, 
formation of society". 7 As Duverger concludes: "The 
Trade Union formation of the Labour and similar parties 
explains their interest in concrete reforms and their 
6. Holland, in his maiden speech to Parliament in 1919, 
in Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History, 
p. 232. 
7. Duverger, Political Parties, p. 14. 
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lack of enthusiasm for doctrine". (Italics mine). 8 
The tendency for trad~ unions and their political 
arms to attach greater importance to immediate, prag-
matic social reforms than to the transformation of 
capitalism has been noted also by Michels and Lenin. 
To Michels, who formulated the 'iron law' that 'who 
says organization, says oligarchy', trade unions were a 
conservative influence upon socialist parties, inevit-
ably undercutting any "serious socialist, revolutionary 
appeals" 9 with their day-to-day needs. Lenin emphasized 
the necessity of a revolutionary party of bourgeois 
intellectuals which would serve as the •vanguard of 
the proletariat'. Trade· unionism, he declared, meant 
"the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bour-
. geoisie". 10 The task of the revolutionary vanguard was 
hence to "combat spontaneity, to divert the working-class 
movement from this spontaneous trade-union striving to 
come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it 
under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracyn. 11 
Trade-unionist politics was the ttbourgeois politics of the 
working class1112 - the struggle for better working condi-
tions and better terms for workers in the sale of their 
labour, but definitely not in itself the "revolutionary 
8. Ibid. 
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9. Kassalow, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations, p. 44. 
10. V I Lenin, What Is To Be Done? 
Our Movement, s1xth rev1se 
Publlshers, 1964), p. 41. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid., p. 83. 
of 
struggle for freedom and for socialism". 13 
Trade unions appear to have influenced the ideol-
ogical development of the New Zealand Labour Party in 
the manner that Lenin and Michels would have predicted. 
In Lenin's terms, it has practised trade-unionist, rather 
than revolutionary Social-Democratic, politics. Compared 
with other working-class parties, the Labour parties in 
both New Zealand and Australia have been moderate ±n 
their objectives and, since they often represented "little 
more than the. aims of the trade unions with whom they had 
close connections", 14 have been "more purely worker-orien-
ted than s~cialist". 15 The dominant tendency among trade 
union delegates at the p~rty's annual conference is for 
them to support the status quo and defer to the views 
expressed by the party leadership - to a much greater 
degree than delegates representing other organizations. 16 
Trade unionists on the party's national executive are 
"much more cautious" 17 than other members in their policy 
preferences: they have been described as mostly "time-
servers",18 rubber-stamping decisions made elsewhere, 
ensuring that meetings are completed by lUnch-time, and, 
13. Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
14. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 
p. 137. 
15. Ibid. 
16. ·Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", 
pp. 336-37, 338-39. Douglas, Interview. 
17. Stan Rodger, Interview, Wellington, January 16, 
1975. 
18. Michael Hirschfeld, Interview, Wellington, December 
17' 1975. 
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above all, determined not to rock the boat. 19 
Although it adopted the socialization of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange as its objective 
in 1916 and retained it until 1951, the party, having 
been thus influenced by the trade union movement, falls 
within the same broad State humanitarian, but fundamen-
tally liberal, as opposed to socialist, ideological 
tradition that has dominated New Zealand political cul-
ture since the late nineteenth century. Hence Savage's 
statement in 1935 that the first Labour Government would 
complete the work that had been begun by Seddon. Ideol-
ogically, 'at least, the party and the trade unions have 
never been very .Par apar~, and, in the 1930's especially, 
with the former trade unionists dominant in the party 
leadership, they were virtually totally united. In 
Parliament, Labour Party MPs persistently expressed 
th . . t f ' " 20 Th ' d h " e unlon poln o vleW • e unlons an t e party 
made the same diagnosis of the causes of the depression -
underconsumption - and proposed the same Keynesian, 
rather than Marxist, remedy - expanded purchasing power. 
The trade unionist nature of the first Labour Government's 
objectives was nowhere better exemplified than at the 1946 
conference, at which Fraser enumerated its .Pour outstand-
ing achievements. In addition to the building of the 
social security system, they included the ending of unem-
ployment, the establishment of adequate wage-levels, and 
19. Hirschfeld claims that trade unionists organized 
his defeat in the party's national executive elec-
tions in 1972. 
20. stone, "A History of Trade Unionism", p. 162. 
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the introduction of the forty-hour week and paid 
holidays. 21 
As it had seen the need to broaden its electoral 
appeal if it was to be a successful Parliamentary party 
and as social problems became more pressing with the onset 
of the depression, the party had gradually retreated from 
its socialist objective and as early as 1928 had adopted 
an approach that was "pragmatic, utilitarian and reform-
ist •••• essentially urgent and immediate, less concerned 
with principles than with measures". 22 By 1933, the 
party's platform had, in effect, been discarded and 
' 
replaced by policies that were presented to the elector-
ate triennially in the election manifesto. Virtually no 
mention was made of any socialist objective which specific 
policies were designed to bring closer to realization. 
Indeed, the party's election manifesto in 1935 proclaimed 
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that Labour's objective was "to utilize to the maximum 
degree the wonderful resour~es of the Dominion". 23 Finally, 
in 1951, conference decided formally to abandon the orgi-
inal socialist objective, its replacement being ttto promote 
and protect the freedom of the people and their political, 
social, economic and cultural welfare 11 • 24 Since the 
21. NZLP, Report of the Thirtieth Annual Conference 
( 1 946 ) , p • 9 • 
22. Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 107. 
23. NZLP, "Labour Has A Plan", in Paul, Humanism in 
Politics, p. 165. 
24. Milburn, "Socialism and Social Reform in Twentieth-
Century New Zealand", Political Science 12 (September 
1 960) : 176. 
inclusion of its former 'purpose' with its objective 
in 1974, the party's objective has been not only to 
promote and protect the freedom and welfare of the 
people, but also to "educate the public in the principles 
of democratic socialism and economic and social co-oper-
ation; to elect ~ompetent men and women to Parliament 
~and local authorities for the purpose of giving effect 
to the party policy; and to ensure the just distribution 
of the production and services of New zealand for the 
benefit of all the people 11 • 25 The replacement of the 
original, specific socialist objective with one which 
is essentially open-ended and vague aptly symbolizes 
the transformation of La.bour from an 'ideological' into 
a 'pragmatic• party in its rhetoric as well as in its 
deeds. 
But the dilution of the party's socialist ideology 
is not adequately captured simply by modifications made 
to its objective. The latter has remained fundamentally 
unaltered since 1951, but the Labour Party, especially 
its leadership, talks much less of capitalism and social-
ism now than it did even then. In 1974, for example, the 
Prime Minister, Kirk, was able to write an article on 
the philosophy of the Labour Party without once using 
either term. 26 In a list of its principles drafted in 
1952, the party had declared that: 
••• For most of the last hundred years capitalism 
25. NZLP, Constitution and Rules, revised ed. (1975), 
p. 3. 
26. Norman Kirk, "The Philosophy of the Labour Party", 
in New Zealand Politics: A Reader, pp. 142-46. 
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has been the main enemy of the brotherhood 
of men. By placing the rights of property 
before the rights of man, capitalism enslaves 
humanity to economic forces. It divides class 
·against class, nation against nation, and race 
against race. It condemns millions to unemploy-
ment, economic exploitation and political oppres-
sion. World crisis, imperialism and war are among 
its inevitable consequences. 
The New Zealand Labour Party, as other 
Socialist parties, was born as a movement of 
protest against the diseases inherent in capitalist 
society •••• 
Labour aims to build a new society in freedom 
and by peaceful means. True socialism can be 
achieved only through democracy just as democracy 
can be fully realized only through socialism.27 
In the New Zealand Labour Party, as in the Western 
European Communist parties, "doctrinal impoverishment has 
reached the summit: the ·intellectual life of the leaders 
is remarkably restricted, no real theoretical and doc-
J 
trinal activity can be observed among them 11 • 28 
The Labour Party's retreat from socialism has been 
attributed largely to "the purely trade unionist approach 
to labour problems which has been a controlling influence 
in the party11 • 29 The great majority of the party's affil-
iated unions certainly supported its abandonment of its 
socialist objective and have consistently opposed its 
rest'oration - the Dunedin Operative Bootmakers' Union even 
tried to pers~ade conference to abolish or amend it as 
27. NZLP, "Principles of Labour", 1952. (Mimeographed.) 
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28. Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 175-76. In contrast, 
the first p·arty leader, Holland, wrote a large numher 
of pamphlets, including one on the Marxian theory of 
value, and kept a vast personal library of political 
literature. 
29. Milburn, "Socialism and Social Reform in Twentieth-
Century New Zealand", pp. 182-83. 
early as 1923. 30 The FOL's replacement of its socialist 
objective actually preceded the party's by two years. 
Furthermore, if a large number of trade union delegates 
had wanted the party to retain it, conference's decision 
in favour of its abandonment would not have been so 
clear-cut - a total of 159 votes was cast for the social-
ist objective and 359 against. Three unions - the 
Wellington Waterside Workers' Union (1958), the ASRS 
(1964) and the tramway employees' national union (1964 
and 1973) - ~ave since sought unsuccessfully to have the 
old objective restored. But the 1964 remit, for example, 
was lost by 354 card votes to ninety~three, the convener 
of the Constitution and Rules Committee having first 
complained that the adoption of the remit "would not 
only turn the clock back for over a quarter of a century 
but would also revive the old fears and misunderstandings 
which were associated with the aims and objects of the 
party during its earlier years".31 Evidently; very few 
union delegates disagreed. 32 
30. NZLP, Report of the seventh Annual Conference (1923), 
p. 11. . 
31. NZLP, Report of the Forty-eighth Annual Conference 
( 1 964) , p. 23 • 
32. A few trade unionists have been disaffected by the 
Labour Party's ideological transformation. The 
secretary of the FOL from 1944 to 1969, Kenneth 
Baxter, maintained that, of all the leaders of the 
Labour Party, only the first, Holland, had remained 
"faithful to the movement". The Labour Prime Minis-
ters - Savage, Fraser and Nash - only tried to "make 
the capitalist system work better than the capital-
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ists could themselves". (Christchurch Star, February 1, 
1969.) The president of the Auckland Boilermakers• 
Union attributes the party's abandonment of socialism 
to "sheer opportunism" and "the political expediency 
of individuals". (Finlay, Interview.) 
II. AUTONOMY FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY 
The trade unions• attitude toward the ideological 
transformation of the party indicates that if oligarchy 
has indeed precipitated the transformation, then the 
unions have supported, if not conspired to assist it. 
However, before we decide whether they have been the 
victims or perpetrators of oligarchy, what concrete 
evidence is there of a shift in the distribution of 
power away from the rank-and-file membership toward 
the party leadership and the Parliamentary party as a 
whole? 
Until Labour came to power in 1935, the annual 
conference was sovereign·, in the last instance, in the 
party's policy-making process. Although it does not 
seem to have initiated the bulk of the party's policy, 
no proposals could be incorporated into the party's elec-
toral platform without its prior approval. The policies 
spelt out in the platform were intended to be the 'planks' 
or steps toward the attaipment of the party's objective. 
Conference appears to have confined itself mainly to 
ratifying proposed policy, delegating the power to form-
ulat'e it to specially constituted committees. The party's 
1935 election policy, for example, was formulated by an 
elected policy committee comprising seven members, five 
of whom, significantly, were MPs. 
Labour's election to office rapidly diminished the 
influence of conference over party policy. The party 
leaders, Savage and Fraser, were quick to champion the 
responsibilities of the new administration to the wider 
electorate. As far as they were concerned, the govern-
ment would be bound by conference decisions only after 
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they had been included in an election manifesto that 
voters had given it a mandate to implement. 33 Fraser 
warned conference delegates in 1937 that he would be 
"dishonest" if he let them believe that "any resolution 
passed compelled the Government to do anything, regard-
less of consequences". 34 Simultaneously, .democracy was 
being subverted even within the PLP. 35 
Despite attempts to downgrade its role, however, 
conference did not immediately become impotent •. As 
party president, Roberts stressed that the PLP was 
accountab~e f9r its actions (or non-actions) to confer-
ence. The latter, he said, was "the parliament of the 
Labour Party" 36 and if MPs did not do what conference 
wanted, then it would find the men who would. Conference 
did actually combine with the party caucus to pressure 
Cabinet and an unwilling Minister of Finance, Nash, into 
nationalizing the Bank of New Zealand in 1945 and Prime 
Minister Fraser into taking the issue of compulsory 
military training to a national referendum in 1949. On 
isolated occasions since then, it has managed to commit 
the party leadership to policies about which the leaders 
had misgivings, but, on balance, it is much less powerful 
today than it was before 1935. In effect, it has retained 
"only minimal limitations over the freedom of action1137 
33. Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", p. 450. 
34. Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pp. 212-13. 
35. john A Lee, Simple on a Soapbox (Auckland: Collins, 
1963), pp. 55, 83-84, 98-101, 137-38. The essence 
of Le~'s account must be regarded as factual. 
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of the PLP. 
Although all the policy remits that conference 
endorses are referred directly or indirectly to the 
policy committee, only a minority of them reach the 
election manifesto and hardly any unmodified. 38 
Especially when the party is in power and the time has 
come for it to implement its policies, policy-oriented 
party members must compete with interest groups, govern-
ment departments and perceived public opinion to have 
the leadership accommodate their demands. In any event, 
the sovere~gnty of the policy committee in the party's 
policy-making process must be doubted. In one election 
year, 1960, the policy committee did not meet at all 
and the party's election policy was instead written by 
the Prime Minister, Nash, between the end of the Parlia-
mentary session and the opening of the campaign. 39 It 
did not meet for more than two years between 1970 and 
1972 and held very few meetings in 1975, another election 
year. 40 
Members of the hierarchy of the extra-parliamentary 
party have been left in no doubt as to the hegemony of 
the PLP over the rest of the party. Since 1935, according 
38. The policy committee is responsible for drafting the 
party's election manifesto, which contains its 
official policy for the next three years. Up until 
this year it included an equal number of representa-
tives (usually five each) from the PLP end the party's 
central executive. From 1976 onwards, it consists of 
"an equal number of representatives from the Annual 
Conference and the PLPt together with one representa-
tive of each of the Maori Policy Committee, the 
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Labour Women's Council and the Youth Advisory Council". 
NZLP, Constitution and Rules, revised ed. (1975), p. 27. 
39. Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", p. 391. 
40. Hirschfeld, Interview; Ditchfield, Interview. 
to one, there has been "an enormous shift of power"41 
within the party toward the MPs, who are happy to see 
the influence of both conference and the party•s affilia-
ted Unions decline, so that they can formulate policy 
more exclusively with a view to electoral success. 
According to a member of the national executive for all 
>\ 
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three years that the third Labour Government was in office, 
the behaviour of the PLP during that period was "totally 
independent 11 : 42 it completely ignored the views of other 
party organs~ including those of the national council, 
which, ac~ording to the constitution, is the party's 
"governing body when the conference is not in session 11 • 43 
As a result, "stand-up fights" 44 occurred at council 
meetings between representatives of the PLP and other 
members. Another member of the executive during the 
same period has affirmed that the PLP was autonomous 
of the council, while the party's youth advisory council 
41. Hirschfeld, Interview. 
42. Ditchfield, Interview. 
43. NZLP, ·constitution and Rules, revised ed. (1975), 
p. 24. The national council was until 1974 the 
•national executive• of the party. Required by 
the constitution to meet at least six times 
annually, it comprises fourteen regional repre-
sentatives, two women's representatives, a youth 
representative, a Maori representative, a Pacific 
Islanders' representative, and all members of the 
new national executive. The latter, which was 
formerly the 'central executive', meets monthly-
"or at more frequent intervals if required" - in 
lieu of the council. It includes the president 
of the party, the two vice-presidents, the general 
secretary and five other members, all of whom are 
elected by conference. Between the 1974 and 1975 
conferences, the national council actually met on 
eight occasions and the national executive on six. 
44. Ditchfield, Interview. 
complained in 1974 that: 
The party has come to be dominated by its 
parliamentary wing, for the executive has sadly 
neglected its function of bringing parliament-
arians to account •••• The executive is derided 
by members of parliament for its weakness. Only 
when the executive is prepared to demand that 
the Parliamentary Labour Party implement Conference 
decisions can we say that the party organization 
has any function whatsoever.45 
~ 
Trade union representation is now quite low in 
the FLP, but is still very high on the national council 
and (particularly) on the nation&l executive, whose 
collective power is much less in reality than in the 
constitution. In 1973-74 and again in 1974-75, as an 
example, three out of eight members of the executive 
were trade union secretar'i,es, two were MPs - one a 
former trade union president and the other 'of trade 
union persuasion' - and another was an office-holder 
in the largest union in the public service. On nine 
executive members in 1975-76, two were trade union 
secretaries, one was a trade union organizer, one again 
was from a public service union, and two were MPs of trade 
union origins or 'persuasion•. The strong trade union 
representation is attributable to two factors: (i) the 
executive is elected by annual conference on a card vote; 
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and (ii) a· large number of trade union secretaries, espec-
ially secretaries of national unions, reside and are employed 
in Wellington, which facilitates their attendance at the 
regular council and executive meetings. 
45. NZLP, Report of the Fifty-eighth Annual Conference 
(1974), p. 87. The national executive to which the 
youth council refers is now, of course, the national 
coucil. 
Even on these bodies, however, trade unionists 
and those 'of trade union persuasion' are not entirely 
dominant. The PLP has itself infiltrated the hierarchy 
of the extra-parliamentary party. Although the constitu-
tion explicitly provides only two seats for Parliamentar-
ians on the national council, other MPs may become members 
by being elected by conference to posts as ordinary mem-
bers of the executive or as party president or vice-pres-
ident. Since 1950, when Roberts• thirteen-year term as 
president ended, six party presidents out of eight have 
been MPs, one of the exceptional two, Martyn Finlay, 
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having served one term in the House before being elected 
to the presidency. Even before Roberts had become pres-
ident in 1937, nine presidents out of fifteen had come 
from the PLP. 46 Three factors may account for the 
(successful) candidature of MPs for positions in the 
extra-parliamentary party: (i). the availability of time, 
because politics is their career and they can devote their 
full attention to it; (ii) the availability of free travel, 
which confers advantages on them that have not normally 
been.enjoyed by other party office-holders; and (iii) 
generally greater individual competence, especially in 
the chairmanship of conference. It is noteworthy in 
this last respect that the last five leaders of the PLP 
- Fraser, Nash, Arnold Nordmeyer, Kirk and Rowling - were 
all previously presidents of the party. 
The PLP has thus reinforced its hegemony over the 
46. See Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 224. 
rest of the party by infiltrating precisely those 
organs and positions in the extra-parliamentary party 
from which it is meant to be kept in check. But how 
has the increase in its power affected trade unions 
affiliated to the party? Given the manner in which 
the social composition of the PLP has changed since 
the party was founded, trade unionists should have 
been much more influential in the party in the period 
before World War II than they are now. 
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOUR PARTY 
(1) The Hegemony of the Trade Unionists 
While the first Labour Government was in power, 
the leaders of the largest unions affiliated to the 
party undoubtedly co-operated with the leadership of 
the PLP in order to negate intra-party democracy. After 
the victory of 1935, caucus was split between, on the 
one hand, the leadership and Cabinet, which was overwhelm-
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ingly trade unionist in composition and enjoyed the support 
of the majority of affiliated unions, and, on the other, 
the 'left', which included a disproportionately high 
number of MPs who had been motivated in their support 
of the Labour Party by intellectual conviction rather than 
by working-class origins. 47 Although the caucus left 
fluctuated in size according to the issue at stake, seven-
47. Brown, "Labour Party", pp. 799-800. These MPs were 
'left-wing' in the sense that they favoured social-
ization of the means of exchange and the use of 
public credit to finance recovery from the depression. 
They did not advocate socialization of the means 
of production. 
teen MPs are reputed to have formed its 'hard core' •48 
One was a former housewife, one a former businessman, 
seven were former trade unionists and eight were former 
'professionals' (a writer, John A Lee, whose origins,· 
however, were distinctly proletarian; a barrister and 
solicitor; an engineering instructor; a doctor of medi-
cine andfour clergymen). The left thus contained a 
number of trade unionists fairly proportionate to their 
representation in the PLP (41 per cent, compared with 
45 per cent); a disproportionately low number of busi-
nessmen ~d farmers (six per cent, compared with 23 per 
cent), but an extremely high number of professional 
people (47 per cent, compared with 26 per cent of the 
PLP's entire membership). On the other hand, ten of 
the thirteen members of Cabinet, against which the left 
was battling to try to restore caucus control of the PLP, 
originated from the trade union movement (see Tables 1.2 
and 14). 
The power struggle between Cabinet and caucus reached 
a climax at the 1940 conference, at which Lee was expelled 
from the party. Many more trade union than branch votes 
were cast for Lee's expulsion. Shortly before his fate 
was debated, conference, by adopting the report of the 
national executive, radically altered the distribution of 
power at conference, enabling affiliated unions to cast 
a number of votes fully proportionate to their membership 
48. B S Taylor, "The Expulsion of J A Lee and Its Effects 
on the Development of the NZLP" (MA thesis, Univer-
sity of Canterbury, 1970), p. 7. 
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so long as they were represented by at least four 
delegates. 49 Not all the represented trade unions 
voted for Lee's expulsion, but all the large ones, 
such as the New Zealand Workers' Union (with fifty-
seven votes, twice as many as in 1939), the Hotel 
Workers' Federation (thirty-nine votes) and the NZWWF, 
did. Lee himself is convinced that the union delegates 
carried out his political assassination on behalf of 
the party leadership. In his view, a majority of the 
delegates on the conference floor had supported him 
and unio~ card votes had carried the motion expelling 
him by 546 votes to 344. In his political memoirs, he 
claimed: 
The branch members - the rank and file of the 
party - on the whole had been my supporters. 
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Card votes of the New Zealand Workers' Union, 
the Waterfront Federation, the Hotel and Restaurant 
Workers' Federation, the Seamen's and Miners' unions 
and the Clerical Workers• Union, the votes of many 0 
unconsulted memberships, settled my political life. 5 
Support for Lee's allegation is plentiful. In a 
letter of resignation from the party, the speaker and MP 
for Napier, William Barnard, told Prime Minister Fraser 
that he viewed with ·alarm the "growing political domina-
tion of some five or six powerful industrial chiefs 1151 
with whom Fraser and Cabinet had formed a close alliance. 
49. See Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pp. 210-11. 
50. Lee, Simple on a Soapbox, p. 197. 
51. Quoted in Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pp. 
209-10. Taylor, "The Expulsion of J A Lee", p. 36, 
·suggests that Lee's expulsion was actually planned 
by Fraser; the general secretary of the party, David 
Wilson; the president of the Seamen's Union, Walsh; 
and the Hotel Workers' Federation leader, Frederick 
Young. 
A Labour Party historian believes that the votes of the 
major affiliated unions had, in the end, proved decisive 
in securing Lee's expulsion,5 2 and a student of the 'Lee 
Affair' and its consequences argues similarly that: 
Though the vote on the expulsion motion was 
not a simple union versus branch confrontation, 
the decisive factor was probably the weight of 
votes cast by the big unions, whose leaders were 
closely allied with the political leadership of 
the Labour Party. The alliance~between the ruling 53 circle and the union leadership had proved crucial. 
Elsewhere it has been argued that, although the full 
card vote wa~ introduced on the initiative of the party 
leadershipin order to facilitate Lee•s expulsion, the 
effect of'the voting behaviour of the union delegates 
was to turn a narrow margin in favour of Lee's expulsion 
into "a very clear-cut one". 54 Whichever version is the 
most accurate, the actual circumstances of Lee's expulsion 
and the means by which it was carried out were rather less 
important than its consequences, which were profound. The 
party's branch membership fell by nearly 31 per cent from 
51,174 in 1940 to 35,481 in 1941. Although this was due 
as much, if not more, to the mobilization for World War 
II as to the expulsion of Lee, the cost of the latter in 
terms of alienated active party members was still great. 
To many of these members - the committed socialists, who 
constituted a large part of the party's backbone in the 
electorates - the expulsion of Lee was the "last straw"55 
ending any hppes that they may still have held that the 
party leadership would uphold intra-party democracy and 
52. Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 211. 
53. Taylor, "The Expulsion of J A Lee", p. 28. 
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54. Northey, "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", p. 338. 
55. Taylor, "The Expulsion of J A Lee", pp. 49-50. 
fully implement the policies for which the party had 
been given a mandate in both 1935 and 1938. The branch 
membership of the Labour Party has never recovered what 
it lost either in numbers or in intellectual activity 
between 1940 and 1941 (see Table 1). 
The end resu~t of this sudden and sharp decline in 
branch membership and the introduction of a full card 
vote at conference was that the hegemonic position of 
the few union and party leaders was consolidated. Despite 
the enactment. of compulsory unionism in 1936, affiliated 
membership of the Labour Party had increased no more 
. 
rapidly than branch membership between 1935 and 1940. 
As branch membership dec~ined in 1940, however, affilia-
ted membership actually rose .slightly from 185,431 to 
190,405, by which stage 97 per cent of the unionists 
affiliated to the FOL and 75 per cent of those registered 
under the IC & A Act were also members of the party (see 
Table 2). No union appears to have disaffiliated from 
the party as a protest against Lee's expulsion~ although 
a few, including the Wellington branch of the NZWWF and 
the Auckland Drivers' and Canterbury Freezing Workers' 
unions, expressed support for Lee and opposition to the 
methods employed to expel him. 56 The only prominent 
trade unionist to resign from the party was Norman Douglas, 
who was then secretary of the Auckland Trades Council.57 
As well as having debilitating consequences for the 
Labour Party, the expulsion of Lee, more than any other 
56. Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
57. Douglas, Interview. 
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single event, signified the emergence in the labour 
movement o£' an oligarchy comprising a few political 
leaaers, notably Fraser and Wilson, who was later 
·elevated to Cabinet via the Legislative Council, and 
a few trade union leaders, including Walsh, Roberts, 
McLagan, Young and the secretary of the New Zealand 
1tJorkers' Union, Richard Eddy. 58 Thus, in the 1930 • s 
and 1940's, trade unions were accomplices in the 
oligarchical leadership of the party. Oligarchy dis-
advantaged th~ party professionals - the 'intellectuals' 
such as Lee. 
(2) The Hegemony of the 'Intellectuals' 
By 1975, however, the distribution of power among 
the various social groups within the Labour Party had 
undergone a remarkable transformation. As we saw in 
the first chapter, former professional employees have 
now eclipsed former manual workers and trade union 
secretaries as the most powerful group within the PLP. 
Between 1935 and 1975, the proportion of Labour Party 
MPs in the former category increased from 21 to 31 per 
cent, while those in the latter category declined from 
45 to 31 per cent (see Table 12). over the same period, 
the proportion of trade unionists among those MPs occupy-
ing the party's thirty safest seats fell by over 50 per 
cent (see Table 13). In Cabinet, ten ministers between 
1935 and 1940 had trade union backgrounds and only one 
had been professionally employed. In the third Labour 
Government, on the other hand, the former professionals 
in Cabinet outnumbered those whose origins were in the 
58. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present 
p. 1 
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trade union movement (see Table 14). Moreover, in the 
'higher circles• of Cabinet, the professionals were 
completely dominant. After the death of Prime Minister 
Kirk, the top Cabinet committee, the Policy and Priorities 
Committee, did not contain a single minister with a trade 
union background (see Table 25). 
TABLE 25 
POLICY AND PRIORITIES COMMITTEE OF CABINET, 1975 
WE 
R J 
w w 
AM 
A J 
c J 
J A 
. Member 
Rowling 
Tizard 
Freer 
Finlay 
Faulkner 
Moyle 
Walding 
occupation 
School teacher and lecturer. 
School teacher and lecturer. 
Journalist and company secretary. 
Barrister and solicitor. 
Sales clerk and credit manager. 
School teacher and farmer. 
Businessman. 
This transformation assumes even greater significance 
when we recall that the PLP is now rather more dominant 
over the extra-parliamentary party than it was while the 
first Labour Government was in office. In any event, 
the ability of affiliated trade unions to exercise 
influence over the proceedings of the party's annual 
conference was probably less between 1972 and 1975 than 
it had been in any other period in the party's history. 
There is thus a sound basis in fact for the trade union 
assertion that the third Labour Government, particularly 
after the death of Kirk, was dominated by 'intellectuals•. 59 
59. The label 'intellectual', however, is undeserved 
and if anything, flatters the party leaders. See 
Ovenden, "On the Absence of Political Ideas", pp. 
192-94. 
Just as fewer former manual workers and trade 
union administrators have been recruited into the PLP 
and the party leadership, so, too, has the manual 
working-class element in the party's branch membership 
seemed to diminish. Some tentative evidence of the 
gradual withdrawal of the manual working-class from 
participation in the Labour Party is presented in 
Table 26. Whereas the party's overall branch member-
ship declined between 1940 and 1975 by about 72 per 
cent (from 51·, 174 to 14,247; see Table 1), total member-
ship of some twenty-five selected branches in predomin-
. 
antly working-class electorates or districts fell by 
more than 78 per cent. The Grey Lynn, Otahuhu, Napier, 
Westport and Port Chalmers branches - all of them in 
undoubtedly working-class districts and among the biggest 
in the party in 1940 - recorded membership decreases over 
the period ranging from 87 to 94 per cent, far in excess 
of the average decline. The expulsion of Lee (who was 
from Grey Lynn), the divisive issue of conscription (which 
records reveal may have cost the party more than 11,000 
members) in 1949, the disappointing performance of the 
second Labour Government - these factors and others, such 
as the eradication of visible poverty and fading memories 
of the depression, seem to have taken their toll of the 
Labour Part'y•s working-class branch membership. In these 
areas, the party has evidently failed to renew itself. 
The impression thus gained that the composition of 
the Labour Party's branch membership has become less and 
less working-class and probably more and more middle-class 
is strengthened by Table 27, which reveals that a far 
174 
TABLE 26 
MEMBERSHIP OF s:~Li~CTED LABOUH PARTY BRANC}ffiS 
. 
IN WORKING-CLASS EL~CTORATES, 1930-75 
-
Branch 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 
. 
1959 1965 1970 1975 
Auckland Central 18 18 135 62 50 58 55 52 75 58 
Grey Lynn 200 53 509 145 120 106 85 58 67 J2 
Grey Lynn V·. est 
- - - - -
141 
-
41 
Onehunga 
-
12 400 108 211 
Onehunga Central 
- - - - -
185 156 158 83 148 
Onehunga North 
- - - - - 54 55 
Otahuhu. 116 17 276 50 190 195 55 
Otahuhu West :·avona 
- - - - - - -
49 JO J6 
Napier 246 153 452 J64 179 235 222 lC:O _// 49 56 
Vianganui 127 21+ 358 81 239' 329 182 18.2 57 94 
Wanganui :Last Jl 2 116 71 110 75 5.7 64 39 44 
Westport 69 lJl 504 231 276 )3 60 '217 135 46 
Runanga 
- -
140 99 210 195 105 58 50 
Greymouth 110 43 253 154 242 110 130 100 42 40 .... 
....,J 
V1 
TAHL~ Zb - ContlnUGu 
Branch 1930 1935 1940 1950 1955 1959 1965 19 1975 
Hornby (-Islington) 
-
10 33 15 61 . 0 288 10 35 38 
Linwood 
- -
166 69 57 24 - - - 51 
lton 11 62 286 2 162 209 224 294 155 
Timaru 12 53 640 371 281 
Timaru Central 
- - - - - 125 208 138 130 
.End 
-
- - - 139 103 125 100 
Timaru South 
-
- - - 267 157 - 63 152 159 
din Central 
- 52 142 28 - - - - -
din 64 222 - 51 57 20 
din South 50 130 201 163 140 245 0 153 ... ~ 
rort Jrners - 444 124 185 7 130 98 43 53 
tal 842 5327 2348 3177 3057 2391 77 1457 1153 
S '""'S: , Annex to the Annual ~ieports of the National Executive, 1930-1940. 
l•agate:s Attending Annual Conferences, 1945-75. 
·,c 1 'vd·inancia1. 
..... 
---..) 
0'1 
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greater proportion of the Labour Party's biggest branches 
are now to be found in seats that, after the 1972 election, 
were held marginally - as many by National as by Labour. 
If the classification were to be made on the basis of 
results of the 1975 election, none of the Labour Party's 
twenty biggest branches - with the possible exception of 
Porirua-Kapiti Samoan (twentieth equal) -would be 
located in a safe Labour seat, of which there remained 
seven (excluding four Maori seats). The proportion of 
the party's policy-oriented branches that are located in 
working-class branches is possibly even smaller. As 
. 
Table 28 indicates, almost 25 per cent of the remits 
' 
considered by the annual.conference in the period from 
1971 to 1975 inclusive originated from branches which 
contained little more than one-thousandth of the party's 
total membership, branch and affiliated. More startling 
still, seven of the eight branches are in safe or marginal 
National seats - Karori (Wellington) and North Shore 
(Auckland), which are both safe, and Wellington Central, 
which is marginal. These branches are somewhat paradoxi-
cally among the most radical in the party- the party's 
left7wing conscience, once found in the working-class 
branches such as Grey Lynn, now appears to reside in 
branches which consist largely of young people - students, 
f . 1 d d . 60 pro esslona s, an aca emlcs. 
Above all else, this transformation of the Labour 
Party into a political organization with an overwhelmingly 
60. Northey records that the changing composition of 
the Labour Party during the 1960's ·was reflected 
in a ".much higher ratio of middle-income to low-
income people among its activists and conference 
delegates". "The Annual Conferences of the NZLP", 
p. 241. Cf. Hindess, The Decline of Working-Class 
Politics, pp. 8-9. 
27 
1~NTY IA3G 'l' 
B~Nl~H.r-::S, 1940 ,J 1975 
l9LJ-O 1975 
1 i Branch Electorate . .l.. r-~embers Branch ~':lee tora te ?.'iembers 
l. Timaru SL 640 l. New Zealand Tongan 
-
321 
2. Oamaru ;'1L 535 2. r-.riramar rem 214 
3- Grey Lynn SL 509 3. L~ahora ;.:L 213 
4. v. estr,ort <""T 0.:L: 504 4. Gisborne 193 
5- Napier "'T 0JJ 452 5. Victoria University l~:1I'~ 167 
6. Port Chalmers SL 444 6. Levih r1~N 165 
7- Patea N lt-22 New Zealand Samoan - 165 
8. New Lynn SL 413 8. Hastings lVrL 164 
9. Inverccrgill SL 402 V.aiheke ·Island SL 164 
10. Onehunga SL 400 10. ~'Pimaru South SL 159 
11. "~asterton T'=L 373 11. Blockhouse Bay SL 158 
12. Wanganui SL 358 12. Lyttelton SL 155 
_. 
--..] 
(X) 
TABLE 27 - Continued 
1940 1975 
Branch Electorate Members Branch Electorate 
13. Whangarei ML 333 Maraenui SL 
. 
14. Birkenhead SL 332 14. Onehunga Cen:tral SL 
15. Auckland East SL 308 15. Temuka IV!N 
16. Balclutha N 301' 16. Geraldine-Orari MN 
Hamilton ML 301 17. Papanui MN 
18. Lytte1ton SL 286 18. Whangarei ML 
19. New Plymouth rJIL 285 19. Golden Bay· ML 
20. Shannon NIL 284 20. Porirua-Kapiti Samoan SL 
Timaru Central SL 
SOURCES: NZLP, "Annex to the Annual Report of the National Executive," 1940; 
."Delegates Attending 1975 Annual Conference," 1975. 
Members 
155 
148 
147 
146 
144 
133 
131 
130 
130 
...A 
-...3 
'-0 
TABLE 27 - Continued 
1 Electorates in which branches were situated have been classified according 
to the results of the 1938 and 1972 general elections res~ectively: SL safe Labour 
(i.e., would fall only if swing against party exceeded 7%); ML marginal Labour 
(i.e., vulnerable to swing against party of up to and including 7%); SN safe 
National; r.m marginal National.· .Swing has been calculated on basis of majority 
as proportion of total vote in electorate. 
.... 
CD 
0 
TABLE 28 
CONF2:REI'TC tt: 1{[:;~,, ITS SELECTED OUR 
PARTY BRANCHES, 1971-75 
1 J''Iembers Branch torate 
1975 1971 1972 
Road SN 15 54 88 
Karori SN 10 
-
10 
Karori Electorate SN 36 
- -
North Shore Youth SN 14 
- -
Princes Street SL 70 12 39 
Tamaki Youth SN 13 - -
The Terrace T':TN 36 18 29 
Thorndon r.m 24 
- -
Total 218 84 166 
'f all members 0.11 
ry, of all 17.0 33.4. 
SOURCES: NZ , Annual Conference Remit Papers, 1971-75; 
" lq~ates Attending 1975 Annual Conference," 1975. 
1 See note to Table 27. 
!\emits 
1973 1974 
35 25 
20 13 
32 -
27 
-
47 39 
- -
30 
-
2 
191 105 
23.3 15.6 
1975 
57 
. 13 
24 
18 
42 
52 
49 
34 
289 
30.6 
Total 
259 
56 
56 
45 
179 
52 
152 
36 
835 
24.3 
~ 
co 
~ 
•professional', middle-class leadership and a predom-
inantly middle-class active branch membership has sown 
the seeds of discord which began to germinate, but 
barely surfaced publicly, while the third Labour Govern-
ment was'in power. The immediate cause of the discord 
'' 
was not any disagreement over the party's ~asic orienta-
tion, which remained essentially pragmatic and, in that 
sense, in the trade unionist tradition, but rather an 
absence of liaison between a very dominant PLP and a 
very subordinate extra-parliamentary party. According 
to a trade union secretary in the hierarchy of the extra-
parliament'ary party, the PLP did not seek the advice of 
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affiliated trade unions on any of the industrial relations 
legislation that it enacted, not even on that which affected 
the vital interests of unions. 61 Not only the party's 
national council, but also the industrial relations sub-
committee of the executive, the Joint Council of Labour 
and the policy committee were ignored on industrial rela-
tions issues as the PLP "went off on its own tacku. 62 
The party's industrial relations policy was the last sec-
tion to be prepared for inclusion in its manifesto before 
the 1975 election. It was devised and written solely by 
the Minister of Labour, Arthur Faulkner, who consulted 
neither the,JCL, the policy committee, the industrial 
relations sub-committee nor - probably - the FOL over its 
contents. 63 
61. Ditchfield, Interview. However, this does not exclude 
the possibility that there was regular consultation 
with the FOL leadership. 
62. Ditchfield, Interview. 
63. Di tchfield, Interview; Rodger,, Interview.. The Auckland 
Star reported on December 3, 1975 that FOL president, 
Skinner, saw the manifesto only after it had been 
printed and he had requested a copy. 
Thus, the only time that most trade union leaders 
saw any members of the PLP was before the 1975 election, 
when they were visited by delegations of Parliamentarians 
requesting financial contributions for the party's cam-
paign fund. The fact that some Cabinet ministers "just 
did not want to know" them, but still wanted "our money 
and our W"eight" 64 angered trade unionists. Hence the 
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disagreements between Parliamentarians and trade unionists 
at meetings of the national council and the trade unionists• 
determinatio~ to defeat what they perceived to be attempts 
by the PLP to diminish their influence within the party • 
. 
As the PLP has become increasingly dominant over the 
rest of the party, it has itself become dominated more 
and more by its middle-class members, by the professionals, 
or 'intellectuals' whom the trade unionists in the party 
distrust. ·This, in essence, is the history of the develop-
ment of the Labour Party since the end of World War II, 
and is also one of the reasons why the party has retained 
the allegiance of fewer and fewer trade unions. 65 For, 
apart from the fact that full employment has made them 
feel stronger and able to be more self-reliant and the 
additional fact that they found it increasingly advantageous 
to emulate the characteristically non-partisan stance of 
most other interest groups, trade unionists have seen 
control of the Labour Party slip into the hands of MPs 
whom they tend to regard as aliens. 
64. Ditchfield, Interview. 
65. Ditchfield, Interview. 
The behaviour of the second as well as the third 
Labour Government reinforced the leaders of affiliated 
trade unions in this attitude. There was little in the 
legislative output of either administration.to enthuse 
t d . . t 66 ra e un1on1s s. As an example, the president of the 
Auckland Boilermakers• Union, the most policy-oriented of 
all the unions affiliated to the party, cited the Annual 
Holidays Amendment Act, which extended the minimum annual 
leave for employees from two to three weeks, as the only 
significant legislative advance achieved for the trade 
union movement by the third Labour Government. 67 Very 
. 
little consultation took place between the trade unions 
and the second Labour Government, which knew that whether 
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they were consulted or not, the unions would neither welcome 
nor readily accept the measures that it envisaged imptemen-
ting- as in the •Black ·Budget•. The PLP, in any case, 
was anxious to assert its independence from the industrial 
wing of the movement. 68 
Both Nash, in his term as party leader from 1950 to 
1963, and Nordmeyer, his successor, tried to turn the 
Labour Party il)to a national, as opposed to a·class, party. 69 
66. On the industrial relations record of the third 
Labour Government, see Don. J Turkington, tt Indus-
trial Relations", in Labour in Power, pp. 50-60. 
67. Finlay, Interview. 
68. Hirschfeld, Interview. 
69. Barry Gustafson, Interview, Auckland, December 5, 
1975. 
The philosophy of Nordmeyer, who was architect of the 
party's controversial 'new look•, was that New Zealand 
society was· classless, or else entirely middle-class, 
and that there was therefore "no place today for what 
. 70 
used to be known as the class struggle". In 1965, 
however, he was ousted from the leadership by tirk, who, 
as the candidate of a trade union •group in the PLP, is 
said to have had the support of the trade union movement 
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in his bid. 71 The following year Norman Douglas was 
elected president of the party and, with tirk and Douglas 
at the helm, the party set out to secure the re-affiliation 
of some of the unions that Nash and Nordmeyer had alienated 
($ee years 1965 to 1970 ·in Table 2). 
Kirk and Douglas actually achieved their major success 
in 1965, when, with the party secretary, Alan McDonald, 
they addressed the biennial conference of the Hotel Workers' 
Union and persuaded it to resume an active role within the 
party after it had not paid affiliation fees for five 
years. 72 By 1971, however, the historical trend toward 
union withdrawal from the party was beginning to re-assert 
itself~ Douglas had been succeeded as party president 
in 1970 by future Prime Minister, Wallace Rowling, whose 
elevation in the hierarchy of the extra-parliamentary party 
had been delayed for some three years by a lack of trade 
70. 
71. 
72. 
Quoted in Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past 
and Present, p. 157. 
Gustafson, Interview. 
Douglas, Interview; NZLP, Report of the Fortf-ninth 
Annual Conference (1965), p. 8. The union e £ectively 
disaffiliated itself from the·party as a response 
to provisions of the 'Black Budget' which it believed 
would reduce employment opportunities in hotels and 
restaurants. 
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union support for his candidature at conference. 73 
· Meanwhile, having led the party unsuccessfully at two 
elections, in .1966 and 1969, tirk was anxious to put 
as.much distance as possible between the party and 
unpopular trade unions. In 1971, the New Zealand Seamen's 
Union disaffiliated from the party because of the PLP's 
attitude toward the punitive Shipping and Seamen's 
Amendment Bill proposed by the National Government and 
toward the deregistration of the union for its resist-
ance to the bill's enactment and implementation. The 
disaffiliation of a union which had been one of the first 
to join the party - in 1919 - signified how the party 
had been totally transformed from its origins. 
73. In three successive vice-presidential elections, 
Rowling is alleged to have gained the votes of about 
three-quarters of the branch delegates, while most 
of the big affiliated unions cast block votes for 
a former trade union president in the PLP, Henry 
May. See Northey, 11 The Annual Conferences of the 
NZLP", p. 333. 
CONCLUSION 
THE DEATH. OF A WORKING-CLASS PARTY 
The wheel has thus turned a full circle in sixty 
years. Trade unions are now dominated, rather than 
dominant, in the Labour Party, although they have, in 
the main, acquiesced in their domination. Whatever 
the indicator, trade union involvement in the party 
has fallen away sharply in the period since World War 
II. In 1975, in percentage terms, less than half as 
many trade unionists were affiliated to the Labour 
Party as well as to the FOL as in 1941; less than half 
as many trade unions were affiliated to the party as in 
1941; barely a third as many annual conference delegates 
were trade unionists as in 1945; less than a third as 
many members of the PLP were former manual workers and 
trade union officials as in 1919; and just under half 
as many members of the Labour Cabinet were former trade 
unionists as in 1935. Trade unionists were completely 
dominant in the leadership of the first Labour Government -
but non-existent on the most important Cabinet committee 
in the third. The Joint Council of Labour met on twenty-
two occasions between 1952 and 1957 - but only twice 
between 1970 and 1975· In so many ways, the Labour Party 
in 1975 was very much less the party of the organized 
,working class- and very much more the party of the sal-
aried middle class - than it had been at the beginning of 
World War II. 
The overall tendency has clearly been for trade 
unions to opt out, rather than be pushed out, of the 
Labour Party. Their declining interest in participation 
in the party has manifested itself in the declining pro-
portion of conference remits that they originate, in 
their general support for the status quo at conference, 
in the declining number of prominent trade unionists 
seeking to advance union interests in Parliament, and 
in the FOL leadership's preparedness to let the Joint 
Council become obsolete - to cite only some examples. 
The growing political indifference of the trade 
unions could also be. inferred from the decline in the 
value of their financial allocations to the Labour Party. 
'The annual capitation fee paid by affiliated trade union-
ists to the party was increased from 3d in 1916 to 1/6d 
in 1942, but then remained unchanged until 1974, when it 
was raised from fifteen to twenty cents on a conference 
card vote in which some union delegates opposed the 
increase. For their fees to have retained the same value 
as they had haq in 1942, affiliated unionists would each 
have had to contribute 54 cents, instead of 15 cents, to 
the party in 1973. Although trade unions reputedly still 
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provide the Labour Party with its "solid basis of finan-
cial support 111 (which may account for its apparent poverty) , 
the party is much less reliant on the unions for funds to 
fight elections than was the case in the inter-war years. 
In the 1930's, unions provided the party with "the bulk" 2 
1. Isbey, Interview. 
2. Bentley, "Trade Union Financial Assistance to the 
NZLP", P• 5. 
of its election campaign funds. In its report in 1939, 
the party's national executive acknowledged "the immense 
value" 3 of trade union contributions to the party's 1938 
campaign fund. The NZWWU that year contributed £1,500, 
the New Zealand Workers' Union£. 2, 809, the Hotel Workers • 
Federation a:2, 500, and the ASRS £1 ,ooo. 4 In 1969, how-
ever, affiliated trade unions and the FOL together gave 
only $3,000 to the Labour Party's election campaign fund -
.less than was given by a single in~urance company. 5 Just 
as the two major political parties have come to look much 
more alike in their policies and Parliamentary personnel, 
' 
so have their financial backers. General elections in 
New Zeal~d today are funded almost totally by business. 6 
The withdrawal of the trade unions Prom participa-
tion in the Labour Party has resulted Prom the coincidence 
of a characteristic specifically of the economy of post-
war New Zealand and three powerful, on-going and mutually 
reinforcing historical processes: the transformation of 
the trade union movement itself (brought about not only 
by technological and economic change, but also by a 
legislative measure, compulsory unionism); the evolution 
of the FOL into an increasingly independent and effective 
interest group, tending to the interests of trade unionists 
regardless of which party is in power; and the growing 
domination of an increasingly autonomous PLP by its pro-
fessional, middle-class members. Although we cannot rank 
3. Quoted ibid., p. 20. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Gustafson, Interview. 
6. Gustafson, Interview. 
them in order of explanatory ·power or state categor-
ically that they alone account for the phenomenon we 
have attempted to explain, these three processes have 
all contributed to the decline in trade union partici-
pation in the Labour Party. so, too, has the success 
with which the unions have been able to pursue econom-
istic objectives under full employment, which has pre-
vailed for virtually the entire post-war period. 
The narrow scope of the unions' objectives - their 
almost exclusive preoccupation with economism - must 
occupy a central position in any explanation of their 
declining ·interest in the Labour Party. What the unions 
have achieved is in itself much less important than what 
they have achieved in relation to what they have sought. 
It is as if the trade unionist, as Mann argues, "takes 
what he can easily get and attempts to reduce the salience 
of what is denied him ... 7 Economistic objectives have been 
fairly easily attained by industrial action, but what 
-
would have happened if, for historical and sociological 
reasons, New Zealand unions had focused-their attention 
on more wide-ranging issues of, say, workers' control and 
public ownership of industry? Could industrial action 
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have realized objectives of this nature? Since they would 
have challenged capitalism itself, the answer is an unequi-
vocal •no•. The decline in trade union involvement in the 
Labour Party, of which full employment has been a major 
cause, rests ultimately, therefore, on the trade unions' 
(implicit) recognition of the legitimacy of the capitalist 
'7• Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the·western 
Working Class, p. 32. 
structure of industry, on the acceptance by the organized 
working class of the so-called 'ideology of hegemonic 
capitalism•. 
There is widespread approval among trade unionists 
in at least one capitalist society, Britain, for the 
separation of industrial and political action that the 
ideology of hegemonic capitalism demands. Fully 48 per 
cent of all the respondents who were trade union members 
1 91 
in one survey disapproved of the relationship which existed 
between trade unions and the British Labour Party and said 
that they should be kept separate. 8 In another, 67 per 
cent of the working-class respondents whose ideological 
orientations were •radical' and a much higher proportion 
of those with other orientations agreed with the notion 
that trade unions "should stay out of politics and just 
try to improve pay and conditions". 9 In the United States 
and Britain at least, the trade union is viewed by the 
great majority of industrial workers as a means of 
"improving their standard of living, and not as an agency 
for transforming the social structure, or even as a way 
to greater worker participation in the affairs of the 
8. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Political 
Attitudes and Behaviour, p. 28. 
g. Bob Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British 
Political Culture (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1974), p. 219. The more widespread disapproval of 
the union-party relationship among Jessop's than 
among Goldthorpe et al's respondents is probably 
attributable partly to the fact that the 'affluent' 
workers in the latter survey were all employed in 
larqe factories, whose work routines tend to intensify 
class consciousness. For a critique of the research · 
design of the 'Affluent Worker' studies, see Ivor 
Crewe, "The Politics of 'Affluent• and 'Traditional' 
Workers in Britain: An Aggregate Data Analysis", 
British journal of Political Science 3 (January 1973): 
29-52. 
enterprise". 10 
Since the ideology of hegemonic capitalism also 
tends to be antagonistic toward trade unionism ~tself, 
there is some evidence that it is even more deeply 
ingrained in the New Zealand political culture than in 
those of Britain and the United States. In a nation-
wide survey in New Zealand in 1975, only 8.8 per cent 
of 2,000 respondents expressed '.full trust and confidence• 
in trade unions, half as many as had a similar attitude 
toward manufacturers and a quarter as many as had a 
similar attitude toward employers. 11 Even in the United 
States, where the hegemony of capitalism is normally con-
sidered to be most ·adv~ced, trade unions enjoyed the 
trust and confidence of 23 per cent of the respondents 
in a similar poll. Of the fact that the ideology of 
hegemonic capitalism has tightened its grip in post-war 
New Zealand, there can be no doubt. The organized work-
ing class in this country has never been so 'unconscious' 
of alternative social structures (to the capitalist 
structure which exists) as it is today. 
If the processes which have split the trade unions 
off.from the Labour Party continue to operate, then we 
must expect trade union involvement in the party further 
192. 
to decline. But there are alternative paths of develop-
ment. Firstly, a determined and protracted effort by a 
National Government fully to exploit the anti-trade union 
strand in the hegemonic ideology could well revive trade 
union interest in the party. The anti-union rhetoric of the 
11. Christchurch Star, June 13, 1975. 
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National Party while it was in opposition from 1972 
to 1975 was certainly a major factor influencing the 
FOL's decision to back the Labour Party "to the hilt"12 
in the 1975 election. However, with important exceptions, 
as in 1951, the National Party in office is a different 
proposition to the National Party in opposition. The 
former usually chooses not to alienate the trade union 
·movement, but rather to integrate the FOL into the decision-
making process, where it can be implicated in policy form-
ulation and, ~opefully, manipulated in order to minimize 
costly industrial conflict. In any event, the threat of 
the enactment of punitive industrial relations legisla-
tion by a National Govern.ment did not suddenj.y jolt the 
trade unions out of their political somnolence in 1975. 
With the possible exception of one solitary union, the 
trade unionists who campaigned for the party did so as 
individuals in their respective electorates. 13 Moreover, 
the last time that trade unions clashed with a National 
Government in virtual industrial war, the Labour Party's 
response to the disunity of organized labour which char-
acterized it caused not an increase, but rather a very 
sudden and very substantial decrease in union involve-
ment in the party. 
A second alternative is that the material prosperity 
that has helped sustain trade union economism in the post-
war period may break down, in which eventuality demands 
would doubtless be heard for greater social control of 
12. Ibid., September 26, 1975. 
13. Wybrow, Interview. According to Norman Douglas, 
the Engineers• Union actually campaigned as a union 
for Labour's re-election. 
the economy - as Mann suggests would be the case in 
capitalist societies generally. 14 This happened in 
New Zealand, of course, in the 1930's. A recurrence 
of material poverty is also likely to be accompanied 
by a recurrence of high-level unemployment and trade 
union industrial weakness, which would almost certainly 
rekindle the unions• interest in political action and 
the Labour Party. But would the Labour party again 
represent the political interests of trade unions as 
effectively as it did in the 1930's? 
The answer, very likely, is that it would not. 
The content of the hegemonic ideology (unless its hege-
mony were to collapse along with material prosperity) 
requires the Labour Party to dissociate itself from the 
trade unions if it is to maximize its prospects of elec-
toral success. In the case of the Seamen's Union, for 
example, the Labour Party indicated its preference for 
maximizing (middle-class) votes above maximizing its 
support in the trade union movement. The Labour Pa~ty 
could not say in the 1970's, as it did in the 1930's, 
that it had "never failed the industrial movement", that 
it had supported the trade unions "in every crisis that 
had arisen in the Dominion". 15 
Quite apart from the constraints imposed by the 
pursuit of electoral success, however, the transformed 
social composition of the PLP, in which power in the 
14. Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western 
Working Class, p. 70. 
15. Walter Nash, in NZLP, Report of the Fourteenth 
Annual Conference (1930), p. 10. 
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Labour Party is effectively centralized, means that 
its members' innate predispositions toward trade unions 
are less benevolent than they once were. In the trade 
unions• absence, other social groups have converged upon 
the Labour Party and turned it into their political 
vehicle. Former manual workers and trade union officials 
in the PLP barely outnumber businessmen and farmers now 
and are actually .outnumbered by former professionals. 
There were isolated manifestations of trade union dis-
content with their waning influence vis-a-vis the party 
'intellectuals' during the term of office of the third 
Labour Government and after its defeat. Notably, the 
controversy which raged for some months over candidate 
selection in the Dunedin North electorate developed 
after trade unionists had taken over. the local LEC in 
order to ensure that another 'intellectual' was not 
recruited into the PLP. Equally notably, however, a 
trade unio~ist did not, in the end, win the party's nom-
ination for the seat. Four days after the November 30 
election, it was prophesied that trade unions would move 
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"swiftly and powerfully to rebuild their diminished author-
i ty",16 in the Labour Party in the wake of its defeat. 
Unidentified •senior' and 'influential' trade unionists, 
believed, as did trade unionists generally, according to 
a unionist on the party's national executive.that the 
J 
party had been 'white-anted' by its "airy-fairy intellec-
tuals11.17 Furthermore, they believed that the time had 
come for the trade unions to do something about it. 
16. Auckland Star, December 3, 1975 
17. Ditchfield, Interview. 
Given the strength of the middle-class groups 
in the PLP and the still great latent power of the 
unions at the party's annual conference and on the 
national executive, it is conceivable that, if a major 
intra-party 'class' conflict were to eventuate, it 
would originate in a concerted trade union attempt to 
restore intra-party democracy, which, in the l~st forty 
years, has been drastically eroded. But the unions 
could not reverse an historical process and undo what 
has been wrought over a period of thirty or more years. 
The odds in any such conflict would so heavily favour 
the middl·e-class groups now ascendant in the power 
structure of the party that, in its aftermath, the 
trend toward union withdrawal from participation in 
the party would likely accelerate. The party would then 
become still more middle-class and still less working-
class. 
Further substantial decline in either its affiliated 
or branch membership would be fatal for the Labour Party 
as a mass-membership political organization, for, in 
this sense, it was moribund in 1975. Controlling for 
population growth, the party's branch membership was 
only 15 per cent of what it was in 1940 (see Table 29). 
At about 2:100, the party's ratio of individual members 
to voters was about one-third of that of the British 
Labour Party, whose own ratio is by far the lowest for 
all the social-democratic parties in Europe. 18 so low 
was branch membership that the party's ability to organize 
18. See Tom Forester, "Labour's Local Parties", 
New Society 33 (September 25, 1975): 695. 
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TABLE 29 
THE DECLINE OF THE LABOUR PARTY 
.AS A MASS PARTY, 1940-75 
Year ]';~embers 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1959 
1965 
1970 
1975 
51,174 
20,340 
·38,155 
38, 26'1 
30,052 
1'(,812 
13,384 
14,247 
1940 236,605 
1945 157,263 
1950 213,068 
1955 174,202 
1959 172,925 
1965 185,414 
1970 203,2 74 
1975 198,903 
Labour1 % Voters Members 
Branch Membership 
.513,397 9.97 
536,994' 3.79 
506,100 ?.54 
484,082 ?.90 
508,179 j.91 
499,392 3.57 
592,035 2.26 
636,322 2.24 
Total Membership 
Total2NZ .% Pop. Members 
1,72?,817 1.18 
1, 927,629 1. 98 
2,164,734 1.77 
2 I 3591 746 1. 2 7 
2,663,843 0.67 
2,852,137 0.47 
3,105,400 0.46 
513,397 46.09 1,633,645 14.48 
536,994 29.29 1,727,817 9.10 
506,100 42.10. 1,927,629 11.05 
484,082 35.99 2,164,734 8.05 
508,179 34.03 2,359,746 7.33 
499,392 37.13 2,663,843 6.96 
592,035 34.30 2,852,137 7.12 
636,)22 31.26 3,105,400 6.41 
SOUHC;;,s: NZLP, Annex to the Annual Reports of 
the National Executive, 1940-45; Delegates Attending 
Annual Conferences, 1950-75. Thomas T. Mackie and 
charc; Rose, The International Almanac of 1Hectoral 
History (London: r.~acnillan, 1974), pp. 296, 300. 
Department of Statistics, New Zealand: Population and 
:igration 1971-72 (~ellington: Government Printer, p. 16. 
1 At closest election. 
2 As at December 31, except 1975 (~~rch 31). 
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its potential supporters for electoral purposes -
the most important activity of a pragmatic party -was 
open to consider~ble doubt. The battle between the two 
major political parties seemed to be becoming increasingly 
unequal. As the Labour Party had been transforming from 
a mass into a cadre party, substituting funds from busi-
ness for funds from organized.labour and the·support of 
social ·'notables' for the efficient organization of the 
masses, the National Party was rapidly becoming a mass 
party. 1 9 With at least 170,000 individual members in 
1975, the National Party's membership was more than 
twelve times as great as the Labour Party's branch rnem-
bership and almost equalled Labour's branch and affiliated 
b h . b' d 20 mem ers lP corn 1ne • In the Canterbury-Westland region 
alone, the National .Party had 37,000 individual members, 
two and a half times as many as the Labour Party had in 
the entire country. 
If, as a mass party, the Labour Party was moribund 
in 1975, then, as the party of the working class, organized 
or otherwise, it was already dead. Having relinquished 
. 19. . On mass parties and cadre parties, see Duverger, 
Political Parties, pp. 63-71. Support for the 
Labour Party in the 1975 election campaign carne 
from the social •notables• who were the first 
'Citizens f,or Rawling'. 
2U Given the inactivity of the Labour Party's affiliated 
membership, the National Party's membership is better 
compared with Labour's branch, than total, membership. 
In the Auckland Boilermakers' Union, which is the 
most policy-oriented of all the party's affiliated 
unions, only about twelve of 600 members in Auckland 
City were active in the Labour Party in 1975. In 
other unions, therefore, the ratio of active to all 
affiliated members is probably lower. 
or been dispossessed of the power that they had once 
exercised in the party, the trade unions had ceased 
to be active participants in its internal politics. 
The party's working-class branch membership appeared 
to have been almost totally wiped out. Though the 
possibility of its ultimate rebirth could not be 
excluded, working-class politics in New Zealand, at 
least as represented by the Labour Party, had simply 
expired. 
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APPENDIX 
~----_--
1'U 
~LECTION M s 2 T 
tl919 4 3 7 
80.0 100.0 87 . .5 
1922 ~o. 10 4 1'-!· 
% 8).3 80.0 82.3 
tl-92.5 No. 2 7 9 
% 40.0 tJ_oo.o 7.5.0 
1928 No. 7 7 14 
% 63.6 87 . .5 73.7 
1931 No. 8 9 17 
% 72.7 69.2 70.7 
1935(~· 6 18 24 24.0 64-.J 4.5. 3 
TABlE 30 
OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS OF MEMBERS OF THE PLP 
B'X SAFE AND MARGINAL SEATS, 1919-7.5 
wcw PS P1~0F. 
-
1.T s T i':l .!.I:. s T ;.~ s T 
1 
-
1 -
- -
-
- -
' 
20.0 
-
12 . .5 . 
- - -
- - -
- 1 1 
-
-
-
1 
-
1 
-
20.0 .5.9 - - - 8. 3 . - .5-9 
1 
-
1 
- - -
1 
-
1 
20.0 - 8.3 
- - -
20.0 
-
8.3 
- - - - - -
3 - 3 
- - - -
- - 27.3 - 1_5.8 
-
1 1 
- - - 3 2 5 
- 7-7 4.2 - - - 27.3 15.4 20.8 
-
1 1 
- - - 5 6 11. 
- J.6 1.9 - - - 20.0 21.4 20.7.5 
B-F 
M s T !d 
- - - .5 
- - -
62 . .5 
1 
-
1 12 
8.3 
- .5-9 70.6 
1 
- 1 .5 
20.0 
-
8.3 41.7 
1 1 2 11 
9.1 12 . .5 10 . .5 .57-9 
-
1 1 1 
- 7-7 4.2 45.8 
14 3 17 25 
)6.0 10.7 32.1 47.2 
TOTAL 
s 
3 
37 . .5 
.5 
29.4 
. 
; 
7 
_58.3 
8 
42.1 
11 
_54.2 
28 
52.8 
T 
8 
10C 
17' 
10C 
12 
100' 
19 
100 
13 
10( 
53 
10d 
I 
1\J 
0 
...... 
TABLE 30 - Continued 
TU wcw PS ! 
~LECTION M s T M s I T M ! s Tl M 
No. 3 20 23 - 2 2 - - - 3 1938 
% 21.4 51.3 43.4 - 5.1 J.8 - - - 21.4 
1943 No. 6 16 22 - 2 2 1 - 1 7 
% 26.1 72.7 48.9 - 9.1 4.4 4.3 - 2.2 J0.4 
1946 No. 6 15 21 - 2 2 - 2 2 5 
% 33.3 62.5 so. a - 8.3 4.8 - 8.3 4.8 27.8 
1949 No. 5 11 16 - 2 2 2 1 3 5 
% 35.7 55.0 47.1 - 10.0 5.9 14.3 s.o 8.8 35-7 
1951 No. 5 7 12 - 3 3 1 1 2 4 
% 38.5 41.2 40.0 - 17.6 ~0.0 7-7 5.9 6.7 J0.7 
1954 No. 4 8 12 - 3 3 5 1 6 3 
% 30.8 36.4 J4.J - 13.6 8.6 38.5 4.5 17.1 23.1 
PROF. 1:3-F 
s T M s 
11 . 14 7 6 
28.2 26 .. 4 50.0 15.4 
2 9 9. 2 .. 
9.1 20.0 39.1 9.1 
3 8 7 2 
12.5 19.0 38.9 8.3 
2 7 2 4 
10.0 20.6 14.3 20.0 
3 7 3 3 
17.6 23.3 23.1 17.6 
7 10 1 3 
31.8 28·. 6 7-7 13.6 
T 
13 
24.S 
.11 
24.4 
9 
21.4 
6 
17.6 
6 
20.0 
4 
11.4 
·:roTAL 
M s 
14 39 
26.4 73.6 
23 22 
51.1 48.9 
18 24 
42.9 57.1 
14 20 
41.2 58.8 
13 17 
43.3 56.7 
13 22 
37.1 62.9 
! 
~ T 
53 
10d 
45. 
10C 
42 
10C 
34 
10C 
30 
10C 
35 
10C 
1\) 
0 
J\) 
30 - Continued 
TU wcw PS 
ELECTION lVI s T M s r ! T I M s T M 
1957 No.I 5 8 13 1 4 I 5 4 3 7 3 I 
% 33-3 30.8 31.7 6.? 15.4112.2 26.7 11.5 17.1 20.0 
1960 No.I 7 8 15 1 2 I 3 3 1 4 3 
% 46.7 42.1 44.1 6.7 10.5 8.8 2 1 • 0 5-3 11.8 20.0 
1963 No. 3 11 14 1 3 4 1 
':{ 4 4 
../ 
% 33-3 42.3 40.0 1.1 11.5 11.4 1 .1 .s 11.4 44.4 
1966 No. 6 10 16 2 1 3 - .2 2 2 
% 54.5 L~l. 7 45.7 8.2 4.2 8.6 - 8.3 5-7 18.2 
1969 6 7 13 1 2 3 3 2 5 3 
% . 3 31.8 32.5 5.6 9.1 7-5 . 7 9.1 12.5 16.7 
1972 No. 4 11 15 2 3 5 2 4 6 6 
% 20.0 31.4 27.3 0.0 8.6 9.1 10.0 .4 10.9 30.0 
1975 No. 4 6 10 2 - 2 3 1 4 8 
% I . 0 54.5 31.25 9-5 I - 6.25 14.3 9.1 12.5 38.1 I I 
' 
PROF. 
s T ! M s 
8 11 2 3 
. 
30.8 26.8 13.3 
-5 
I 5 8 1 3 
. 3 23.5 6.7 .8 
6 10 - 3 
23.1 28.6 - 11.5 
8 10 1 3 
33-3 28.6 9.1 12.5 
7 I 10 5 4 
.8 25.0 27.8 18.2 
11 17 6 6 
31.4 30.9 30.0 17.1 
2 10 4 2 
18.2 31.25 19.0 18.2 
T M. 
5 15 
12.2 36.6 
4 15 
11.8 44.1 
3 9 
8.6 25.7 
4 11 
11.4 31.4 
9 18 
-5 45.0 
12 20 
21.8 36.4 
6 21 
18.75 65.6 
TOTAL 
s 
26 
63.4 
19 
55-9 
26 
74.3 
24 
78.6 
22 
55.0 
35 
73.6 
11 
34.4 
T 
41 
100 
34 
100 
35 
100 
35 
100 
40 
55 
100 
32 
100 
1\.) 
0 
(...;l 
SOURCES: Results of General Elections (Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives, 1920-1970, H.JJ; 
1972, E.9); Nigel S. Roberts, "The New Zealand G~neral Election 
of 1972", in New Zealand Politics: A Reader, pp. 111-112; 
Who's Who in New Zealand, all eds. 
1 Marginal seats (i.e., seats vulnerable to swing against party 
of up to and including 7%, calculated on basis of majority as 
proportion of total vote). 
2 Safe seats (i.e., seats which would fall only if swing against 
party exceeded (j{.). 
3 One NIP, Mrs Catherine Stewart (wellington West), who was a 
hpusewife, has not been categorized, but her seat has been 
included in the total. 
1\) 
0 
..p.,. 
TABLE 31 
TRADE UNIONS AFFILIATED TO THE LABOUR PARTY, 1941: 
~·1EMBERSHIP AND CONFERENCE CARD VOTES AND DELEGATES 
Union 
Auckland Abattoir Assistants 
New Plymouth Acid and Fertilisers 
ASRS 
Baking Trades: 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Nel-son · 
Wellington 
Bi.scuit workers: 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Nelson 
Wellington 
Boilermakers: 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Bootmakers: 
Auckland 
christchurch 
Dunedin 
Wellington 
Brewery workers: 
New Zealand 
Dunedin 
Bricklayers: 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Vvellington 
Members 
1,264 
75 
13,000 
560 
290 
174 
32 
426 
942 
126 
350 
50 
220 
194 
100 
400 
450 
201 
359 
764 
202 
137 
60 
54 
Votes Dele-
gates 
4 
1 
27 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
9 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1· 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
l 
2 
1 
l 
Unfinancial 
205 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Union 
Brick, Tile and Potteryz 
Auckland 
Dunedin 
Brush and Broom: 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Butchers: 
Auckland 
Gisborne 
Granity Brakesmen and Bricklayers 
. 
Dunedin Canister Workers 
Caretakers: 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Auckland Caretak~rs & School Cleaners 
Carpenters: 
Auckland 
Blenheim 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Gisborrie 
Hawkes Bay 
Hutt 
Ne on 
Oamaru 
Otahuhu 
Palmerston North 
Taranaki 
Timaru 
Wellington 
Cement Workers: 
Dunedin 
Portland 
Chemical workers: 
. 
Otahuhu 
Wanganui 
Members Votes 
700 3 
140 
64 
30 
1 
l 
1 
Unfinancial 
30 
20 
40 
430 
551 
30 
2,877 
75 
461 
683 
140 
335 
408 
146 
75 
208 
346 
170 
66 
1,345 
240 
259 
300 
89 
l 
l 
l 
2 
3 
l 
7 
l 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
l 
1 
2 
2 
l 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
Dele-
gates 
2 
l 
l 
l 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
l 
206 
207 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Manufacturing and Chemists: 
Dunedin 80 1 1 
Wellington C rical Workers 4,892 11 7 
Canterbury Clothing Trades 1,100 4 4 
Coachworkers: 
Auckland 181 1 
Dunedin 80 1 
Nelson 1 
v, ellington . )0 1 1 
Grey Valley Colliery Workers 160 1 1 
New Zealand Cooks and Stewards 950 4 4 
Auckland Coopers 30 1 1 
~ellington Cool Store Employees 75 1 
Auckland Curriers 2) 1 l 
New Zealand Dairy Workers 2,675 7 2 
Buller Deputies 22 1 
Grey Valley Deputies & Underviewers 55 1 
Drivers: 
Auckland 3,218 8 2 
Blenheim 110 1 1 
Canterbury 1,171 4 4 
Gisborne 241 2 1 
Hawkes Bay 522 3 1 
Otago 699 3 1 
Taranaki 344 2 
Wellington 1,)01 5 4 
V\estland 186 1 
Electrical Workers: 
Auckland 1,18) 4 4 
Dunedin (wire) 80 1 1 
Dunedin (line) 126 1 
Taranaki 147 1 
Wellington 870 3 
208 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Engineers: 
New Zealand 5,260 12 6 
Westland 135 1 
Northern 2,597 7 1 
Ohinemuri 60 1 
New Zealand Engine Drivers 837 3 3 
Auckland Fellmongers 226 2 1 
Lunedin Felt Hatters 32 1 
Auckland Female.Printing 201 2 1 
Fire Brigades: 
.Auckland! 55 1 1 
Christchurch 50 1 
Lunedin 51 1 1 
Wellington 60 1 1 
Fish Workers: 
\',ellington 25 1 1 
Manawatu Flax ~orkers 210 2 2 
Flour 11 Employees: 
Auckland 100 1 
Christchurch 117 1 
Dunedin 30 1 
Timaru Unfinancial 
Oamaru 33 1 
Freezing Workers:· 
Canterbury 2,000 5 2 
Gisborne 280 2 
Moe rewa 198 1 1 
Nelson 30 1 
Otago & Southland 1,540 5 1 
cton 90 1 
Taranaki 351 2 2 
Wellington 3,075 8 8 
Fruit Canning: 
Auckland 272 2 1 
Nelson 97 1 
209 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Furniture Workers: 
Auckland 941 3 1 
Canterbury 350 2 1 
Dunedin 2)8 2 2 
Invercargill 100 1 
V:ellington 678 3 2 
Westland 11 1 
Christchurch Gardeners 120 1 1 
New Zealand Gas Workers 651 3 3 
Auckland Glass Workers 160 1 1 
Gold Dredge Workers: 
Colao Bay Unfinancial 
!\J'elson 15 1 
Otago 185 1 
v. estland 301 2 
Grocers: 
Gisborne 251 2 1 
North Canterbury 460 2 
Oamaru 40 1 
Hairdressers: 
Auckland 212 2 
Christchurch 110 1 1 
Otago & Southland 53 1 
New Zealand Harbour Board Employees 1,689 5 4 
Hotel V:orkers: 
Auckland 5,140 12 4 
Christchurch 2,114 6 2 
Taranaki 450 2 1 
Wellington 4, 733 11 4 
Otago 1,256 4 1 
Viestland 480 2 1 
Southland 455 2 1 
Nelson 200 1 1 
Marlborough 145 1 1 
210 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Dele-
Union N~embers Votes gates 
Iron and Brass rroulcl ers: 
Auckland Unfinancial 
Christchurch 148 1 
Dunedin 175 1 
Jewellers: 
Auckland 46 l 1 
Dunedin· 20 1 
Wellington· 52 1 1 
Labourers: 
Aucklanti General Unfinancial 
Auckland Local Body 1,804 5 3 
Christchurch 2,601 7 5 
DunecUn 1,484 4 4 
Oamaru 210 2 1 
Poverty Bay Unfinancial 
Taranaki 
V.anganui rnunicipal 135 1 
Wellington 3,700 9 2 
laundry Workers: 
Auckland 450 2 
Dunedin 51 1 1 
Timaru 40 1 
w.ellington 400 2 2 
01a tchworkers: 
v; ellington 60 1 1 
r::etalworkers: 
Dunedin 240 2 1 
Wellington Unfinancial 
~ilkroundsmen Auckland 250 2 1 
Miners: 
Blackball 50 1 
Brunner 100 1 
Denniston 340 2 1 
Inangahua 290 2 
Millerton 100 1 
TABl~ 31 - Continued 
Union 
Miners: (Continued) 
Nrsakawau 
Nir:;htcaps 
Northern 
Ohinemuri Mines & Batteries 
Otag;o 
Pakemiro 
Puponsa 
Roa 
Sec1donville 
State 
Thames 
Motion Picture Proj. Dunedin 
Municipal Clerical ~orkers Dunedin 
Musicians :·{. Z. 
Oyster Trades, Bluff 
Paint t Varnish, Auckland 
Painters: 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Napier 
Wellington 
Plasterers: 
Auckland 
Dunedin 
~.'z. Plumbers & Gasfitters 
!Yiembers 
220 
340 
1,000 
472 
232 
Votes 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
Unfinancial 
8 
66 
10 
400 
141 
30 
189 
1,065 
81 
35 
5J9 
J65 
182 
86 
420 
J50 
80 
1,409 
l 
l 
l 
2 
l 
l 
l 
J 
l 
1 
J 
2 
l 
l 
2 
2 
l 
4 
Dele-
gates 
1 
2 
l 
l 
1 
2 
l 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
l 
4 
211 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Union 
Pressers, Dunedin 
N.Z. Printing Trades 
Dunedin Printing Trades 
N.Z. Railway Tradesmen 
Green I. Rolling Mills Bmps. 
Rope Workers: 
Christchurch 
Dunedin. 
Auckland Roof Tilers 
Auckland Rubber WorkBrs 
Saddlers: 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Seamen: 
Auckland 
Dunedin 
\vellington 
Ships Tally Clerks: 
Lyttelton 
Wellington 
Shipwrights: 
Dunedin 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Shop Assistants: 
Blenheim 
Dunedin 
Members 
130 
1,815 
339 
2,128 
20 
31 
30 
72 
138 
139 
90 
900 
520 
1,139 
59 
76 
19 
122 
54 
165 
Dele-
Votes gates 
1 
5 
2 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Unfinancial 
212 
213 
TABLE 31 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Shop Assistants: (Continued) 
Gisborne Unfinancial 
Christchurch 1,600 5 2 
Wellington Unfinancial 
Steam Ferry Emps. Auckland (Devon) 108 1 1 
Auckland Stevedores 59 1 1 
Stonemasons: 
'Auckland 130 1 
Christchurch 39 1 1 
Wellington· Unfinancial 
Storemen & P~ckers: 
·Auckland 1,488 4 2 
Christchurch 763 3 2 
Napier 254 2 
Nelson 40 1 
Otago 620 3 2 
Birkenhead Sugarworkers 219 2 1 
Dunedin Tailoresses 250 2 1 
Auckland Tallymen 152 1 
Theatrical Workers: 
Dunedin 80 1 1 
Wellington 939 3 1 
N.Z. Timberworkers 7,210 16 4 
Wellin15ton Trade Union Sees. 37 1 1 
Tramwaymen: 
Auckland 1,035 4 1 
Christchurch 308 2 2 
Invercargill 47 1 
Dunedin 260 2 2 
Kaikorai Cable 30 1 
New Plymouth 43 1 
Vi ellington 845 J 2 
Vianganui 46 1 
Dunedin Tramway Officials 27 1 
Auckland Transport Boards (Inspect.) 36 1 
Auckland Transport Boards (Maintnce) 34 1 
Raglan Underground Officials 62 1 
TABlE 31 - Continued 
Union Members Votes 
Ohai Underviewers 21 1 
United Warehousemen, Wellington 1,424 4 
N.Z. Waterside Workers 6,203 14 
Timaru \\a terside Taily Clerks 12 1 
Woollen Mills Employees: 
Canterbury 365 2 
Otago & Southland 892 3 
v;e llington 920 3 
N.Z. v; orkers 28,000 57 
TOTAL 190,405 
::>OUHCE: NZLP, "Delegates Attending 1941 Annual 
Conference", 1941. 
Dele-
gates 
4 
6 
2 
8. 
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TABLE 32 
TRADE UNIONS AFFILIATED TO THE LABOUR PARTY, 1958: 
MEMBERSHIP AND CONFERENCE CARD VOTES AND DELEGATES 
Union 
Auckland Asbestos Workers 
Baking Trades: Dunedin 
Biscuit Workers: 
Auckland 
I!unedin 
i-l'elso n 
Boilermakers: 
Auckland 
Dunedin 
Bootmakers: 
Canterbury 
Dunedin 
Vi ellington 
Brewery v, orkers: 
New Zealand 
Dunedin 
Dunedin Brick, Tile & Potters 
Christchurch Bricklayers 
Butchers: 
Gisborne 
Nelson 
Dunedin Canister Workers 
Caretakers & Cleaners: 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Carpenters & Joiners: 
New Zealand 
Dunedin 
Auckland Chemical Workers 
Dunedin Mfg Chemists 
Members 
14,600 
81 
186 
533 
461 
70 
611 
98 
835 
240 
522 
1,006 
130 
170 
80 
62 
71 
50 
570 
400 
5,640 
745 
156 
228 
Votes 
31 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
13 
3 
1 
2 
Dele-
gates 
8 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
215 
TABLE 32 - Continued 
Union 
Clothing Trades: 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Wellington 
Dunedin Coachworkers 
V•ellington Chief Stewards 
Wellington Cool Store Workers 
Cooks & Stewards: 
Auckland 
Welling~on 
Auckland Coopers 
Dunedin Corporation Inspect9rs 
Auckland Cutters & Pressers 
v, ellington Dairy Workers 
Deputies: 
Buller 
Grey Valley 
Ohai 
Drivers: 
Canterbury 
Nelson 
Otago 
Westland 
Timaru 
Blenheim 
Dunedin Electrical Workers 
N.Z. Engineers 
Engine Drivers: 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
Westland 
Ferry Co. Employees 
F.ire Brigades: 
Auckland 
Dunedin 
Members 
2,361 
1,084 
4,202 
114 
13 
100 
225 
625 
36 
50 
480 
97 
60 
87 
28 
1,295 
50 
1,037 
240 
225 
208 
310 
19,376 
200 
144 
130 
75 
148 
134 
71 
Votes 
6 
4 
10 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
40 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Dele-
gates 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
216 
217 
TABLE 32 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Flax n,1ills, rllanawatu 200 1 1 
Flour Mills: 
Auckland 100 1 
Christchurch 100 1 
Dunedin 60 1 
Timaru 77 1 
Oamaru 30 1 
Freezing Workers: 
Canterbury· 2,500 6 
Gisborne 383 2 1 
Burnside 201 2 
f/IcLeod Soap Works 35 1 
Feilding 560 3 
Patea 637 3 
Tomoana 858 3 1 
Long burn 417 2 
Ngaruranga 443 2 2 
Waingawa 462 2 
Picton 156 1 
Auckland Fruit Preserving 401 2 1 
Dunedin Fur Trade 52 1 1 
Gasworkers: 
Canterbury 164 1 
Gisborne 27 1 
Westland Gold Dredge 92 1 1 
Grocers Assistants: 
Gisborne 451 2 1 
Otago 158 1 
Auckland Glassworkers 175 1 
Otago Hairdressers 65 1 
N.Z. Harbour Boards 1,880 5 3 
Auckland Hatters 65 1 
N.Z. Hotel Workers 20,568 43 3 
Ice Cream Workers: 
Auckland 50 1 
Wellington 108 1 1 
218 
TABLE 32 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Iron & Brass Moulders: 
Christchurch 118 1 
Dunedin 164 1 
Dunedin Jewellers 20 1 
Labourers: 
Auckland 700 3 2 
Poverty Bay 270 2 
Wanganui' 100 1 
v:ellington 2,472 6 4 
Canterbury 2,108 6 3 
Dunedin 700 3 
Dunedin Lime & Cement 159 1 
laundry Workers: 
Auckland 950 3 1 
Dunedin 150 1 
Dunedin Metal Workers 160 1 
f/finers: 
Blackball 168 1 
Brunner 195 1 1 
Denniston 240 2 
Canterbury 33 1. 
Mangapehi 86 1 
Millerton 110 1 
Ngakawau 153 1 
Nightcaps 377 2 
Ohura 70 1 
Otago 187 1 
Roa 70 1 
Runanga State 430 2 
Runanga Co-op 104 1 
Thames 34 1 
N.Z. Musicians 1,680 5 1 
Painters: 
Gisborne 48 1 
Christchurch 316 2 1 
Dunedin 132 1 
Wairarapa 37 1 
219 
TABLE·32 - Continued 
Union Members Votes Dele-gates 
Dunedin Plasterers 120 1 
N.Z. Plumbers & Gasfitters 1,606 5 2 
N.Z. Printing Trades 3,000 7 4 
N.Z. R.T.A. 2,020 6 2 
Dunedin I\ope & Twine Workers 34 1 
Wellington :Kubber Workers 271 2 1 
Wellington Saddlers 142 1 
Seamen: 
Auckland 789 3 1 
Dunedin 478 2 1 
v:ellington 900 3 2 
Lyttelton 57 1 
N.Z. Shipwrights 237 2 
Ship, Yacht & Boat Builders 210 2 
Blenheim Shop Assistants 222 2 
Auckland Stevedores 100 1 
Christchurch Stonemasons 40 1 
Storemen & Packers: 
Christchurch 1,447 4 2 
Napier 320 2 1 
Southland 305 2 
Auckland Sugar Workers 247 2 2 
Auckland Tailors 66 1 
Tally Clerks: 
Auckland 186 1 1 
Wellington 110 1 
Canterbury 45 1 
Theatrical Workers: 
New Zealand 1,364 4 1 
Dunedin 60 1 
Timber \'i orkers: 
South Auckland 2 2 
Westland 800 3 
v:ellington 1,700 5 1 
TABLE 32 - Continued 
Union Members Votes 
Tramwaymen: 
Auckland 878 3 
v, e llingtori 400 2 
Christchurch 300 2 
New Plymouth 32 1 
Dunedin 234 2 
Dunedin Transport Officials 20 1 
Waterside Workers: 
Wellington · 1,617 5 
Nelson 95 1 
New Plym'outh 300 2 
Timaru "136 1 
Westport 48 1 
Port Chalmers 200 l 
Napier 300 2 
Auckland ~harf Foremen 72 1 
Woollen r.:ills: 
Canterbury 830 3 
Wellington 620 3 
N.Z. Workers 13,533 29 
N.Z. Tobacco Workers 840 3 
TOTALS 142,097 
SOURCE: NZLP, "Delegates Attending 1958 Annual 
Conference", 1958. 
220 
Dele-
gates 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
l 
1 
1 
2 
7 
1 
TABLE 33 
TRADE UNIONS AFFILIATED TO THE LABOUR PARTY, 1975: 
~'lli;\mERSHIP AND CONFERENCE CARD VOTES AND DELEGATES 
Union 
Otago Biscuit Workers 
Ne on Biscuit Workers 
Auckland Boilermakers 
N.Z. Brewery Workers 
Nelson Butchers 
Waikato Carboni~ation Workers 
Wellington Caretakers & Cleaners 
N.Z. Carpent~rs 
Clothing Trades: 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Wellington 
Chief Stewards 
Wellington Dairy Workers 
Northern Drivers 
v.- es tland Drivers 
Dunedin ectrical.Workers 
N.Z. Engine Drivers 
Waikato Engine Drivers 
Westland Engine Drivers 
N.Z. Engineers 
North Shore Ferry Employees 
Timaru Flour Mill Employees 
Footwear Operatives: 
Canterbury 
Dunedin 
Wellington 
Foremen and Stevedores: 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Members Votes 
Unfinancial 
144 1 
926 3-
1 •t62 4" 
75 1 
33 1 
2,946 7 
1.5,123 32 
2,480 6 
870 3 
4,297 10 
Unfinancial 
37 1 
6,338 14 
319 
Unfinancial 
50 
26 
43,051 
25 
78 
1,187 
128 
682 
2 
1 
1 
88 
1 
1 
4 
1 
3 
150 1 
Unfinancial 
Dele-
gates 
3 
2 
1 
5 
2 
1 
4 
2 
11 
1 
3 
1 
1 
221 
TABLE 33 - Continued 
Union 
Freezing Workers:· 
Auckland 
Tomoana 
Wairoa 
Auckland Fruit Preservers 
Gisborne Gas Workers 
Gold Dredge Workers 
N.Z. Harbour Board Employees 
N.Z. Hotel Workers 
Wellington Ice Cream Workers 
Dunedin Iron'and Brass Moulders 
Labourers: 
Northern and Taranaki 
Wanganui Municipal 
·wellington 
Laundry Workers.= 
Canterbury 
Dunedin 
Westland 
f,1ea t Workers: 
Canterbury 
Gisborne 
~ilk Roundsmen's Union 
r~iners.: 
Allison 
Charming Creek 
Denniston 
Grey District Co-op. 
Rotowairo 
Runanga State 
National Union of Railwaymen 
Painters: 
Gisborne 
Christchurch 
Members Votes 
5,787 
1,400 
460 
400 
23 
38 
3,005 
29,457 
257 
100 
5., 786 
104 
1,080 
238 
360 
Unfinancial 
5,699 
836 
164 
90 
4 
93 
42 
150 
205 
11,300 
Unfinancial 
Unfinancial 
13 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
8 
60 
2 
1 
13 
1 
4 
2 
2 
13 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
24 
Dele-
gates 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
7 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
6 
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TABLE 33 - Continued 
Union 
N.Z. Plumbers & Gasfitters 
N.Z. Printing Trades 
N.Z. Railway Tradesmen 
Rubber Workers: 
Canterbury 
Wellington 
N.Z. Shipwrights 
Auckland Soap & Tannery.Workers 
Auckland Sugar Workers 
N.Z. Theatrical Workers 
Wellington Timber Workers 
Auckland Tramway Employees 
Christchurch Tramway Employees 
Dunedin Tramway Employees 
New Plymouth Tramway Employees 
Wellington Tramway Employees 
Waterside Workers: 
Auckland 
Gisborne 
Lyttelton 
Maunganui - Tauranga 
Napier 
Nelson 
New Plymouth 
Port Chalmers 
Timaru 
Wellington 
Westport 
Whangarei 
Auckland Wharf Foremen 
Members Votes 
1,602 
7,000 
2,098 
906 
505 
230 
Unf'inancial 
151 
484 
1,100 
783 
275 
110 
28 
362 
1,647 
96 
684 
655 
508 
113 
345 
134 
266 
1,239 
30 
102 
51 
5 
15 
6 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
5 
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
NZ Wood Pulp & Paper Products Emps. 1,802 5 
Woollen fflill Employees: 
Christchurch 
Oamaru 
Wellington 
TOTAL 
. 2 '816 
126 
900 
7 
1 
4 
419 
SOURCE: NZLP, "Delegates Attending 1975 Annual 
Conference", 1975. 
Dele-
gates 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
105 
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